The neoconservative hawks in the Bush administration
demand regime change in Iran. The nation's supposed ties to Palestinian and
Lebanese terrorist groups coupled with its attempts to build a nuclear weapon
motivate such prescriptions. Of course, the (sometimes) unspoken reason has
something to do with Iran's threat to Israel. No matter the justifications,
Roger Howard's book Iran
in Crisis? Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response should be required
reading for anyone demanding immediate U.S. intervention in Iran.
Iran in Crisis? sets out to explain the historical context of American hostility toward
Iran while outlining the potential social,
cultural, and political crises that threaten to alter the ongoing debate. Detailing the nation's political and cultural history, it
presents a perspective required to evaluate both sides of the debate, in this
case hardliners in Iran and the U.S. Howard makes it clear that one cannot easily
judge what is the "right" U.S. policy vis-ŕ-vis Iran without understanding this
historical context. Despite his more dovish position on how the world should approach Iran, Howard is far from uncritical. For instance, he writes,
"In light of events in recent years, it is clear that Washington has good
reason to suspect a high degree of Iranian influence in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Yet there are some respects in which America's own policies have arguably exacerbated
the tension with Iran over this issue."
This theme is repeated throughout the book. With it, Howard suggests that a
more thoughtful – though stern – diplomatic approach toward Iran will be more
productive. For example, aspects of U.S. policy openly support supposed Iranian
rebel groups. It is thought that by verbally recognizing such groups, an independent
revolution may occur, thus making U.S. intervention unnecessary. However, Howard
points out that the groups the U.S. supports may not be the ones it would like
to see in power after such a revolution, illustrating yet another case where
historical ignorance and blind belligerence may lead to unintended consequences.
Simply, Howard details a variety of "blowback" possibilities after U.S. intervention.
One of the most important sections of the text is Howard's take on the role
of neoconservatives in increasing American hostility toward Iran. Howard correctly
makes the historical and contemporary connections among the Ledeens, Feiths,
etc., and the Likud party of Israel. He further writes
"One such defining defining characteristic of neoconservatism ... is a liberal
idealism that argues that the 'democratization' of the outside world and the
defense of human rights should play a prominent role in U.S. foreign policy
at the expense of a more 'realist' emphasis upon the national interest."
Once certain nations are "democratized," others throughout the world will supposedly
follow suit. Howard:
"[S]uch views have been regarded by their critics in the State Department
and elsewhere as little more than a hubristic blueprint that ignored the much
more commonsensical proposition that U.S. intervention would in fact be 'much
more likely to stir up a hornets' nest.'"
Despite this analysis, Howard believes it is incorrect to characterize American
hostility toward Iran as solely neoconservative. Rather, "something distinctive
about the American mind lies at the heart of this issue." He claims that American
attitudes toward Iran stem from a "need for catharsis" after 9/11 and the much
earlier Iran hostage crisis. Essentially, Howard argues that America is "seeking
compensation" for its past losses. This view is echoed by the Iranian media.
The author also argues that the hawkish U.S. attitudes are a manifestation of America's tendency to use
force before diplomacy.
With regards to "force first," Howard may be on to something. However, he fails
to make the distinction between (1) why the debate about the threat of Iran
exists, and (2) the cultural factors that make it popular. I think that the
former must proceed the latter. The war on Iraq is the perfect example. The
American public was not calling for the overthrow of Saddam minutes after 9/11.
Instead, it was the administration hawks who demanded action. And only after
months of scare tactics involving WMD and a pliant media instilling fear in
the public was the administration able to go to war.
But why do these neocons care so much about democracy abroad? They consider
Iran a threat. There are three main threats that interventionists cite: Iran's
nuclear capability, its suppression of liberties, and its support of terrorist
organizations.
Howard makes the case that Iran is likely seeking a nuclear weapons program.
He details the history of this move and its origins in the more independent
and aggressive parts of the Iranian government. An important question is thus
raised: has U.S. policy increased the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons?
On the one hand, Howard points out that many hawks unjustifiably speak of the
existence of Iran's nukes as a "certainty." Similarly, many vocal critics of
Iran speak in black and white terms, claiming that, "sources indicate a ready
weapons program in a few months." Such pronouncements should be taken with a
grain a salt after the war on Iraq. As Howard trenchantly points out
"[S]uch heavy-handedness also plays into the hands of political hardliners
inside Iran who argue that the insubstantial nature of Washington's arguments
reveals an ulterior motive against which all Iranians should guard themselves."
America is also seen as touting a double standard.
"And throughout Iran, and in the wider Islamic world, many repeatedly ask
why the same U.S. administrators that condemn Iran so vociferously are also
so silent about Israel's nuclear capabilities."
Next, Howard profiles the state of freedom in Iran. The country's constitution
is a good representation of two important and contrasting aspects of Iranian
political culture. First, the constitution "declares that 'the affairs of the
country must be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by the
means of elections,'" which has resulted in an elected president and legislature.
However, the constitution also lays out "other sources of political power that
do not have real popular mandate, foremost among them the Supreme Leader." Knowledge
of such things is crucial when making policy decisions. For to assume that Iran
is purely a dictatorship is to ignore the possibility that freedom and democracy
have independent roots without the need for U.S. intervention. Moreover, as
Howard makes clear, American "support" for Iranian democracy may only give more
power to the unaccountable members of government who can claim that foreign
powers are "meddling" with Iranian independence. If the American critics of
Iran consider such consequences, they may also consider a more diplomatic approach
to any resolution of disputes.
The book is not without its weaknesses. First, I suggest skipping the wordy
introduction which lends little to understanding what is to come. Next, just
as Howard emphasizes the importance of separating political rhetoric and potential
action, the same perspective should be taken with the American hawks who demand
immediate overthrow of the regime. It is equally plausible that those laptop
bombardiers are merely using harsh rhetoric to appeal to their own audiences,
much as the religious leaders in Iran are saving face with tough anti-American
rhetoric.
Nonetheless, Iran
in Crisis? is a welcome book in a sea of punditry and historical naiveté.