May
28, 2002Creating
a New Axis A
good deal of President Bush’s trip to Russia and Europe amounted to the kind of
image-polishing and schmoozing most U.S. presidents do at various times. U.S.
presidents usually spend about two years trying to work on their purported domestic
agenda before figuring out that they look a lot more “presidential” when traveling
overseas than when snorting at the trough with Congress or nattering about senior
prescription benefits. So they attend receptions and visit schools and hospitals,
and it’s much more mediagenic (and less contentious) than amendments to farm bills
or details of regulatory restructuring. George W. Bush had foreign affairs thrust
upon him by the September 11 attack, and perhaps just in time as he had passed
most of his exceedingly modest domestic agenda and didn’t look to have very much
to talk about between now and 2004. So he has the advantage of being almost forced
to take on the foreign-policy president role most presidents embrace in the third
year or second term – and to appear to do so as a result of a vicious attack rather
than sagging poll numbers and stalled domestic policy.
It just could be,
however, that this trip will serve as a marker for an interesting and potentially
significant shift in the world power balance. President Bush and President Putin
of Russia seem to have developed a genuine coziness, and it’s beginning to be
reflected in alliances and policies. By signing the nuclear warhead reduction
treaty and talking about the U.S. getting more of its petroleum from Russia, the
two presidents may be signaling a Russo-American entente. The Bush-Putin relationship
seems to have more practical policy implications than the apparent Clinton-Yeltsin
warmth, and it could alter power relationships around the world.
PERSONAL
OR POLITICAL
Whether this new and
warmer relationship lasts may depend on whether it is based more on personal warmth
between the two presidents or on a perception of shared interests. Bush apparently
has great confidence in his own intuitive senses and personal BS detector when
sizing people up, and by all accounts he seems genuinely drawn to Putin, even
though one is inclined to be a bit skeptical of Dubya’s ability to look into his
soul.
Since Bush didn’t demonstrate any great interest in international
affairs, let alone a fascination with history, diplomacy or any of the related
dark arts prior to becoming president, it might be justifiable to worry just a
bit about his apparent willingness to commit the United States to relationships
and agreements on the basis of his instincts and feelings, without much historical
background or knowledge of contexts that could make relationships notably more
complex than can be handled by two simpatico men on the phone.
For example,
Putin faces a fairly delicate problem of improving the relationship with the United
States while not appearing too eager to embrace the West, especially to some of
the more conservative elements of the Russian military. To be sure, Putin is hardly
a natural democrat who is disinclined to move forward on a policy or decision
until he is sure he has the majority of informed opinion with him (but then, neither
is Bush), but he does have to take domestic opinion into account.
The persistence
of suspicion of America in certain Russian quarters, the existence of what might
becalled a fallen-superpower syndrome that makes Russians even touchier than usual
could constrain Putin’s freedom of action or ability to deliver on implied promises
to Bush. One wonders how aware Bush might be of such constraints or complications.
THE
BARGAIN
Whether all parties are
aware of complications or truly able to deliver, however, the U.S. and Russian
leaders seem to have made several implicit bargains. The nuclear warhead reduction
is essentially superficial; it needs to be formalized only for appearance’s sake.
More important is the determination of the two countries to be “strategic partners”
in ensuring the stability of world energy markets. Translation: Bush isn’t too
sure Saudi Arabia is going to continue to be a reliable supplier, especially if
an attack on Iraq complicates matters there. So he’s looking to Russia to be a
back-up and perhaps eventually the primary supplier of petroleum to the United
States, especially if the effort to get Congress to approve drilling in the Alaskan
wilderness continues to fail.
In addition the U.S. gets an implied Russian
blessing to continue to operate in Georgia, Tajikistan and other parts of Central
Asia. There might be semi-legitimate concerns about terrorists operating there,
but these countries are of interest to the United States chiefly because of petroleum
or petroleum transportation potential. In addition, of course, they provide a
handy back door through which to keep an eye on China, which has disappeared from
the media radar but not from the screens of U.S. diplomats and strategists. China
is keenly aware of this potential and more than a little concerned about the new
U.S.-Russian coziness. Finally, the U.S. gets at least tacit approval from
Russia to conduct the continuing war on terrorism, even if it involves attacking
Iraq and taking out Saddam Hussein. Russia might not provide material support,
but it is unlikely to raise the kind of diplomatic and “world community” obstacles
it did during the Kosovo bombing operation and the Bosnian exercise in establishing
a garrison in an imperial outpost.
WHAT RUSSIA GETS
In
exchange, Russia gets several things, some concrete and some ephemeral. Perhaps
most important to Putin, it gets tacit U.S. consent that the brutal exercise in
suppressing rebels in Chechnya is to be viewed as a part of the noble worldwide
war on terror rather than an illegitimate effort to keep the old empire together
regardless of the wishes of the subjects. Since Putin rode to power to a great
extent on his promise to deal harshly with Chechnyan rebels (perhaps helped by
staged "atrocities"), deflecting U.S. and Western criticism of the rather
nasty way the Russians are going about the Chechnyan operation is important. Russia
also gets a virtual promise of U.S. help getting in to the World Trade Organization.
