Indeed, Sharon's claim that "restraint is power" must have
made Orwell turn in his grave. Seldom has a term been so successfully
abused, especially in the Israeli and American media (the Europeans
seem to be more suspicious). Israel's "restraint" comprises everything
from weekly assassinations by death squads, through "sweeping" (another
marvelous euphemism) countless acres of Palestinians fields and
bulldozing dozens of houses, to using the most advanced US-made
helicopters to target Palestinian facilities and persons. What else
can Israel wish? Mercilessly oppressing occupied territories while
the whole world is warning of worse to come (implying that the present
is not that bad) looks like the ultimate dream of any colonial regime.
Under such circumstances, why bother to go to war?
BLOWING UP OSLO
Tempting as it may be, this argument
misses the wider historical context. We have been reminded of it
recently by Ehud Barak, who seems ever more like a key figure behind
the moves that have led us to the present situation.
Barak has just given an interview to Newsweek
(23.7), the first since his defeat last February. Not much of
it is new, but it is useful as a summary. "Oslo was based on a set
of assumptions" about Arafat's conduct, says Barak. "When I took
power, there was only one path that I found reasonable either
to unmask Arafat or to take calculated risks if we found him a Palestinian
Sadat, ready to put an end to the conflict." Now, President
Sadat got back 100% of Egypt's occupied land, free of settlements.
Barak implies that President Clinton (not Israel!) offered Arafat
"90 to 91 percent [of the West Bank]," and note than the last
words are merely a Newsweek editorial interpolation. But
exposing Barak's demagoguery is not our business here. What we do
want to recall is that Barak opposed Oslo from the very beginning,
and even abstained in the Knesset vote on Oslo II. So the simple
interpretation of what he says here is that when he took power,
he decided to blow up Oslo. He may insist that "it was not a conspiracy
or a trick to push Arafat into a trap" and that "at the beginning
I thought [the chances were] maybe 50-50," but we cannot expect
a politician to say the whole truth. In fact, "50-50" is revealing
enough.
Barak's intentions at Camp David remember he and Clinton
forced Arafat to come are now further supported by an evidence
of key White House adviser Robert Malley who attended the talks,
previewed in the International Herald
Tribune and expected soon in the New York Review of
Books. Malley says "the Israeli prime minister helped set the
stage for failure by refusing to carry out some earlier agreements
with the Palestinians, including a commitment to turn over West
Bank land, by expanding Jewish settlements in the occupied territories
and then by pushing Mr. Arafat to agree on an all-or-nothing peace
deal." We also know that Barak prepared the army for war from his
very first day in office.
Barak may have casual embarrassing slips of the tongue (like
telling Newsweek that "If they [the Palestinians] were a
democratic society they would replace him [Arafat]" says the
democratically replaced, yet very reassured Barak). However, the
scheme described above was definitely not casual but a well-calculated
plan. Barak could not have implemented it alone: he needed, and
certainly enjoyed, the support of some active and retired Generals
who shared his objection to Oslo: people who believe that Oslo,
with Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, may sooner or later jeopardize
what they consider Israel's interest, i.e. the Occupation. Listen
to Barak: "I put an end to the process of giving him more and more
land just to find out in the end that we gave him everything [and
got nothing in return]." Again, note Newsweek's amazing editorial
interpolation.
Sharon, the opposition leader at the time, was certainly among
the initiated. He is at least as hostile to Oslo as Barak, and contrary
to a common belief, both men come from the same militaristic milieu
and have been close friends for decades. Barak was Sharon's favorite
and admiring general back in the early eighties. The outbreak of
the Intifada was their shared operation: Sharon's visit to the Temple
Mount that triggered the Intifada was coordinated with Barak.
The fact that former general Sharon, sitting in the opposition,
may have known what no minister (particularly Peres) knew is quite
a common practice in Israel's junta. For example, on the eve of
the 1982 Lebanon War the young general Barak submitted a plan to
Defence Minister Sharon on how to make war with Syria behind the
government's back, by relying on a small number of initiated officers.
(See Amir
Oren in Ha'aretz, 8.1.1999.)
