February 20, 2002
CIA: Avoiding Reform
A
joint Senate and House select committee is planning an investigation not just
into possible lapses by the CIA and other government intelligence agencies immediately
prior to September 11, but into the "intelligence community's" response
to terrorism over the past 16 years. While the investigation might unearth a
few interesting tidbits, it is unlikely to be as bold or far-reaching as is
warranted by the magnitude of the U.S. intelligence failure. And it is even
less likely to be the thoroughgoing re-examination of the real intelligence
needs – of the United States in the post-Cold War era that many Americans would
welcome.
That's
too bad. The terrorist attack represented a huge intelligence failure by the
U.S. government, one that should have more Americans – and the supposed watchdogs
in Congress and other branches of the government – asking lots of pointed questions
about just what they're doing with all the tax money they spend. What we're
more likely to get is a polite inquiry conducted by intelligence insiders with
a vested interest in not rocking too many boats.
Of
course, trying to determine the intelligence needs of a country without a real
debate, with all possible options on the table, over what the foreign policy
of the United States should be, is putting that cart before the horse. Since
the collapse of communism, however, most people with an interest in foreign
policy have studiously avoided addressing fundamental questions about policy
that might undermine some of the ill-defined assumptions that now underlie foreign
policy. So we have drifted from engagement to engagement, and now into a war,
without anything resembling a clear picture of that U.S. objectives in the world
should be – let alone what the concrete objectives (as opposed to abstract concepts
like "defeating evil") of a war on terrorism should be.
A
COMMITTEE OF LACKEYS
According
to the Washington
Post, this will be the first time House and Senate intelligence committees
headed by members of different political parties have combined to do an investigation.
Senate leaders are said to have been a bit apprehensive about the idea, since
they wouldn't have complete control of the committee. The best evidence, however,
is that the new joint committee will not be in business to embarrass anybody.
House
Intelligence Committee Chairman Porter Goss is a Florida Republican, Senate
Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham is a Florida Democrat. Both consulted
with the ranking members of the opposite party before hammering together a deal.
California Democrat Nancy Pelosi, the ranking House committee member appears
to be the only potential fly in the prescribed "it was a tragic failure,
it's not our fault, give us more money" ointment. She is on record supporting
a broader commission to study September 11, and has made it clear that her acquiescence
in the joint committee idea doesn't rule out the idea of a broader, perhaps
more independent commission.
But
those who are on the intelligence committees in both houses of Congress are
generally loyal friends of the "community" who have become accustomed
to confidential briefings and have been tested to see to it that they don't
leak secret material at least not too promiscuously. It's not quite accurate
to call all of them lapdogs Republican Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama has been
critical of George Tenet, the current CIA director. But they are by and large
all too susceptible to the argument that there's a war on, the intelligence
community has lots to do, and now is not the time to be scratching at scabs
from the past.
THE
FIX IS IN?
Last
Thursday Sen. Graham announced that they had hired someone to run their investigation,
and all of a sudden most objections and reservations about the investigation
melted away. According to a fax sent out a couple of days ago by the Center
for Security Project – Frank Gaffney's superhawk policy and lobbying outfit
– "it is no more reasonable to expect Britt Snider to be thorough, let
alone independent, than it would be if Enron's general counsel had been tapped
to run hearings into his company's melt-down."
Who
is L. Britt Snider and why do the hawks think he won't conduct a no-holds-barred
investigation? Here's how the CSP puts it: "Mr. Snider is George Tenet's
guy. When Tenet was staff director for the Senate Intelligence Committee in
the late 1980s during which period he forged close personal and professional
ties with many of the legislators now charged with overseeing his conduct the
future CIA Director made Snider the panel's general counsel. Later, when Tenet
was appointed the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), he asked Snider to
be his 'special advisor,' in which capacity the latter served for two years.
Then, in 1999, Director Tenet persuaded President Clinton to give this hand-picked
and reliable subordinate the role of in-house watchdog, the CIA's Inspector
General."
So
the investigation – at least the investigation conducted by the House-Senate
joint committee – will be run by an insider, one of the boys. And not just one of the boys, but a special
favorite of CIA Director George Tenet. Some of the Senate members might get
unruly in the next few months the staff is expected to investigate and
gather material for the next two months, whereupon hearings that could last
until July are expected – but the staff director, who will have effective control
over the scope and nature of the investigation, will be a reliable from Mr.
Tenet's perspective.
DENIAL,
DENIAL
All
this might not be so bad if CIA Director George Tenet had ever acknowledged,
as a number of current and retired intelligence officials have, that the September
11 attacks revealed serious problems with the way his agency and other intelligence
agencies have gone about their business over the last decade. There have certainly
been plenty of gaps to lament, and a surprising number of people willing to
lament them.
But
Tenet has generally apologized without content, claiming that it would have
been simply impossible to detect or prevent the September 11 attacks and overall
the CIA was doing a superb job. That's almost laughable about an agency that
since the collapse of the Soviet empire has lurched from one temporary task
to another – thinking about economic espionage here, talking about tracking
former Soviet nukes and generally flailing – seeking to find a role that would
justify its continued expensive existence in the post-Cold War world. It might
have focused on terrorism but didn't.
You
don't have to believe, as I do, that we would be better off dismantling the
CIA as an institution, dumping the deadwood, and starting over from scratch,
with a more clearly defined mission and sense of mission, to believe that significant
reform is desirable in America's vaunted "intelligence community."
The current investigation is more likely to resemble a friendly whitewash –
with some mistakes admitted and many more covered up – than the kind of thoroughgoing
no-holds-barred bottom-up investigation this country deserves in the wake of
such a calamity.
Democratic
Sen. Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, in calling for a Warren Commission-like
investigative effort – which might or might not be all that effective – has
pointed out another obvious fact. The House and Senate committees that will
be conducting this joint investigation are the very committees, with most of
the same members, that have had oversight responsibility for the intelligence
community for decades. They might well be part of the problem. At any rate,
Sen. Torricelli is probably right that this committee "would not provide
the full and impartial investigation needed."
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