In
a recent article in Canada's Globe & Mail, former Canadian Ambassador
to Yugoslavia James Bissett invokes the famous words of Otto von Bismarck, who
once said, "If there is ever another war in Europe, it will come out of some
damned silly thing in the Balkans."
As it turned out, the "Iron Chancellor" was right. He was specifically vindicated
by the onset of World War I, sparked by the assassination of Austrian Archduke
Franz Ferdinand by a Bosnian Serb in 1914. Of course, then as now tensions had
been brewing and the spark itself was only the necessary formality; Serbia's
successes in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 deeply concerned imperial Austria,
eager to shore up its own pretensions of Balkan dominance. Now, the tensions
building up are different: on the "traditional" front, the U.S.-Russian
competition for power; on the front of asymmetrical war, the pan-Islamist movement's
quest for dominance in the Balkans versus local and Western interests. But essentially,
Bismarck's Balkan admonition has continued to echo down the ages, even though
war itself has changed and will no doubt manifest differently this time around.
Indeed, in the current "war on terror" and great-power rivalry over
control of multinational energy and telecommunications networks, the war is
being expressed in decentralized, often territorially distant ways. For example,
when Russia defended Serbia's right to sovereignty over Kosovo in the Balkans,
U.S. client state Georgia audaciously arrested Russian diplomats, declaring
them spies, a move that enraged the Kremlin and raised the political temperature
considerably. Matching the West's increased agitation for Kosovo status resolution,
a Russian-backed independence referendum in Georgia's breakaway province of
South
Ossetia passed on Sunday with 99 percent in favor. On the other side of
things, Balkan organized-crime syndicates with ties to al-Qaeda are popping
up in relation to planned terrorist attacks as
far afield as Norway.
For former ambassador Bissett, the "damned silly thing" going on now in the
Balkans is "the seeming determination of Western policy makers to grant the
Serbian province of Kosovo its independence." Mr. Bissett would not object,
I believe, if we expanded the remit of said "damned and silly things" to cover
Western intervention in general in the Balkans since 1990, too. For that whole
process has done much more harm than good, enabling and propelling violent ethnic
rivalries and building up dangerous mafia groups, appointing war criminals to
high political office, and, of course, indulging in various forms of financial
corruption and neglect that has helped to leave whole swathes of rural Muslim
populations in the UN protectorates of Kosovo and Bosnia funded only by Saudi
Arabia and its virulently anti-Western Wahhabi movement.
Interventionist Agitators Demand: Free Kosovo!
However, with the likes of the ICG leading the
chorus in calling for Kosovo independence, these more sordid realities are being
suppressed. They are simply not convenient for the powers-that-be. Confirming
its historic role as
nothing more than an Albanian lobbying front, the ICG recently bemoaned
the delaying of Kosovo's final status until after Serbian parliamentary elections
in January thus:
"[I]nstead of finally closing the question of western Balkan borders with an
orderly Kosovo settlement, delay would open a new destabilizing chapter." The
adjective here gives away the patronizing, quasi-fascistic mindset of the interventionists:
the process of ripping apart a country and creating one anew is deemed "orderly"
if carried out by the empire. Balkan peons should simply fall into line and
behave like good children, while the adults from the West tell them how to make
their beds. The phrase "orderly settlement," implying an independent Kosovo
supposedly securing a rosy future for the Balkans, is reminiscent of that other
old ICG descriptor of the former Serbia-Montenegro union as chronically "dysfunctional."
Yet this was hardly more dysfunctional than, say, the UN's disastrous administration
in Kosovo.
The dubious wordplay continues: "[T]he longer the Kosovo Albanians are forced
to wait," cries the ICG, "the greater the chance they will discredit themselves
with unilateral independence moves or riots." Note that "discredited" is rather
genteel, compared to the alternatives. After all, they could have said "commit
atrocities," "resume ethnic cleansing of Serbs," etc. Most often, the word is
used in the context of describing something like, say, a mad scientist's obscure
invention or a nonsensical historical claim. In other words, the worst consequence
of being "discredited" is to wind up ignored or forgotten, which is exactly
what the ICG hopes the world media will do with any future "unilateral independence
moves or riots" from "discredited" Albanians.
