March
6 , 2002
The
War Comes Home
I
could be imagining it, but I thought I detected some notes of bitterness
as Charles Gibson of ABC-TV's "Good Morning America" interviewed
the wife and twin brother of Chief Warrant Officer Stanley Harriman
of North Carolina, one of seven or eight Americans killed on the
ground in Afghanistan last Saturday. The family members said all
the right things that military families are supposed to say
that their loved one died in a good cause, that it's important to
keep the terrorists on the run, that their faith allowed them to
believe that Stanley was in a better place now.
But I thought they were on the verge of a barely controlled "why
us?" explosion. Or maybe not. But one could certainly understand
some bitterness. Since Somalia in 1993, the United States, while
hardly being shy about intervening in various disputes, has sought
assiduously to avoid U.S. combat casualties. Even as commentators
in various conservative and neoconservative organs bravely proclaimed
that U.S. military strategists were underestimating the American
people, that we were prepared to deal with combat casualties, American
planners did combat conservatively, in an existential sense.
We
bombed from 15,000 feet in Bosnia and Kosovo, then sent troops mostly
to places that were already secured, to do police and social-worker
duty rather than combat. In Afghanistan we bombed first, then used
the Northern Alliance as frontline troops. Even in the clean-up
and chasing phase after the fall of Kandahar and Kabul, the U.S.
tried to use local surrogates (and bombs, of course) rather than
confronting fortified cave positions directly.
THE
OTHER POOR SON-OF-A-BITCH
There's
nothing terribly wrong with a policy of trying to minimize casualties.
Most Americans are probably more than sympathetic to Gen. Patton
as portrayed by George C. Scott, who cinematically reminded his
troops that the idea of war was not to die for your country but
to make the other poor son-of-a-bitch die for his country. Even
if the cause is glorious, death in combat is far from pleasant or
desirable.
Those
who remain behind when loved ones die may justify the death as being
in a good cause, note that their beloved was doing what he was trained
to do, and even feel a certain sense of pride. But at some level
there is also deep-seated devastation as the realization sets in
that the person to whom they had pledged their life will never return
home.
It
has probably been wise for U.S. planners to try to avoid combat
casualties, and until this past weekend they had been able to do
so (assuming that even though those who die in training missions
or simulations are gone just as irrevocably, somehow it seems different
than being killed by an enemy). The American casualties in Somalia
were politically intolerable (almost) because most Americans could
see no relationship between those deaths and anything resembling
a core national interest. And despite all the propaganda about genocide
and Milosevic, few Americans identified a strong and compelling
U.S. interest in Bosnia or Kosovo, beyond helping out the Europeans
and being generic good guys.
A
DIFFERENT ATTITUDE?
Apparently,
however, it has become virtually impossible to rely on bombs and
surrogates in Afghanistan. Among the stories that seem plausible
it might be months or years before reliable narratives can
be assembled the United States seems to have discovered in
the Tora Bora campaign that when you pay ad hoc military groups
to do the job, the job sometimes doesn't get done, and sometimes
the money simply disappears. So the decision was made to put U.S.
troops in the front lines, and when that happens casualties are
virtually inevitable.
I
sense that at least for now the attitude toward U.S. combat casualties
is a little different than toward tussles in Somalia, Bosnia and
elsewhere. The United States was attacked on September 11, after
all, and the evidence is that al-Qaida was at least a sponsor of
that terrorism. As long as the United States is going after people
with at least some plausible connection to the terror attacks, I
suspect, the American people will tolerate some American deaths.
I
don't know of any reliable or scientific way to predict when the
number of casualties might become intolerable to most people, if
it ever happens. We were well on the way to the 47,393 Americans
killed in Vietnam before opposition to the war became popular, or
even generally acceptable. Some 109 Americans were killed in the
Persian Gulf War, and few Americans consider that death toll unacceptably
high.
Things
are a little different now even than during the Gulf War, however.
We have already begun to see images of the flag-draped caskets on
the way home. With several cable outlets doing news 24/7, every
step of the process, from picking up bodies to placing them on airplanes
for Europe or the United States, to interviews with grieving families
and service buddies, all highlighted by commentary from supposed
experts, will be played out repeatedly and almost interminably.
It might even crowd out a couple of sensational trials for a few
weeks. The impact might be intensified beyond what could be expected
from sheer numbers of American dead.
MARCHING
THROUGH GEORGIA
If
U.S. casualties are now to be expected in Afghanistan, and tolerated
so long as there is a credible connection to the hunt for al-Qaida
(and maybe even the elusive Osama bin Laden), one wonders how Americans
will respond to what is beginning to look like a firm and relatively
open-ended commitment to fight various guerrillas in Georgia, formerly
a Soviet province but with a history that predated even Russian
imperial domination, on the black sea between Russia and Turkey.
Even the intelligence Web site Stratfor.com,
which is hardly known as a pacifist outpost, suggested
in its daily briefing last Friday, that
"U.S.
intervention in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia is not so
much to fight terrorists but to establish a 'firm foothold' in the
Caucasus region in order to protect its access to the vast oil reserves
of the Caucasus and Central Asia, according to official Russian
sources. The Voice of Russia World Service, an official broadcasting
arm of the Russian government, characterized reports of an imminent
U.S. Military presence in Georgia as 'shocking news.'"
The
U.S. media have been fed stories of legions of al-Qaida fighters
taking refuge and maybe even the elusive Osama! in
the rugged, 65-km-long Pankisi Gorge, and it may well be that there
are some al-Qaida fighters there. But the region has long been a
haven for guerrillas, smugglers and crooks of all kinds.
It
is likely there are Chechen fighters taking refuge there or planning
new attacks in the region Russia insists must be kept part of Russia
rather than gaining independence. And there seems to be some evidence
although it's a little tenuous that a few more than
a mere token number of those helping the Chechens have been Islamic
militants, some with al-Qaida ties. But it is hardly the case that
Georgia and its Pankisi Gorge are the world headquarters of a large,
active, international terrorist organization that even now has the
United States in its sights.
GETTING
INTO LONG-STANDING FEUDS
The
fighting and infighting in Georgia and surrounding regions is baffling
in complexity and of considerable duration. Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze, a former Soviet foreign minister, is viewed as something
of loose cannon by most Russians, and he is certainly capable of
convoluted political plotting. And there are plenty of feuds and
conflicts in the region that have little relationship to fundamentalist
Islam or al-Qaida, but which U.S. forces could be drawn into easily.
The
sometimes reliable (sometimes not) Internet service DEBKAfiles
even speculates that
"when
Shevardnadze knew U.S. Forces were coming to Tbilisi [Georgia's
capital], these Russian officers contend, he opened the door for
Chechen insurgents hiding in the Pankisi Gorge to skip with their
al-Qaida comrades over to the Kodori Gorge on the Abkhazia-Georgia
border. That move is seen as he opening shot in his plan to remove
the Russian Army peacekeepers restraining the Georgians from attacking
and reclaiming the breakaway province of Abkhazia and igniting another
ethnic war."
The
point is that Georgia is a volatile region with plenty of political
complications, few of which have anything to do with international
terrorism or al-Qaida. Georgia itself may be playing the oldest
game in the geopolitical quiver bringing in the faraway great
power to counterbalance the great power next door. Whether the American
public will show tolerance for casualties in a conflict that is
almost certainly a diversion from anything resembling a bonafide
war on terror is a question to which we might have an answer sooner
than we would prefer.
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