The UN's Last Winter in Kosovo - by Christopher Deliso

Only 18 months ago, it was still possible to take refuge behind the insignia of the United Nations, the OSCE, and other international administration bodies in Kosovo when one needed salvation. After all, this is precisely how 33 Serbs escaped certain death at the hands of rioting Albania mobs in March of 2004.

However, at the same time arrived Kosovo's moment of truth: a radical break that showed the international presence would no longer be tolerated and would even be targeted if it got in the way of Albanian secessionist demands. And this is the situation we will discuss below, in the context of an increasing flood of hushed-up information coming out Kosovo from disillusioned international workers fearful for their lives.

Some Background

By the time of the March 2004 riots, the hostility and frustration had been building for a couple of years already. Unemployed, disgruntled Albanian men had long tired of watching the big spenders from the international force flaunt their wealth and indulge in conspicuous consumption of wine and women and whatever else. At the same time, they were vexed by the stubborn Serbian minority that refused to flee, thus thwarting their quixotic dream of creating a 19th-century Albanian nation state.

Nevertheless, the UN forces in Kosovo refused to pay attention – publicly, at least – to the growing unrest. Every time a Serb was viciously murdered or attacked, it was described as an "isolated incident" – and still is to this day. Yet while the organized nature of the ethnic cleansing became incontestable in March 2004, UN spokesman Derek Chappell was "internally transferred" for daring to say as much. Mid-level staff today still mutter unhappily about the sacking.

Similarly, the "shadowy militant groups" that have sprung up dependably under new acronyms and leaders have been dismissed universally as common criminals – which some of them are – thus staving off public acknowledgment of the fact that Kosovo's ruling ideology is a virulently nationalist, culturally closed one. And while the dismissal continues even today, not even the credulous mass media still buys it; as Reuters intelligently commented on the incident, "illegal checkpoints and ominous communiqués were the early hallmarks of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which emerged in 1998 to launch a guerrilla war against Serb forces."

Indeed, it always takes the precedent-setters a while to catch on, mired as they are in their old precedents, which were never even true to begin with. However, it was clear at least since 2003, when the "Albanian National Army" began a prolonged series of bombing campaigns aimed mostly at Serbs but targeting internationals as well, that NATO's honeymoon was over. It was only a matter of time before the Albanians would rise up against their liberators, who were unfortunately encumbered by their own grandiose dreams for shaping the entire region, and thus slowed and restricted by the sensitive diplomatic necessities such work required. The Albanians, by contrast, were not weighed down with concerns for anyone but themselves. It was not hard to see who had the tactical advantage.

Winter Blues

Winter in Kosovo is always bleak; the air is thin and cold, the apartments drab and decrepit. Men in threadbare jackets warm themselves by bins of burning trash, and everyone has too much time on their hands to think. I remember well last winter when the electricity in Pristina itself would – after some five years of international administration – spark on and off intermittently, and then go down for hours at a time. The water was regularly turned off at midnight. And all this in the capital, not some small village.

So people have had every reason to despise the international do-gooders. Although they've done a poor job of building working infrastructure, they have always done a great job of collecting their exorbitant paychecks and squandering them on gold, girls, and vacations in idyllic Croatia and Greece.

This winter is likely to be the last for the international administration in Kosovo – at least the last one in which they aren't fighting for their lives. As such, they are trying to publicly downplay the threats emerging from all sides, but as we will see, they are among themselves privately terrified about the outcome of a situation that was obvious all along.

The ICG: Providing Cover for Cowards

And so we fast-forward to October 2005, a year and a half after the March riots set the standard for what must come next.

First of all, it's simply pathetic to see how execrable lackeys of Western power such as the ICG keep bending over (not even backward) to please their paymasters. The think tank's Sept. 13 manifesto makes the astonishing demand that KFOR, the UN's military unit, relocate its main operations to northeastern Kosovo, inhabited only by Serbs, in order to prevent Belgrade from surreptitiously developing "parallel institutions" there. In other words, the ICG would like to let the internationals, armed to the hilt yet quaking in fear, ride out the coming storm in the safety of peaceful Serbian villages, far from the Albanian paramilitaries and Islamic fundamentalists rising up everywhere else. We should thank the ICG for elevating Kosovo to an unprecedented level of farce. Blusters the pressure group:

"[U]NMIK and KFOR must quickly regain the security initiative north of the Ibar by increasing force levels and assertiveness, under the Special Commissioner's direction. KFOR should explicitly make Mitrovica and the north its primary operational focus and restructure accordingly."

