February 25, 2003
Korea:
Background and Implications
I
thought it might be useful to know a little more about North Korea
than what is in the latest headlines, so I talked to a couple of
people who have a bit of expertise and knowledge of recent history.
Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute,
wrote Tripwire,
a book on Korea published in 1996. Chalmers Johnson, emeritus professor
of political science at the University of California and a long-time
specialist on Asian politics and strategic issues, is the author
of the recent (but published before 9/11) book Blowback:
The Costs and Consequences of American Empire.
What
follows, however, is my own attempt to synthesize what I've learned
from them and others (including a talk by Douglas D.M. Joo, president
of the Washington Times, who is sympathetic to the South
Korean side of things and may be close to South Korean intelligence,
though I don't know that for sure). If there are mistakes or shortcomings
because of incomplete or missing knowledge, the responsibility is
all on me.
THE LAST BASKETCASE
The
fundamental fact underlying the entire situation is that North Korea
is the last significant basket case of the communist era. During
the Cold War, for a variety of reasons, the North Korean bosses
adopted the entire panoply of Stalinist claptrap, including the
cult of personality of the Great Leader, and swallowed it whole,
with a few Asian variations that if anything made it more hard line
even than Stalin. They isolated themselves, cutting off contact
with almost all of the non-communist world and a fair amount of
the communist world, and stewed in their own juices.
As long as the Soviet Union was around as a communist
country, they were able to stave off some of the ruin that comes
from adopting such an economically absurd doctrine as communism,
in part by playing China and the Soviet Union off against one another
to maximize the aid and other forms of assistance they got from
both. Once the Soviet Union ceased to be formally communist and
became the diminished Russian Federation, without much interest
in buttressing the positions of titularly communist regimes that
don't border Russia directly, much of this kind of assistance dried
up.
China,
which shares a border and quite a bit of history with North Korea
(and has been working to move beyond communism without actually
admitting it has given up on the old religion), has propped up the
North Korean regime to some extent. But propping up an inherently
unstable and destructive system can go only so far. What North Korea
needs is to bring itself into the international marketplace –
and although I don't know this directly, I'd be surprised if the
Chinese hadn't been telling the North Korean leaders just this,
in no uncertain terms.
THE CHINESE EXAMPLE
That's
essentially what the Chinese have been doing, although in fits and
starts and with hesitations and second thoughts. They have to some
extent recreated markets within China (though not with the kind
of solidly protected private property rights one would like to see),
and have agreed to abide by enough of the international rules of
the managed-quasi-capitalist road to gain admission to the World
Trade Organization. In general, for the last couple of decades,
they have chosen the strategy of economic liberalization first,
while delaying or denying efforts at political liberalization. The
Soviets, on the other hand, chose (or were pushed by events and
circumstances into) political liberalization first, without a clear
plan for economic liberalization; the political regime collapsed
and they got gangsterism in economics rather than capitalism.
So far the economic results for China have been fairly
gratifying, although the process of building a quasi-market economy
and a larger middle class is creating social instabilities that
will have political implications before too long. I don't know if
the Chinese leaders have real plans to deal with political instability;
my advice would be to abdicate, decentralize, and de-emphasize politics,
but being political animals they probably won't do so.
CLUMSY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
So
here's what I think is at least a possibility with North Korea.
The leaders have gotten the message, or have been pushed by events
and homegrown misery into acknowledging that it's time to give up
the lone-wolf quasi-Stalinist path and rejoin the world. But for
reasons of pride and political face, they can't just say (as even
democratic and relatively rational political leaders find it hard
to do), "well, we were wrong all those years, and now we're
trying to go straight." The leaders fear (perhaps with some
reason) that if they were to be that honest the people would rise
up and kill them before they got a chance to ease their way onto
a different path.
For the better part of the last 10 years, North Korea
and South Korea have been groping toward some form of workable rapprochement.