The Word on the Street: Criminal Neglect
Aside from all the politicized arguments for why
Kosovo should be independent, and whose bread would be buttered in so doing,
let me just take a moment to relay a message from American and other international
soldiers and police who are actually employed in the province. The story they
have to tell is somewhat different from the one the lobbyists would have you
believe. Indeed, you don't need a National Intelligence Estimate to prove that
the Kosovo intervention has made the Balkans demonstrably less safe. It just
takes common sense and some looking around.
On my most recent excursion to Kosovo, I spent some time, as always, recording
the testimony of various international police and military officials associated
with the UN's Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), both
of which are tasked with keeping the peace in Kosovo. Despite the formidable
range of weaponry, surveillance equipment, money, and other resources available
to them, these officials say, the UN has essentially given up the fight against
terrorism. "It's just like it was in Bosnia," said one American soldier who
had previously served in that other wonderful example of Western peacekeeping.
"We got tired of it, gradually withdraw our forces, and the 'bad guys' didn't
have to do anything but outlast us."
According to the soldier, the U.S. Army at Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo has now
even "farmed out" its intelligence-gathering operations to a Romanian KFOR unit
serving under it. Another international police source seconded this, decrying
that "the Americans are not even collecting their own intelligence! No wonder
they don't know what is going on!" Neither source meant anything personal about
the Romanians, but in general it must be said that if you are that world power
trying to oversee the security and final status of a province you are occupying,
usually it is better to collect your own information than to leave it up to
your minions.
Blending bitterness and acquired Balkan black humor, my interlocutors all pointed
out that the UN, the U.S., the Europeans, and everyone else were busily trying
to wash their hands of the mess in Kosovo, get on with the final status (independence
for the Albanians), and get out. None of this was a surprise, of course; it
has been the same old story ever since the UN set up shop in 1999. But hearing
about the efforts that the UNMIK regime has taken to avoid the glaring truth
– that Kosovo is little more than a playground for powerful mafiosi, infested
with unemployed paramilitaries and disgruntled, "born-again" Islamists – was
especially revealing.
Indeed, as one disenchanted UNMIK official put it, "These high UN staffers
don't want to endanger their next international posting by taking on the criminals
and terrorists, and above all they can't admit that the mission has been a huge
failure and created a new base for Islamic terrorists. The outside world is
not told of what they are bringing on here."
Indeed, as we speak, Saudi mosques continue to go up, funded by a bottomless
pit of oil riches, while the Kosovo Albanian civil administration is being selectively
stocked with officials whose allegiances to the Islamic world may outweigh their
allegiances to Kosovo. The present reality reflects the words of Albanian scholar
Isa Blumi, who warned four years ago that the influx of Saudi charities
and schools was creating a new "generation of young men and women whose loyalties
are not with Kosovo and [who] sustain a volatile intolerance to anyone who contradicts
their training." While such people are still well in the minority, the West's
"donor fatigue" and increasing desire to disengage is practically guaranteeing
that the poor and needy province will come more and more under the economic
control of radical Islamic interests. And one should not forget that on several
occasions representatives of Islamic states have affirmed their support in terms
of lobbying internationally for Kosovo independence for the Albanians. In return,
we may ask, for… what?
Turbulent Events of October 2006: Not Exactly an Encouraging
Sign
While the signs of future trouble are all there,
let's take a minute to examine the things going on right now in Kosovo – that
is, the things that the busy interventionists don't want you to hear about.
Of course, if you ask any top official in or involved with Kosovo to speak on
the record about security issues, the answers are inevitably the same. They
can be boiled down to the following: despite some isolated incidents, the
security situation in Kosovo is stable, and it is heading toward a happy future
as a thriving, multi-ethnic country.