This is perhaps the biggest load of horsesh*t – and there have been quite a number of cartloads over the years – to have ever come down the pike from the ICG. Claiming that the UN must scurry to the north, where the real danger lurks, is just too ironic: in late 2005, the only safe haven NATO's successors can still find in Kosovo is the enclave of the very people they came to kill six short years ago.

The ICG blusters that a "major security, political, and financial effort is required to save the situation" in North Mitrovica, and that therefore the internationals should get there on the double. Yet anyone who has ever been there knows that crossing the river brings you out of chaotic Unmikistan and into a pretty, peaceful, and clean city, where safety, sanity, and normal life prevail. Indeed, what a sacrifice it would be for those brave peacekeepers sent off to sloth in the bars of North Mitrovica!

The Sovereign Hypothesis

At first it wouldn't seem to make sense. Rather than luxuriate in Serbian restaurants and cafés, shouldn't the UN be cracking down on the extremist elements of Kosovar society?

No; this would violate the sovereign hypothesis, unique not only to UNMIK but to every international peacekeeping mission in the world: that the staff, from the foot soldiers to the highest diplomats, care less about improving local life than about cashing their paychecks, enjoying conspicuous consumption when possible, safeguarding their careers and escaping to greener pastures. Of course, there are exceptions, but the few individuals who dare to question the rule of mediocrity are shut up or fired, or both. This sovereign hypothesis, culled more from basic human motivational psychology than complex geo-strategic issues or historical causality, explains why the situation in Kosovo continues to fester unhappily, six years after its "liberators" arrived. There is perhaps no better argument against humanitarian intervention and international peacekeeping forces than this one.

The Appeasement Strategy at Work

That said, it's not hard to see why the internationals in Kosovo have continually moved to mollify Albanian demands, as I noted two years ago. Ironically, however, now the Hague is being pitted against UNMIK over the case of Ramush Haradinaj, the indicted war criminal temporarily released for "good behavior."

While a 2-1 decision from the court on Oct. 14 gave the erstwhile "prime minister" of Kosovo the option of returning to his "political activities," the prosecution is trying to block it. The latter, rightly criticized for its double standards when dealing with Albanian and Serbian war crimes indictees, is trying to save face by stopping this breathtakingly hypocritical decision. By contrast, UNMIK is lobbying hard for the rehabilitation of Ramush, as it believes that only he can keep popular unrest from boiling over into anti-UN violence. In other words, it's a battle pitting face-saving against saving lives.

The desperate affection UN officials have shown for Haradinaj is the stuff of legend, and just as farcical as the ICG's depiction of North Mitrovica as a security hazard. When Ramush was carted away to the Hague this past spring, UN officials were literally shedding tears over his departure. UNMIK chief Soren Jessen-Petersen "publicly lamented the fate of his 'close partner and friend,'" recalls Tim Judah, who adds:

"[W]hat is clear is that since Haradinaj's release, the UN and diplomats in Kosovo have courted him in ways that would have been deemed outrageous and inappropriate if the indictee had been a Serb or Croat. For example, on 26 September, a huge party was held at the Hotel Grand in Pristina to celebrate the wedding of Haradinaj's brother. Among the guests were deputy UNMIK chief Larry Rossin and other senior officials and diplomats. Haradinaj is frequently seen dining in fashionable restaurants in Pristina with foreign guests, who also visit him at his home in the village of Gllogjan."

The UNMIK is now praying for three things: that final status negotiations begin as soon as possible (so much for all that talk of "standards before status"); that Haradinaj can be wheeled back onto the stage and hopefully help improve their street credibility; and that President Ibrahim Rugova, the veteran Albanian leader and a key figure in the upcoming negotiations, does not suddenly die of lung cancer (he was diagnosed in early September after having been flown to a U.S. Army base in Germany for treatment). If any of these three prayers are not answered, things could get very messy, very fast.

The need to extricate themselves from a volatile situation has led the internationals to venture onto the terrain of the surreal. Instead of demanding that minority rights be guaranteed and that Kosovo not annex the territory of neighboring states, a powerless UN has facetiously suggested that some sort of "conditional independence" be granted to the province. This invites the Kafkaesque scenario that NATO could someday bomb the place for a second time, should the Albanians violate whatever "conditions" are placed on them, or else that the UN could impose economic sanctions on a statelet that has no economy to begin with. Puh-leaze!

The Floodgates Open, as Bombs Go Off and Protests Mount

While I don't want to take all the credit for the increasing number of present and former UN workers in Kosovo coming forward with inside testimony, it is clear that since my articles on Islamic fundamentalism in Kosovo appeared, which cited former OSCE security boss Tom Gambill, new voices are beginning to be heard. Cybercast News Service picked up the baton, getting the story of chronic anti-Serb violence in Kosovo again from Tom, who recently told me that "we've now gotten the attention of the [U.S.] military … we are stirring up some serious sh*t." Well put.