Various steps, including brief visits, some family reunification,
some South Korean investment in North Korea and a few steps toward
joint ventures have been taken. The new South Korean government
just elected is even more committed to eventual rapprochement (although
probably not reunification, as I'll discuss a little later), and
is also increasingly ready to reconsider certain aspects of South
Korea's longstanding alliance with the United States, which includes
the stationing of 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea. Those troops,
which have always been more tripwire than effective defense, have
become a source of aggravation to many South Koreans. But how do
the North Koreans get the United States to reconsider the longstanding
relationship of mutual hostility? Unfortunately, being still somewhat
under the spell of communist ideology as well as more general theories
of how power politics is done, they seem to think (even as many
in the U.S. think about the rest of the world) that only power,
strength and threats will work; it's the only thing "those
people" understand. So they choose bluster and confrontation
rather than conciliation and offering compromise in advance. Consequently,
much or most of what they have done has been clumsy and counterproductive.
BLUSTER WITH BLUSTER
Unfortunately,
most of the U.S. response to clumsy North Korean overtures has also
been clumsy and counterproductive. After the 1994 confrontation
over North Korean efforts to develop nuclear weapons, the Clinton
administration (through Jimmy Carter) came to an agreement to supply
energy and the material to build nuclear power plants that couldn't
be converted to weapons use (North Korea has few resources for producing
electric energy – no known petroleum deposits and no rivers capable
of being dammed for power).
But the Clinton administration, probably figuring
along with many of us that the North Korean regime was so inherently
unstable that it would fall of its own weight fairly soon, delayed
for years on making good on the U.S. end of the bargain. But the
regime didn't collapse. Instead, it felt betrayed and restarted
the nuclear program – which it might never have abandoned completely
in the first place.
The Bush administration, with a great deal more attitude
than knowledge, decided to include North Korea in the rhetorically
satisfying "axis of evil" last year, and then to expose
North Korean violations of the 1994 agreement last October. Unfortunately,
it did so without anything resembling a plan to deal with whatever
response North Korea might make (perhaps without even imagining
North Korea would come up with a response) at a time when it was
preoccupied with Iraq. So it has backed and filled, substituting
tough-sounding statements for policy. The North Koreans, who are
probably shrewder and think longer-term than the typical U.S. diplomat,
have taken advantage of the lack of anything resembling a coherent
U.S. policy to make ever more bellicose statements, probably thinking
this will get them a better deal when Uncle Sam finally decides
to pay full attention. Most of the people I talked to don't think
they want war or even military confrontation with the United States,
but they have been isolated for a long time and don't understand
the U.S. very well. So the possibility for a miscalculation that
leads to military hostilities is there.
NEIGHBORLY PROPPING UP
What
many of us didn't appreciate is that for their own reasons, most
of North Korea's neighbors don't want the regime to collapse altogether,
although that might be the most karmically satisfying development
for leaders who became so entranced with their own power. Both the
Chinese and the South Koreans fear a massive influx of essentially
starving refugees with few if any resources for starting new lives
and few useful skills for achieving anything like independence.
The South Koreans have been studying German reunification
(I remember meeting with a delegation of South Korean diplomats
and academics about a decade ago when the project was just getting
underway) and they have decided that it was enormously expensive
to West Germany. They would prefer to achieve some kind of rapprochement
that would allow North Korea to reenter the modern world and cease
to be a permanent looming threat to Seoul, but without formal reunification
with South Korea. So they would prefer to keep propping up the North
Korean regime until something better can be worked out, rather than
encouraging the regime to collapse. Both China and South Korea also
have concerns about what would happen to much of North Korea's military
materiel if the regime should collapse. So both have an interest,
at least for now, in keeping Kim's absurd dictatorship going for
now, and easing its transition into a more normal regime with something
resembling normal relations with the rest of the world. This desire
not to unleash possible chaos (besides being the natural inclination
of most political leaders, who tend to equate not changing things
much with stability) is reinforced by the military situation. South
Korea's capital, Seoul, is about 30 miles from the demilitarized
zone (DMZ), an aftermath of the armistice that ended the Korean
War in the 1950s. The North could batter Seoul and inflict lots
of casualties with artillery. Missiles, whether tipped with something
nuclear or not, could be devastating. And it is doubtful that a
pre-emptive strike against North Korea, even one backed by the full
force and fury of the United States, would eliminate the North's
ability to inflict devastation on the South. In addition, the North
tested a missile that arched over Japan back in 1998 or 1999. So
Japan knows full well that if the North has even one nuclear warhead,
it has the potential to inflict massive damage on Japan. So Japan
has an interest in no conflict getting started.