However, the official UNMIK police log of October's security incidents leaked
to me recently attests otherwise. To summarize, the police report chronicles
over 70 incidents that occurred during the month throughout Kosovo, ranging
from public demonstrations and intimidation to beatings, bombings, and murders.
Very few of these events made it into media reports. They indicate not only
continuing attacks on Serbs and their Christian heritage in Kosovo, but also
more internecine violence between Albanians.
For example, on Oct. 6 at 11:45 p.m. in Prizren, "a K-Albanian male killed
a fellow K-Albanian male with a pistol shot for unknown reasons. During the
investigation, the perpetrator was arrested but no weapon was found." A day
later, at 3:40 p.m. in Lipljan, "a K-Albanian youngster shot with an AK-47 rifle
at a fellow K-Albanian youngster for unknown reasons. The victim was hospitalized
with head injury and remained in stable condition. During the investigation,
a bullet hole on the wall and the weapon were found at the spot. The culprit
was questioned in presence of his parents and the rifle with 49 rounds of ammunition
was confiscated." At 2 a.m. on Oct. 1 near Suva Reka, "an explosion of unknown
origin occurred in a K-Albanian house under construction. No injuries but considerable
damages were reported. Two K-Albanian males were later arrested as suspects
… the explosion was caused by an equivalent of 5-6 kilos of explosives [similar
to an anti-tank mine]." Six days later, the same man found another "8 kilos
of explosives with a fuse" in his house, the report added.
Along with a great many ethnic provocations against Serbs, threats, break-ins
of apartments rented to internationals, and the ominous testimony to the apparently
renewed "Albanian National Army" terrorist group spray-painted everywhere,
the month of October saw explosions recorded on four occasions, confiscations
of weapons seven times, 13 armed attacks, and three murders. Some were carried
out against "outsiders," such as the hapless Chinese shop owner in Pristina,
robbed at 1 a.m. on Oct. 9 of "€500 in cash and 3 cell phones. The victim resisted
the perpetrators [4 armed and masked males] and was stabbed." A day earlier,
an Albanian businessman was shot at 8:30 p.m., some 4 km east-northeast of Klina,
after surviving three previous assassination attempts. According to the police
report, "the incident has created a strong feeling of insecurity amongst both
K-Albanians and the K-Serbian returnee community."
October also saw continued attacks on Serbian Orthodox Church facilities as
well, a clear extension of the "religious cleansing" that has gone on since
1999, as Albanians have vandalized, damaged, or destroyed over 150 churches,
some dating back to the 14th century. On Oct. 7 in Pristina, "children found
a hand grenade in the premises of an Orthodox church." Luckily authorities were
able to dispose of it safely. In three separate attacks on churches on Oct.
30 in Stimlje, Kacanik, and Djakovica, "unknown persons" tried to set one church
on fire, broke into another, and stole the protective fence from the third.
The question of whether Albanian militants, whose acronym and political demands
were prolifically sprayed around Kosovo in October, could mount a serious threat
to stability was revealed on Oct. 1 when police discovered, in the central Kosovo
mountains of Malisevo, "68 anti-tank and 97 anti-personnel mines, as well as
20 hand grenades and 1,500 rounds of small arms ammunition … 400 kg of explosives
were found in the same area." This is hardly the only contraband arms depot
in Kosovo. According to one of my police sources, whole warehouses of rockets
can be found in southwestern Kosovo, for example.
On Oct. 6 in Pristina at 9:15 p.m., the police logs attest, "a K-Albanian male
public prosecutor reported that 2 unknown allegedly armed males introduced themselves
as members of the 'National Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvede & Bujanovac'
[UCPMB, active in the Southern Serbian Municipalities in 1999-2001] and threatened
to kill him if he wouldn't release a K-Albanian male from the Detention center."
Lockstep Silence
When confronted with this record, UN officials
said, as expected… nothing. This was not surprising, as past experience has
revealed. On May 12, 2006, the UN's Head of Civil Administration, Patricia Waring,
sent out an internal e-mail ordering the destruction of a list of recent violent
attacks compiled from official sources – some 32 in only 11 days. "Please make
sure that the table you presented this morning is destroyed," wrote Waring
to the unnamed recipient. "I do not want it circulated at all. Its lack of integrity
in assumptions, not backed up by fact, is potentially damaging."