In other words, now is the time to kick back and enjoy as the flood of new information presents itself and other UN workers, realizing it is in their own best interests to speak out, are starting to come forward. One recently attested that "explosives are found underneath UN vehicles almost every night, but no reports nor coverage are ever made on them. … Why should there be such a news blackout that can also put our lives at risk?"

Although this hush-it-up tendency is clear, some of these incidents have in fact been reported. Kosovo publication Lajm reported on Sept. 21 that an UNMIK vehicle had been blown up four days earlier in Ferizaj (Urosevac in Serbian) and that, as usual, "the circumstances are still not known." They quote Rahman Sylejmani, leader of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) Department for Serious Crimes as saying "we are investigating the case. We don't have any suspects regarding this case at the moment."

The charred wreckage of an UNMIK vehicle destroyed
in Kacanik, Kosovo, on Oct. 4. (Official UN photo.)

According to a KFOR security bulletin a few days later, a hand grenade was found under an UNMIK police vehicle in Pristina, in the early hours of Sept. 27. The next day, it was "reconfirmed that it was of an antipersonnel mine set up as an improvised explosive device."

A week later, on Oct. 4, a UN vehicle was blown up to spectacular effect in Kacanik. The pictures of the mangled wreck were not circulated publicly.

Six days later, according to another UN brief, an Albanian member of the KPS – remember, this is the "official" police service on the side of the good guys – "was caught in the garden of a house rented by a UNMIK International male police officer, filming his activities with a camera through the window."

On Sept. 29, hundreds of Albanian youth protested against negotiations with the Serbs, spilling fake blood on the steps of the Kosovo Parliament in a symbolic gesture. Most recently, on Oct. 19 police had to use pepper spray to disperse the same group, who were protesting in front of the UNMIK headquarters.

Staged protests have been central to Albanian pressure tactics in Kosovo and Macedonia for over 30 years, and the cynical positioning of brainwashed children and teens in the front rows – designed to incur maximum popular outcry should any of them be hurt by police – also continues. Ultimately, however, the leadership comes from much higher up.

In a nice touch, the activists – ironically, led by a former student protest leader once arrested by Milosevic's government – have also begun spray-painting UN vehicles. The letters F and N have been added before and after the letters UN to create the Albanian word "fund," meaning "end" or "finished." It's not exactly difficult to infer who is intended to be "finished" here.

All in all, the plan is simple, effective, and predictable. Public protests, together with more mysterious militancy, are a key tactic. On the other end of the spectrum, according to the forecast of another current UN officer in Kosovo, "the Albanian [militants] will use hit-and-run tactics, so that the IC [international community] will comment that they don't know who's doing it. The Albanian media will lie to their public, claiming that this is the work of Serb Special Forces, thus keeping the fire of hatred and mistrust burning in Albanian eyes."

This view was seconded on Oct. 11 by Belgrade's Vecernje Novosti, which noted that Albanian media are increasingly blaming alleged Serbian infiltrators for attacks against Serbs, such as the recent attack on Dejan Jankovic, a minority Serb member of the Albanian-dominated KPS. According to the newspaper, "what really happened [was] a well-orchestrated action of the Security-Intelligence headquarters of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), and its so called G2 department, headed by Kadri Veseli, a man who enjoys extreme confidence in the eyes of [former militant leader] Hashim Thaci. The goal of this well-planned action is to compromise Belgrade, in light of the beginning of the negotiations for the Kosovo and Metohija final status."

Albanian activists have started making creative linguistic
modifications to UN vehicles in Kosovo, intimating that the
internationals are "finished" in the occupied province.

A Leaked Text Betrays UNMIK's Fears

Regardless of the typical Balkan intrigue at work here, the bombings, attempted murders, and sightings of armed militants manning checkpoints in lawless western Kosovo have pushed the UN onto an emergency footing. The following leaked internal UN document, reprinted verbatim, indicates the level of desperation now gripping the colonial regime:

"For the attention of all UNMIK Staff members:

"1. All staff members please be informed that due to a number of security related incidents in the Pejë/Pec and Prizren/Prizren Region, with effect from 18:00 hrs Friday 14 October -05, a vehicle tracking will be in affect in the whole UN REGION SOUTH WEST, including the Pejë/Pec region and Prizren/Prizren region until further notice. These measures do not apply to UNMIK Police.

"2. Vehicle tracking will be in affect daily between 18:00 hrs until 08:00 hrs in the following municipalities: Pejë/Pec, Istog/Istok, Klinë/Klina, Deçan/Decani, Gjakovë/Ðakovica, Malishevë/Mališevo, Suharekë/Suva Reka, Rahovec/Orahovac Prizren/Prizren and Dragash/Dragaš. Daytime travel between 08:00 hrs-18:00 hrs is permitted.