ENTER THE EAGLE
For
whatever set of reasons, however – it might be recognition of sole-superpower
status, desire to bring in the country that wields what it perceives
as the real, decisive power, a perception that it can get a better
deal from naïve Uncle Sam than from neighbors who understand
the situation better, or just the desire to tweak the United States'
beak – North Korea has announced that it wants to deal with the
United States and only with the United States. And since the Korean
War was concluded without a formal armistice but with a cease-fire
and stalemate, it has the justification that North Korea and the
United States are formally at war, and that situation has to be
resolved before anything else can happen. Becoming the sole bargainer
and sole guarantor of peace in the region is about the last thing
the United States – for diplomatic, military, priority-setting and
political-testosterone prestige reasons – wants. But it could come
to that anyway.
Unfortunately, the United States really has no good
options in the situation. It is only partially because U.S. intelligence
believes North Korea might have a couple of usable nukes that North
Korea holds so many cards. There's also the conventional military
capability that puts South Korea at risk, along with Chinese and
Japanese concerns about what could happen either if a genuine military
conflict started or the North Korean regime collapsed and started
producing starving and destabilizing refugees. So far the Chinese
– and other regional powers, including Taiwan – have been content
to watch the United States stew, delay, and generally look weak
and indecisive over North Korea. They have no interest in a full-on
confrontation developing, in part because it could easily spill
over in ways that could cause them great damage. But they don't
mind if the arrogant and sometimes clueless United States gets its
political nose bloodied a bit before things are settled.
GETTING ATTENTION
Doug
Bandow has argued that the best way to get the full attention of
North Korea and its neighbors would be to withdraw the American
troops who serve more as a tripwire and an irritant than as an effective
defense anyway. That would make it clear that the United States
is not going to get stuck with full responsibility for whatever
mistakes and blunders North Korea might make in the near future.
It would then become clear to all concerned, in a way that could
not be conveyed by words and statements alone, that it's up to North
Korea's neighbors to figure out how to ease North Korea into the
modern globalized world with as little destruction and violence
as possible.
Perhaps it would be best simply to announce that the
U.S. has decided that prudence suggests it is time to withdraw those
troops, possibly as part of a larger policy of reconsidering current
commitments in light of the new demands of the War on Terror. Or
we might quietly let the South Koreans know that they are in a position
to offer the North the withdrawal of U.S. troops (possibly after
some brave-sounding demands and declarations of independence from
the South) if Pyongyang will start behaving itself when it comes
to nuclear weapons and openness to trade and diplomacy. There might
well be other ways to accomplish U.S. disengagement from North Korea.
But it seems fairly clear that such disengagement is the best way
to defuse the potentially dangerous situation the North has been
fomenting. North Korea's neighbors might not handle the problem
of bringing the country into a normal relationship with the rest
of the world perfectly; indeed, it is almost certain they will make
mistakes along the way. But as the country with the most directly
at stake, they have the most incentive to proceed carefully. And
getting the United States out of the equation will reduce the likelihood
that mistakes will lead to a worldwide or large-scale conflict rather
than a regional problem.
Alan Bock
comments
on this article?
|
|
Please
Support Antiwar.com
Antiwar.com
520 South Murphy Avenue #202 Sunnyvale, CA 94086
or
Contribute Via our Secure Server Credit Card Donation Form
Your
contributions are tax-deductible
|