Elections
in the Middle East do not usually attract too much attention in
the international media. Who remembers the recent elections in
Iraq or in Syria? And who cares? Exceptions to this rule are Turkey
and Israel: both countries are considered democracies, even though
the concept of democracy needs considerable fixing and bending
to be applied to either. Indeed, both countries have a multi-party
system; but both have a long undemocratic tradition of oppressing
ethnic minorities (up to 1966, Arab Israelis were held under military
regime; since a year later Israel has been ruling millions of
Palestinians deprived of nationality and voting rights), and both
are to a large extent ruled by the army.
In
Turkey there is full awareness to this anti-democratic tension
between the elected parliament and the self-appointed military,
and the conflicts are often played out in the open. In Israel
the tensions between the Army and the elected leadership are almost
completely covert, both because the army is a constant participant
in the actual leadership, and because unlike in Turkey, in Israel
there has not yet emerged even a single political actor that stands
up against the army.
No
matter how often IDF officers and spokespersons are caught in
cover-ups, dirty intrigues and outright lies (their war-crimes
are simply denied), no matter how much waste, carelessness and
corruption any Israeli soldier sees whenever he is in the army,
polls show that the Israeli public trusts and respects the army
more than any other institution of the Jewish state, including
the Knesset and the judicial system. In fact, the whole Israeli
culture and identity is organised ever more around the army, with
the obvious price of excluding Israeli Arabs (they don’t go to
the army), discriminating against women (who serve a shorter period
and in inferior jobs), and a general preference to solve problems
by violence rather than by negotiations and compromise.
As
an illustration, take the new television channel, "Israel
Plus", which will air this week: Israel’s first national
channel in the Russian language. The growing legitimacy given
to the country’s multi-culturalism is laudable; but what replaces
the Hebrew language and culture as social cement in a melting-pot?
One look at the advertising poster of "Israel Plus"
is enough to find out: it depicts a smiling young Israeli officer,
in full uniform, hugging an elderly war veteran with dozens of
Soviet medals on his chest. The message is clear: Russian grandpa
was fighting the Nazis, Israeli grandson is fighting the Arabs,
we all belong together because we are all soldiers (and our enemies
are all Nazis).
Who
Rules Israel
Cabinet,
Knesset, parties etc. play a marginal role in Israel: they serve
as democratic fig-leaves, to distract public attention from the
actual centres of power, and to give comfortable jobs to those
who serve the junta best, with retired officers over-represented
all along the line (retiring officers usually "go shopping"
among the bigger political parties and join the one that offers
them most).
In
fact, Israel is not run just by its elected government, but by
a triumvirate consisting of the Chief of Staff (or the army top),
the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. It has been so for
decades, but severed considerably in the last two years: the new
Intifada radically changed the balance of power between cabinet
and army in favour of the latter. Even a senior main-stream analyst
like Ben Kaspit of Israel’s second-biggest daily Ma’ariv,
who studied the subject and published two shocking articles (6.9.02,
13.9.02) on the extent to which the army had its own political
agenda and imposed it on the cabinet, concludes: "Israel
is not a state with an army, but an army with an affiliated state".
This
fact is obscured by the relative lack of conflicts between the
Army and the government – i.e., the two key ministers – simply
because they are usually retired army generals themselves. Take
the last few years: in 1999, former Chief of Staff General (ret.)
Ehud Barak became both Prime Minister and Defence Minister simultaneously
(Chief of Staff was Shaul Mofaz). He was succeeded last year by
General (ret.) Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister and by General (ret.)
Benyamin Ben Eliezer as Defence Minister. And last week, when
the latter resigned, he was swiftly replaced by General (ret.)
Shaul Mofaz, Chief of Staff just three months earlier. When, however,
the cabinet musical chairs are taken by outsiders, things get
rough: for example, Ben Kaspit reports that when Benjamin Netanyahu
was Prime Minister, he demanded that the army make plans for withdrawal
from occupied South Lebanon; the army, unwilling to co-operate
with an elected Prime Minister who was not a retired general,
refused and declined.
Do
the Elections Give Hope?
So
are the coming elections important or not? Well, they are definitely
not very important, because only the political leadership will
be elected and possibly changed, not the army top that shares
power with it. If, however, one or two of the key cabinet positions
fall into the hands of non-generals, it will be a good sign.
This
perspective gives us a good tool to evaluate the coming primaries
in both Labour and Likud. On one hand, we have the junta members
trying to hold sway: in the Likud it is Sharon, in Labour – Ben
Eliezer. If both retired generals are re-elected in their respective
primaries, they are most likely to co-operate again after the
elections, resuming the winning recipe that worked so well until
last week: giving the army a free hand in its a murderous policy
towards the Palestinians (and possibly Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran
and any other enemy that the US would allow them to attack), backed
by a soft Labour rhetoric on the propaganda front, especially
abroad (with Shimon Peres, who was never a soldier but gave the
Israeli junta the most precious gift of all – nuclear weapons
– as an obedient spokesman).
On
the other hand we have the "civilians". In Labour, where
primaries are to be held on 19.11, Chaim Ramon and Amram Mitzna
are challenging Ben Eliezer. Ramon, a man with no military record,
a dangerous populist who has so far destroyed whatever he claimed
to repair (most notably Israel’s strongest trade-union and Israel’s
public health system), seems to lag behind in polls. Haifa’s mayor
Amram Mitzna, the favourite candidate in current polls, has decisively
taken dovish positions almost unheard of in Labour. He rejects
the idea of "having no partner on the Palestinian side",
spurns the cynical argument of "no negotiations under fire",
and openly calls to dismantle settlements. Mitzna is indeed a
retired general – which undoubtedly accounts for some of his popularity
– but a general with a "stain": he asked to resign in
protest after the massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps in
Sabra and Shatila in 1982. Though Labour’s chances to win the
elections do not look good at the moment, a victory for Mitzna
in the primaries may shift public discourse considerably and help
overcome the devastating, so far undisputed ideological legacy
of Barak, who turned Israel and its supporters world-wide
into a choir playing in unison the national anthem, in which God
reigns in heaven but everything on earth is Arafat’s fault.
In
the Likud, Netanyahu will be challenging Sharon in the 28.11 primaries.
Risking the fury of most of my friends, I dare say that Netanyahu
– who left the army as a junior officer with no real military
carrier – was quite a good Prime Minister (not only in comparison
to his disastrous successor Barak). Not that I subscribe for a
single moment to his hawkish positions and extremist economic
neo-liberalism – but because of his very weakness, due to having
little or no backing from the army and from Israel’s established
elite. His weakness at the top induced more pluralism at lower
levels inside Israel, as well as more flexibility towards outside
pressures; Netanyahu went the Oslo way, and even the settlements
flourished considerably less in his time than under Barak. Due
to his permanent defamation in the media, the return of Netanyahu
is a nightmare for many Israeli liberals; I am more optimistic.
A
victory for any of the challenging "civilians" will
be a small victory over the army. The army will undoubtedly fight
back and try to force the elected leadership to continue the present
project of destroying the Palestinian people (operation "fighting
terrorism"), hoping to drive them out sooner or later. The
government will not risk confronting the army directly, but it
might try to restrain it (and it might obey, or not). This is
the hope in the coming elections, and these are its limits: a
real change in Israel’s policy is unlikely. But breaking the bloody
unison of Sharon/Ben Eliezer/Mofaz/Yaalon will be something of
an achievement too.
Ran HaCohen
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