Is Albania Sponsoring 'Freedom Fighters' Next Door?

In 1998, when NATO's war on Yugoslavia was first being organized, secret camps were set up in northern Albania. There, British and American forces trained the rag-tag fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The two countries openly armed, supplied and supported the KLA during the war against Milosevic, using the paramilitary group as NATO's ground troops.

A New Question

All of this is fact. Albania's army also directly trained the KLA. After all, if the West said it was OK, then there was nothing to be embarrassed about. However, once the fallout from Kosovo registered and Macedonia was destabilized by the renamed militants of the NLA (National Liberation Army) in 2001, Tirana changed its tune. It officially deplored the violence and denied having anything to do with sponsoring the rebels.

However, at the same time "all contact stopped" between the intelligence services of the two countries, according to one informed Macedonian source. Clearly, Albania was not entirely pleased with beleaguered Macedonia's attempts at self-defense.

Since then, the Albanian government has gone to great lengths to boost economic and defense cooperation with Macedonia, under the rubric of NATO enlargement and participations in joint ventures along the east-west Corridor 8, such as prospective railroad lines and oil pipelines. Albania is clearly looking for a new lease on life and deliverance from the economic dark ages that afflict most citizens who aren't super-rich politicos or gangsters.

Nevertheless, despite these increasingly positive developments, a new question has been raised regarding the current involvement of the Albanian government – in whole or in part – in sponsoring paramilitary groups active in neighboring states. This issue is complex; its contemplation only invites further questions. With Albania, do we have state-sponsored attempts at control through disruption (as was the case with Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban?) Or could it be instead just the manipulations of sparring political gangs?

Tirana Cracks Down: One Arrested, Another Indicted

In July, the Albanian government arrested one Gafurr Adili, leader of the Front of Albanian National Unity (FBKSH). This diaspora-based group claims to be the political wing of the AKSH (or ANA, Albanian National Army), active since 2001 in Kosovo and Macedonia. The group's stated goal is to gather all "Albanian lands" into one majestic 19th century nation-state, by waging war with the "Slav colonizers," Greeks, and whoever else gets in their way.

Simultaneously, the Swiss banned Adili from living in their country. Stated the BBC, "…until now he has enjoyed refugee status – though it appears that he is not actually barred from visiting Switzerland where members of his family live." Such ambivalent restrictions are completely characteristic of the West's schizophrenic, lax treatment of Albanian militants since even before 2001.

On 8 October, a second arrest warrant was lodged for the leader of Albania's right-wing Party of National Unity, Idajet Beqiri. A high profile FBKSH leader, Beqiri is accused of "incitement and support for the extremist group."

Since last spring's attack on a bridge near Mitrovica, which proved that Kosovo Protection Corps staff members were moonlighting for the AKSH, the group has been deemed a "terrorist" one by Balkan and Western governments alike. Reports in the Economist and elsewhere described it as being run by increasingly desperate criminals and KLA veterans impatient with UNMIK's rule in Kosovo. This year's more concerted crackdowns by KFOR on smuggling, as well as similar revived efforts by Macedonian authorities, have also angered the militants. Averred the Economist on 12 September:

"…the AKSH represents few ethnic-Albanians. Its core consists of some 50-70 cigarette smugglers drawn from both sides of the border with Kosovo. Their latest violence has been largely prompted by their desire to stop Macedonia's police from shutting down their smuggling routes and putting them behind bars. Hisni Shaqiri, an ethnic-Albanian MP in Skopje who is trying to help keep the peace between Macedonia's Albanians and Slavs, describes Avdil Jakupi, the AKSH's "divisional commander" known as Chakala, as a "mental patient and heroin addict". A British brigadier advising the Macedonian government on defence calls the AKSH "criminals flying a political flag of convenience in the hope of finding legitimacy."

Revelations from the Inside

Until now, little has been revealed about the "highly secretive" AKSH. Who runs it? What are its plans? Does it really exist? Most importantly, perhaps, what is the leadership and extent of support enjoyed by its political wing, the FBKSH?