"3. Staff members are NOT allowed to travel off the main routes in the municipalities of: Pejë/Pec, Istog/Istok, Klinë/Klina, Deçan/Decani, Gjakovë/Ðakovica, Malishevë/Mališevo, Suharekë/Suva Reka, Rahovec/Orahovac Prizren/Prizren and Dragash/Dragaš between 18:00 hrs and 08:00 hrs.

"4. Staff undertaking any movement in any of these Municipalities must inform Regional Sierra Base prior to travel and when travel is concluded, providing their a. Call sign, b. Vehicle registration number, c. Route, d. Passenger details and e. Return times.

"5. Staff members are advised to monitor Lotus Notes and radio broadcasts for further updates.

"6. Sierra Base will provide tracking support for UNMIK Police on request.

"UNMIK Security

"FOR THE ATTENTION OF ALL STAFF MEMBERS EFFECTIVE TODAY:

"1.) STAFF MEMBERS CAN NOW REQUEST A SECURITY ESCORT TO ACCOMPANY YOU FROM MHQ TO YOUR PLACE OF RESIDENCE FROM 1800 HOURS BY SIMPLY DIALING SIERRA BASE ON EXTENSION 4444.

"2.) FOR STAFF MEMBERS LIVING BEYOND WALKING DISTANCE SECURITY WILL ARRANGE TRANSPORT FROM MHQ TO TAKE STAFF MEMBERS TO THEIR RESIDENCES.

"3.) FOR STAFF MEMBERS WORKING AT AHQ PLEASE CALL TRANSPORT DISPATCH EXT. 5688.

"UNMIK SECURITY"

The Militants Speak

The cause of all this alarm is the sudden appearance of the so-called Kosovo Independence Army (KIA) in the always volatile west. As we said, the UNMIK officials predictably described the masked and uniformed men as a group of "criminals" that "does not have the support of local citizens," according to UNMIK Police Commissioner Kai Vittrup. However, militant groups have never had much popular support in Kosovo until they start exacting tribute from local villagers and press-ganging their young men into service, as happened in 1998 and in 2001 in neighboring Macedonia as well. Recent history has shown that whether or not a group has "popular support" is irrelevant. And as the above document shows, whatever it might say, the UN is very, very afraid.

And perhaps with good reason. Earlier this month, the KIA issued a manifesto threatening that unless the Kosovo Parliament declares independence by Oct. 15, the militants would start executing any parliamentarians not supporting it, while announcing that a "general mobilization" of the citizenry would also begin. That this did not happen exactly on time doesn't preclude it from happening in the future. The communiqué also implies that the same folks in the new KIA are veterans of the 1999 KLA paramilitary army. This association was seconded by central Kosovo's Serbian National Council official, Rada Trajkovic, who said that the two groups "are more than likely made up of exactly the same people."

The manifesto also threatens Albanian "UDB collaborators" (that is, alleged collaborators with the Serbian secret service) that "if they are not divorced/separated from UDB, the language of communication will be the barrel of the gun." As for UNMIK, they are ordered to release from their jails all so-called "war hostages," or else "10 innocent UNMIK officers will suffer" (presumably, 10 of them for each jailed Albanian is meant).

Finally, the manifesto presents UNMIK with this chilling ultimatum:

"[I]f a citizen of Kosova is arrested or his house is searched by KPS-UNMIK, just because this is done to an individual or a group UNMIK pillars wants, then consequences will be irreparable. This time we won't give you the March [2004 riots] lesson, but this time except the obligation that we have for independence you will also pay for other debt, that Albanian has higher values … for six years you betrayed us."

One Way or Another…

These are clearly fighting words. But the UN would be hard-put to try and claim that only a few isolated toughs and criminals share this feeling of betrayal. Everyone from regular Albanians who have felt their needs neglected, to minority Serbs who have watched their homes and churches go up in flames, feels betrayed. By now, the entire surface area of Kosovo could have been literally paved with gold, for all of the billions that have been poured into this Balkan black hole over the past six years.

Instead, a small group of internationals and locals have become very rich exploiting the plight of the masses, reviving pointless hatreds, and indulging in perverse corruption. The situation is too far gone to be saved now. The tragedy is that so many uninformed people in the outside world are going to be surprised when it all goes to hell, thanks to a UN long bent on damage control and an acquiescent media, not to mention self-aggrandizing think tanks like the ICG.

Nevertheless, for everyone's safety (if not prestige), the more whistleblowers who step forward the better – even now, as one old song goes, with the sun so dark and the hour so late.