WTO membership, in an ideal world, would be viewed as a mixed blessing at best.
But in today’s world, it provides a member country with more access to trade and
investment, so Putin, who seems to be shaping up as something of an ultimate pragmatist,
no doubt values it. The U.S. also implicitly promises a new NATO-Russian relationship,
the shape of which is not clear yet but is clearly supposed to be beneficial to
Russia. Bush was also specific about wanting to repeal the old Jackson-Vanik restrictions
on trade, enacted in the 1970s to encourage the old Soviet Union to ease up on
persecution of Soviet Jews or to allow them to emigrate.
Despite some lip-service
scolding from Bush and U.S. diplomats, Russia also gets a bit of a pass on its
relationship with Iran. It seems likely that Russia is getting hard cash when
it sells missile and nuclear technology to Iran, which is valuable to Russia.
So the U.S. and Russia will agree to disagree and postpone any potential showdown
over the issue, even though President Bush previously included Iran in his fanciful
“Axis of Evil."
NEW AND MAYBE DISTURBING
All
this U.S.-Russian coziness is an interesting and in some ways surprising development.
Most observers expected Russia to be especially dismayed over the Bush administration’s
decision to go ahead with some sort of missile defense system. But after a pro
forma protest, Putin apparently shrugged it off and decided it was more important
to build a new relationship with the United States than to let old missile-defense
wounds stand in the way.
The closer U.S.-Russian relationship, however,
seems deeply disturbing to many Western European countries. As the Bush-Putin
relationship gets closer, many Europeans are worried that the U.S. doesn’t consider
Western Europe to be the center of the geopolitical universe any more. They’re
right. The U.S. has achieved the kind of hegemonic power that it thinks it can
go it alone, without Europe, on most of adventures it really wants to undertake.
As U.S. planners seem to see it, it would be nice to have European support and
it is worth expending some effort to deflect or defuse potential European criticism.
But when it comes down to it, who needs them.
Thus the European aspect
of Bush’s trip amounts to handholding and reassurance. He probably hoped that
his speech in Berlin would win unanimous support from the EU countries for an
invasion of Iraq. But he’s realistic enough not to be surprised that unconditional
support was not forthcoming. Still, he would prefer not have Western European
countries sniping at his heels when the U.S. finally does decide to invade Iraq.
So,
as in some marriages, even as the U.S. and Western Europe are drifting apart,
Bush is making the effort to reassure the nervous Europeans that we are closer
than ever, that NATO is more central to U.S. plans and strategies than before,
that we would never think of doing anything rash without consulting our oldest
friends and allies. Pay no attention to the fact that we have rented apartments
not only in Moscow but also in St. Petersburg. They’re strictly for srictly-business
trips. No hanky-panky.
In fact, it could be that momentous power shifts
are underway, and almost everybody knows it.
MEMORIAL
DAY MISGIVINGS
The celebrations,
at least as shown on television, of Memorial Day this year reinforce what an enormous
favor the September 11 terrorists did for the power structure in the United States.
The concert from Washington, DC, shown on PBS (which I watched because it contained
some of the kind of music I prefer – and because I thought it might be a barometer)
featured endless ruminations from family members related to firefighters killed
in the terrorist assault.
It couldn’t help but tug at the heartstrings
of almost any American, but I couldn’t help noticing how well the powers-that-be
used the event to engender support for whatever is next in the long imperial war
on terror. It helps enormously to have not only completely innocent victims, but
people who knowingly put themselves at risk for the sake of others, having been
forced to do so by a dastardly attack.
The American establishment hasn’t
had many credible heroes to celebrate since – well, maybe since World War II.
There was heroism in the Vietnam War, certainly, but the war was ultimately unpopular
and many Americans chose to revile rather than celebrate the military. The splendid
little incursions of the Reagan-Bush I-Clinton eras offered little opportunity
for personal heroism and were undertaken in the pursuit of foreign policy goals
that were not very well articulated or understood.
With the exception of
Gulf War I, an understandable military adventure that got American blood stirring
and was over before it could create too many casualties and complications, the
little incursions have been mostly desultory, winning mile-wide-inch-deep support
from Americans who just couldn’t bring themselves to feel invested in “nation-building”
in Somalia, Haiti, Lebanon, Bosnia or elsewhere.
But now we have innocent
victims, brave heroes, righteous indignation, and implicit permission to connect
with World War II and other more positively remembered military exploits. Truly
the terrorists did U.S. authorities and leaders a great favor, the opportunity
to bolster and buttress their power. Please
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