Recent new information from Idajet Beqiri himself casts considerable light on this issue. In its October 11-17 issue, the Serbian publication NIN ran a lengthy interview with him. Apparently, Beqiri also has a pseudonym – Albana Viosu – and is the secretary of the FBKSH. He founded Albania's Party of National Unity, was elected its president in 1991, and embarked on a volatile political career that saw him imprisoned, empowered and involved with various scandals. He has a law degree from the University of Tirana, served as a judge and claims to now work as a lawyer. Since 1997, he has been stationed in Western Europe, where he has lobbied and raised money for Albanian militant groups.

NIN claims the interview was arranged "…by tracing the news of an Albanian lawyer who organizes gatherings for wealthy Albanians throughout Western Europe." A "smiling" Beqiri then met the interviewers in Brussels.

Taking All the Credit…

Doubtless, we have to take the inevitable boasting with a grain of salt. Such figures tend to exaggerate their popularity and gains. Thus when asked whether the group only exists "on the internet," Beqiri cited "proof" to the contrary, being "…the 33 attacks for which we have assumed responsibility, as well as numerous members that join us daily."

Indeed, there have been around 30 minor bombings, murders and other mishaps since 2001, but it is decidedly unclear as to whether these were all carried out by one unified group under a single banner and command. Beqiri himself states that right now "…seven armed groups that aren't under our control act in Kosovo and Macedonia," each having around 40 members. Given the track record for Albanian gang infighting in Kosovo and Macedonia, it seems more likely that other groups have perpetrated some of these attacks – for reasons other than the Greater Albania.

Indeed, an obscure incident took place in Kumanovo a few weeks ago, when an Albanian from south Serbia opened a new pizza parlor. Apparently he was trespassing on someone else's turf, because his first customer was a drive-by shooter, who fired a hail of bullets into the shop. It is believed that two people were injured. And there have been numerous other incidents of such "cross-border cooperation" between Kosovo and Macedonia.

...Almost

Amazingly enough, Beqiri does not claim responsibility for the worst attacks – like the land mine deaths of Polish soldiers in Macedonia last spring, or the murder of Serbian children in the River Bistrica this summer. In the interview, he doesn't mention the former (they blamed it on the Macedonian army trying to discredit the AKSH), and as for the latter, he makes the rather brazen claim that the Serbs machine-gunned their own children to turn Western opinion against the Albanians. Beqiri carefully restricts his group's stated activities to legitimate military targets (though blowing up railroads and bridges doesn't seem to exactly fit the bill).

In any case, says Beqiri, "…the Front of Albanian National Unity (FBKSH) completely controls all diplomatic and armed ANA forces." This would rather seem to implicate him and his comrades for the effects of their ordained actions. According to the now fugitive secretary, the AKSH "…hasn't performed a single attack without the approval of FBKSH."

An AKSH Chronology

Beqiri's recounting of the group's recent history is particularly interesting. After the Tetovo turf war of spring 2002, and the short-lived Coordinative Council for Albanian unity led by Ali Ahmeti, many of the latter's "disappointed" NLA fighters went over to the AKSH. However, adds Beqiri, "…a large part didn't join anyone and was completely independent. Chaos was created and the need for establishing was urgent."

Here is where the story takes an interesting twist. Beqiri's summary of what happened next casts aspersions on Albania's alleged "neutrality" in Kosovo's ongoing vortex of violence. States Beqiri:

"…in July 2002 we organized a large gathering in the Congress Palace in Tirana, where, apart from all commanders of various fractions from Kosovo and Macedonia, also were present many high intellectuals, military people, as well as representatives of all Albanian political parties. It was established then that all of us share the same desire for resolving the 'Albanian issue' and it is necessary for the sake of it to establish a military and political structure with a clear system of hierarchy. This is how FBKSH was created."

Say What?

