One of the difficulties in writing regularly about
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, in my eyes, that so little ever changes.
The basic constants – above all, Israel's overwhelming military, economic, and
political superiority, all serving its colonialist aims – change slightly over
years, if at all. The media concentrate on immediate episodes: a violent incident,
a statement, a peace plan – but in hindsight, they all make very little difference.
In the longer term, the realities on the ground are ultimately derived from
the aims and interests of the stronger side, with minor considerations, modifications,
or delays due to Palestinian resistance or international reservations.
Blockade on Gaza
The Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip seems
to be one of those few great earthquakes that do change the view completely,
for better or worse. This is not the place, perhaps not the time either, to
evaluate the withdrawal as a whole; but at the moment, even here little has
changed. The Quartet's special envoy for the disengagement finds that Israel
is acting as if the
disengagement never happened. James Wolfensohn says "the Government
of Israel, with its important security concerns, is loath to relinquish control,
almost acting as though there has been no withdrawal, delaying making difficult
decisions and preferring to take difficult matters back into slow-moving subcommittees."
Typically, what Israel targets is Palestinian freedom of movement. The Gaza
Strip has no seaport nor airport; the border to Egypt is closed: "The Israelis
have not agreed to accept the EU's generous offer to consider the role of 'a
third party' in supervising the Rafah crossing temporarily," says Wolfensohn
in his report, and as for the Strip's border with Israel, Ha'aretz
(24.10.2005) reports that "since the pullout was completed, the Erez Checkpoint
has been almost hermetically sealed to Palestinian traffic. Before the disengagement,
6,500 people went through Erez daily. That number dropped in September to 100,
on average, and to zero at the beginning of this month. The Karni cargo crossing
has also been either closed or particularly slow." The Palestinians may
now move freely inside the 5 x 25 miles of the Strip, free of Israeli settlements,
but the economic and humanitarian
disaster due to Israeli strangulation from without has only worsened since
the withdrawal.
Apartheid Roads in the West Bank
But the real gambit of the Gaza pullout, in Israel's
eyes, is the West Bank. Barely a month after that pullout, using as pretext
an armed Palestinian attack killing three Israeli settlers, the Israeli army
closed Road 60
– the main intercity road of the West Bank, connecting the urban centers of
Hebron and Nablus with Jerusalem – to Palestinian private vehicles. Following
American protest, officials in Jerusalem clarified
that Israel had no new plans to separate Israeli and Palestinian traffic. That
is quite true: Israel has no such new plans. What is being implemented, step
by step, are very old policies. The settlers' far Right, always the best indicator
for the government's future plans, demanded almost a decade ago, years before
the second Intifada, to impose "complete and perpetual closure on the Arabs
of Judea and Samaria" (Moledet Party ad published in Ha'aretz, June
15, 1996); during the past half decade, this demand was more than met. As Gideon
Levy writes (Oct. 23, 2005),
"For nearly five years, the basic freedom of movement has been denied
to 2.5 million residents in the West Bank. … Most of the roads in the West Bank
are desolate, with no people or cars. On days [Shabbat] and hours when the settlers
are not traveling on them, they become ghost roads. … If you strain your eyes,
you will notice at the sides of the road the traffic lanes assigned to the Palestinians:
pathways through the terraces winding up the hills, goat paths on which cars
are sputtering, including those carrying the sick, women in labor, pupils, and
ordinary citizens who decide to place their life in their hands in order to
travel for two to three hours to reach the neighboring village."