So Barak went to Camp David in order to blow up Oslo. He did
it very successfully, so he can now proudly take the credit for
what he calls "the precondition for the Israeli unity which Sharon
enjoys" the belligerent unity which I termed "Barak's
Legacy."
It would be very naive to believe that Barak and his initiated
helpers carried out all this elaborate and sophisticated project
just to return to a constellation all too similar to what they had
opposed all along, with Arafat, the Palestinian Authority and the
old agreements that have to be kept. They would not have gone into
so much trouble just to "unmask Afarat" and then return to business
as usual with him. Their goal is definitely much more ambitious.
It seems to include as many sources now report an invasion
into the Palestinian Authority, causing its collapse, deporting
the highest Palestinian leadership and killing the rest. This is
Phase One, the basics. Phase Two is optional. It is often referred
to as "Chapter Two of 1948" and implies a mass-deportation to Jordan,
the ultimate Palestinian state in Sharon's vision for the Middle
East. If, however, President Bush successfully vetoes dragging Jordan
into war (after all, the Saudi oil wells are just around the corner),
Israel may skip this phase and move directly to Phase Three: use
the already forced division of the Territories into numerous separate
enclaves to crumble the Palestinians politically. After all, once
we get rid of President Arafat, it will be much more convenient
to negotiate separately with the Prince of Nablus, the King of Bethlehem
and the Emperor of Ramallah, all imposed and disposed of at Israel's
will. At that stage, the employment of an international (or rather
American) observers' force might become inevitable; Israel will
try to confine the observers' mandate to delivering rice and water
to the smashed Palestinians, or to policing them, thus saving Israel
money and casualties.
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Text-only
printable version of this article
Ran HaCohen
was born in the Netherlands in 1964 and has grown up in Israel.
He has B.A. in Computer Science, M.A. in Comparative Literature
and he presently works on his PhD thesis. He lives in Tel-Aviv,
teaches in the Department of Comparative Literature in Tel-Aviv
University. He also works as literary translator (from German, English
and Dutch), and as a literary critic for the Israeli daily Yedioth
Achronoth. His work has been published widely in Israel. His
column appears monthly at Antiwar.com.
Archived
columns
Mideast
War – Really Imminent?
7/24/01
The
State of the Army, Part Two
6/22/01
Building
Settlements, Killing Peace
5/26/01
The
State of the Army, Part 1
5/8/01
Israeli
Left Sells Out Peace
4/13/01
Barak's
Legacy
3/23/01
|
WHY BARAK RESIGNED
This historical context may shed
light on an unsolved mystery: Barak's resignation. Let us recall
that by his resignation Barak imposed general elections for the
Prime Minister's office only, but not for Parliament. This was a
very strange thing to do. Not only because Barak's defeat was unanimously
predicted all along, but because even if he had won the elections,
he would have remained with the very same Knesset that had caused
his resignation, a Knesset in which he had no stable majority. It
therefore seems that Barak actually wanted to be defeated, to leave
office without Knesset elections that might put the political map
in vibration and jeopardize his "achievements" in terms of preparing
the ground for war. He led the people out of the Oslo desert, but
didn't live to enter the promised war.
Did Barak outwit comrade Sharon by a sting, putting the old
horse before the cart at the crucial moment, letting him finish
the dirty job? Or, more likely, was it actually a gentlemen's agreement
within the junta, with comrade Sharon, too old to have any future
to risk, getting the ambivalent honor of doing the war, while young
Barak is allowed to cultivate his image as
"peacemaker" (Newsweek!), to be sold to
us in the aftermath of war as the junta's "peaceful alternative"?
(Newsweek: "Are you going to come back to politics soon?"
Barak: "It's not on the table right now.")
THE LAST HOPE
The future, however, is never deterministic.
Asked whether Israel should enter Palestinian territories, eliminate
the Palestinian Authority and get rid of Arafat, Barak answered:
"It should be a last resort, an option we are willing to contemplate
only if all other options have not worked and we have gathered international
support." So there is a will, there is a way, and there are
plans. They are waiting to be implemented like a ticking bomb. But
heavy international pressure could still stop the march to an even
greater bloodshed.
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