If Beqiri can be taken at his word, key players from the whole Albanian establishment – politicians, intellectuals and most importantly of all, military men – are behind the AKSH. This story wildly contradicts every official statement made by Tirana since the war in Macedonia, i.e., that the country is not helping paramilitary forces. The most compelling aspect of all this is the alleged role of the military:

"…the generals played the key role from Albania, who enjoy enormous authority among the fighters and their commanders.

"…The general personnel are mostly from Albania and from Kosovo. The main chief of the GS (General Staff) ANA is General Vigan Gradica. He was honored with three stars and has enormous experience. The supreme council of ANA, that brings all military decisions, is made up of a total of eight generals. The entire general core is educated, mostly in Croatia and Albania, and even in Germany. All of them are professional soldiers."

Albania Implicated – and the Diaspora Too

This rather eye-opening statement calls into question Tirana's publicly stated anti-militant position. Apparently, right up until Gafurr Adili's arrest the FBKSH operated out of Tirana – "…where our base has been from the beginning." After losing their leader, the group went underground – i.e., to Kosovo – where Beqiri claims they work, "…completely openly as a legal political party." Given his present indictment by the Albanian government, and KFOR's uncompromising new attitude, this assertion will be tested.

According to Beqiri, the FBKSH command structure is made up 11 people and focuses on 5 "interest zones" of conquest: south Serbia's Presevo Valley, Kosovo, Macedonia, Ulcinj (in Montenegro) and Greece. Other protagonists in the movement are stated as being professor Femi Kelmendi, the aforementioned General Gradica and Bestar Kosova, "who is in charge of all security affairs."

As with all liberation wars past, funding for weapons comes mostly from the diaspora. Jane's estimated that during a 6 month period in 2001 the NLA raised $60 million from diaspora contributions. As was the case then, says Beqiri, "…most of the aid comes from America, then Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium." Card-carrying members (Beqiri rather bombastically claims to have 20,000) are required to kick down monthly; locals pay 2 euros per month, diaspora members, 20 euros per month. Finally, he adds, "…we are trying to organize as many as possible gatherings in the Diaspora at which we encourage people to help us as much as they can."

It is highly likely that American diaspora funding is being organized by the same congressional lobby groups that funded the last two wars, and which retain strong links with former KLA leaders. The fact that Mr. Beqiri was invited one month ago to advertise his views in front of the International Crisis Group in Brussels cannot be reassuring either.

Antagonisms on the Home Front

What kind of support does the AKSH enjoy in Albania itself, however? It would appear quite a lot. Yet is this a case of official state support (i.e., the Pakistan model), or a side effect of instability? Probably the latter. Rather than categorically blame the Albanian government, we might mention the current political volatility there – a state of affairs which leaves plenty of room for third-party mischief.

For months, unrest has been building with the government of Fatos Nano. Last week his Socialist Party suffered its second setback in 3 months, winning "…only 65 votes for nominees as foreign and interior ministers from 131 members of parliament," reported Reuters on Thursday.

With longstanding rival Ilir Meta calling for early elections in Spring, it is quite possible that Nano's days are numbered. Nano "…accused rivals who voted against him of a 'palace coup' and making common cause with the opposition Democratic Party" of Nano's other archenemy, former president Sali Berisha.

Interestingly enough, from the NIN report we learn that Nano goes way back with FBKSH Secretary Beqiri – all the way back, in fact, to their mutual imprisonment under Berisha's regime. When that regime tanked in 1997, due to the collapse of a colossal pyramid scheme that impoverished thousands overnight, Beqiri won his release, and joined a political coalition with the also-freed Nano. The latter came to power, but was removed a year later. The enmity between the two camps continues even now.

The NIN report mentions the Beqiri-Nano friendship and shared opposition to Berisha. Yet despite their common cause, the report states, Beqiri and Nano have "divergent" political views. Is NIN trying to imply that Nano is not a closet supporter of the AKSH adventure? If this were true, then how was Beqiri able to operate the FBKSH with such impunity and such high-level cooperation in Tirana, as he claims?