The Permit System
There are about 700 checkpoints and roadblocks
spread throughout the West Bank. The checkpoints are not an ad hoc measure for
the short term; they are part of long-term policy. The checkpoints are supported
by an entire bureaucratic
edifice, responsible for the permit system. Incredible as it sounds, a Palestinian
needs an Israeli permit to pass internal checkpoints within the occupied territories
– not just from the Occupied Territories to Israel, but also between the different
geographical cells in the West Bank, whose borders are defined by the Israel
security forces; in order to get to the Palestinian enclaves that have been
created by the Wall; in order to move between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank;
and between both of these and East Jerusalem. The permits are issued by eight
so-called "District Coordination and Liaison Offices" (DCO) – historically
a joint Palestinian-Israeli institution of the Oslo period, but in fact the
authority to issue permits is exclusively in Israeli hands. The DCOs are chronically
– i.e., intentionally – undermanned; applicants wait for hours on end, treated
like cattle, humiliated by rude Israeli teenage soldiers who are given the chance
to play God over the helpless colonized subjects. At least one DCO (Nablus)
is located behind an Israeli checkpoint, which, absurdly enough, makes it inaccessible
to Palestinians without a permit – you have to have a permit in order to apply
for one. A permit is issued – or, more often, not issued – by a confidential,
unaccounted-for decision by Israel's notorious General Security Services. Estimated
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, mostly men, are blacklisted by the GSS
and cannot get even a magnetic card, which is a necessary, though not sufficient,
condition to get a permit of any kind. Appeals to a court or even just hiring
a lawyer often makes the GSS change their mind, exposing the total arbitrariness
of their previous rejections. Rules for blacklisting Palestinians are Kafkaesque:
if a Palestinian is killed by a settler or soldier, the whole family is blacklisted
– thus deprived of job opportunities, access to health and education facilities,
etc. – for fear of revenge. If issued, a permit can be valid for a few days
or for a month, from sunrise to sunset only; it has to be renewed regularly.
MachsomWatch activists in their extensive
annual report have countless heartbreaking stories to tell, like that of
the father not allowed to visit his two children, lying badly injured in a traffic
accident in Palestinian and Israeli hospitals in Jerusalem. The principle question
is, of course, why an individual needs a permit to get to his/her workplace,
or go to school, or visit the doctor, or to do any other mundane activity.
Stinkers and VIPs
The answer is obvious to anyone who knows a thing
or two about control mechanisms, especially colonialist ones. Permits of sorts
were imposed by apartheid
South Africa, by the Dutch in colonial Indonesia, and elsewhere. The colonizer's
gains are clear: divide-and-rule; destroying national coherence in favor of
separate, conflicting local interests; making the colonized too busy with survival
to oppose their oppression; and so on. The GSS have a more concrete motivation,
well phrased in the sentence that so many Palestinians discretely hear when
they apply for a permit: "We'll help you, if you help us." After all,
collaborators – "stinkers" in Israeli army jargon, "helpers"
as the official Israeli Newspeak terms them – are at the heart of every tyranny,
and the occupation run by the Middle East's only democracy is no exception.
If the only way to save your child's life is by betraying your brother, what
would you do? The permit system allows the Israeli forces to spot the soft points
of a Palestinian – a family tragedy, a sick child, a dying parent, financial
plight – and take advantage of them. The weakest is always the easiest prey.
On the other end of the ladder, or perhaps on the same, are the Palestinian
VIPs. Again, no tyranny can survive without them, and Israel is no exception.
Already in the Oslo years, when limiting the Palestinian freedom of movement
started, the occupation was wise enough to issue so-called VIP cards to the
Palestinian elite – politicians, intellectuals, businessmen. While the vast
majority of Palestinians have to chose between the legal torture (DCO, permits,
and checkpoints) and the illegal one (avoiding checkpoints by using goat paths
and pathways through the terraces), a thin layer of Palestinian VIPs can pass
any checkpoint in their air-conditioned cars, enter Israel rather freely, and
enjoy much of the freedom of movement denied their less lucky compatriots. The
benefits for the colonizer are again obvious: the co-opted elite has got something
to lose, which separates it from the powerless masses. The Palestinian elite
is thus complicit in the occupation; VIP cardholders deserve an accusing Palestinian
finger no less than the wretched persons blackmailed by Israel into collaboration.