What was more damaging, perhaps, was Waring's reply to my requests for clarifications:
"I requested staff to destroy material which was not based on appropriate police
reports – merely assumptions and gossip, most gathered at third hand," she wrote
on June 22. (I see nothing particularly villainous about reprinting this reply
here, as Waring after all proudly copied the e-mail to UNMIK bigwigs at the
time, such as Police Commissar Kai Vittrup and then-head honcho Soren Jessen-Petersen.)
Yet after this bout of bluster, the civil administrator apparently did not have
the self-confidence to answer my further request for elucidation regarding precisely
which of these 32 incidents based on official sources were "merely assumptions
and gossip." It's because there weren't any. They were all clearly marked
by source. No surprise that Waring failed to reply to my recent questions on
the security situation in Kosovo today.
Nobody except local journalists ever tries to hold these UN officials accountable
for their failures, ignorance, and corruption. To their credit, local Kosovo
Albanian reporters produce some good work, but who on the outside ever listens
to them?
It is ironic that a Western world allegedly so anxious to listen to the opinions
of the people it came to liberate only listens to what it wants to hear. If
one wants to speak about Serb oppression or the perceived wonders of spontaneous
self-determination, there is an audience in the international press – less so
when you want to expose UN corruption and crimes, or what the catastrophic UN
rule has meant for safety, security, and the war on terror in Kosovo. These
are things that local journalists, Serbs, Albanians, and others, have written
extensively about. However, no one on the outside ever hears about them. This
is because the UN is taking great pains to cover up the fact that it is, and
has always been, a part of the problem – not the solution. Instead, the whole
story of Kosovo is boiled down to a simplistic and bogus tale of Serbs vs. Albanians,
eternally divided by sheer ethnic hatred. Outside forces, such as the UN or
Islamic states, are never part of this pithy narrative.
What the outside world does not realize is that the rule of these favored UN
bureaucrats is creating a Kosovo in which not even they, let alone the rest
of us, will be allowed free passage in a future of corrupt police, xenophobic
nationalist villages, and Islamist-dominated "no-go areas." A great part of
the UN's declared success in making Kosovo a more peaceful place is that, for
over a year, they have simply
stopped patrolling in the dangerous places. Fewer patrols also means fewer
reports to burn later.
And don't imagine that when the UN is gone and Kosovo is independent that anything
will remain in terms of paperwork. Fortunately, there are literally thousands
of good UN human sources, who are only going to get riper with time as fear
of crackdown from their former employer recedes. Yet their stories are verbal;
future historians are going to have a hell of a time getting anything good on
paper. Ironically, today's powers-that-be are directly prolonging the same Balkan
impulses toward the anecdotal, the apocryphal, and rule of insinuation and rumor
that they lament as being to blame for the historical misunderstandings by Balkan
nationalists of the most recent to the most remote past. The foreigners have
become more Balkan than us. Perhaps there is a shred of truth to the legends
of a curse on all who enter these lands?
In any case, what is clear is that the powers-that-be will continue to destroy
or suppress everything that paints their occupation in a negative light. This
is why it is so important, whether you are a journalist or not, to get your
questions in now. Challenge these people while they still at least hypothetically
are supposed to be accountable for something. They have gotten away with a free
ride for far too long; unlike in a real country, none of them were ever elected
to the positions they have held and profited from. Nevertheless, they are
the ones scolding Kosovo about its need to be democratic and obey the rule of
law.
Unless more people try to call them on it, the Kosovo that is already physically
the black hole of Europe will become historically a black hole as well – a perfect
crime perpetrated by a phantom administration of individuals coming and going
on temporary contracts, parasitically taking what they need from the system
and moving on, and doing away with all the records afterwards. Such could not
happen in a real country, though Kosovo is apparently about to become one.