Indeed, this connection is being made by Beqiri's enemies in Kosovo, too. Albanian leaders there have recently damned the AKSH as a dangerous monstrosity run by Hoxha-era "Communists" under the implicit control of Nano – in other words, as an unofficial branch of the state.

That said, should we understand current Tirana's crackdown on Adimi and Beqiri as indicative of Nano's dwindling authority? Or is he being forced to sacrifice his friend due to political pressure, either internal or Western?

Hey – What Ever Happened to the Mujahedin?

No article of mine has inspired such a rancorous reaction as my brief history of Islamic terrorist involvement in Albania. While admittedly I may have exaggerated the threat, everything was based on facts and detailed reports. Since 2001, there haven't been many new developments on this front. However, another byproduct of today's political volatility in Tirana may be the subtle penetration of foreign Islamic fighters. The revelation that bin Laden's forces were training the KLA in 1999, just as the US and Britain were, was embarrassing enough for the US; but what if, after so many subsequent anti-terror operations, the Evil One has returned to the Balkans?

In a report dated 19 September, congressional director of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Yossef Bodansky claims that Albania is once again being used as a "springboard" for terrorist activities in Europe:

"…starting in mid-August 2003, there was a discernible increase in the number of foreigners in the Islamist mosques throughout Albania. 'They [originally] come from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran. They come from many countries,' noted an eyewitness in Tirana. 'They arrive [in Tirana] from Afghanistan,' he added. These expert terrorists are being prepared in Albania for their specific missions in the West.

"This training program is conducted under the cover of the Albanian National Army (ANA or AKSh in Albanian) with most senior trainers and commanders being 'mujahedin who retreated from Bosnia' and are affiliated with al-Qaida.

"In return for the Albanian support of this endeavor, the Islamists assist the local terrorists in preparing for launching spectacular terrorism into the major cities of Serbia and Montenegro, with Belgrade and Nis believed to be the top targets. As well, Islamist cadres, mainly veterans of Bosnia, are providing advance training to thousands of Albanian terrorists in camps in Kosovo-Metohija, near Prizren, on the slopes of Mt. Sara, in the Kosovo Morava River valley, in the Albanian towns of Kukes and Tropoje, and around Tetovo in western Macedonia."

A Mess of Contradictions

This tantalizing testimony directly contradicts Beqiri's statement of policy to NIN, namely, that the AKSH desires no help from the mujahedin and has no interest in attacking Belgrade. Beqiri claims that all attacks are to be carried out only within the specified "zones of operation" (i.e., Albanian-populated areas).

However, he also admits that other, apparently unaffiliated militant groups presently prowl the hills and forests of Macedonia and Kosovo. Could some of these have struck with the Islamists? Indeed, a well-informed Western security official in Kosovo told me earlier this year that the AKSH had broken up into three groups, precisely because of cooperation with the mujahedin – unsavory for some, expedient for others.

Yet as Beqiri maintains, the main AKSH body is probably content to exist solely as a magnificent fighting force of secular-enough Albanian nationalists. Especially since they seem to have such a well-oiled and experienced diaspora machine, this bunch has no interest in winding up on the wrong side of the war on terror. However, this does not mean that Islamist-associated fringe groups don't exist in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia.

In the end, Bodansky's enigmatic evidence leaves one very curious as to his sources. Had the Bush Administration not been so disingenuous with the evidence on Iraq, there would be no doubting these Balkan revelations. Now we have to be a bit more critical. One hopes that an American congressional investigator would be better-informed than a lowly freelance reporter. However, the mystery may remain unresolved, barring further violence or other inside revelations.

However, even if we never get an answer on mujahedin in the Balkans, Albania is not off the hook. Should the authorities there actually arrest Mr. Beqiri (or other of his cohorts), a clearer picture will no doubt emerge of the precise connection between Tirana and the neighborhood's most notorious paramilitary group.

Is Albania Sponsoring 'Freedom Fighters' Next Door?

And What Happened to the Balkan Mujahedin, Anyway?