Figuring out the direction President Barack Obama's
foreign policy will take has become a full-time job for pundits and foreign
diplomats in Washington. And a key question on everyone's mind is how exactly
Obama will seek to exert influence as the American Empire shrinks.
A clear consensus among Washington cognoscenti on the direction of "Obadiplomacy"
has yet to emerge, despite nearly two years of presidential campaigning and
a full slate of Cabinet nominees. This points to two possibilities. First,
that Obama has a coherent foreign policy vision and a strategy to implement
it, but that he and his aides are keeping it top secret a great skill for
those who want to win victories in the games that nations play. Or, Obama does
not have a grand diplomatic strategy à la Cold War containment
or the "war on terror." If such is the case, the evolution of foreign
policy under Obama could be a process of trial and error, a cost-effective
diplomatic approach in which major decisions are made in response to political
and economic pressures at home and abroad.
If the second possibility eventually comes to define the Obama presidency,
we can be certain of one thing the Washington foreign policy elite will not
be sated. Whether they are on the Right or the Left, hawks or doves, liberal
internationalists or neoconservatives, foreign policy "professionals"
tend to gravitate to grand strategies that reflect their favorite intellectual
fads or narratives like Fukuyama's
End of History, Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, Kaplan's Coming Global
Anarchy, or the neocons' Islamofascism threat. Intellectuals are drawn to global
crusades to promote a collective good that tends to be transfused with a sense
of adventure and romance.
But after eight years of foreign policy fantasies, the notion of an Obama
administration muddling through foreign policy choices should be welcomed,
even by those who will be disappointed if the new president's choices fall
short of our high expectations.
In making our predictions about Obama's policies, many of us project our hopes
and fears. Many opponents of the neoconservative agenda supported the Obama
candidacy based on his opposition to the invasion of Iraq, his stated willingness
to dialogue with Iran and Syria, and his apparent commitment to resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Compared to the ideologues and fanatics who were
recently in charge of U.S. diplomacy, Obama has seemed like a staunch member
of the antiwar camp. This explains much of the enthusiasm that he garnered
among antiwar bloggers during the Democratic primaries, when he challenged
then-Sen. Hillary Clinton, who had voted in favor of the congressional resolution
authorizing the invasion of Iraq.
But there is a certain element of wishful thinking in this image of Obama.
Obama's earlier opposition to the Iraq War corresponded to the constituency
he represented as an Illinois state senator. But he never proposed that his
position on Iraq was grounded in any left-wing or progressive anti-interventionist
principles. Instead, he reiterated several times during the campaign that he
respected the realpolitik types who were responsible for the more
traditional diplomacy of the first President Bush. In fact, the Wall Street
Journal reports Obama consulted with one of these realist luminaries,
former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, about his foreign policy
picks for the new administration.
Some hopes of progressive and libertarian antiwar activists were already dashed
when Obama announced he would retain Robert Gates as defense secretary and
nominate Hillary Clinton as secretary of state and retired Gen. James Jones
as his national security adviser. The non-interventionists' mood was probably
not improved after reading reports about the potential role that former Clinton
administration aides like Martin Indyk, Dennis
Ross, or Richard Holbrooke known for their pro-interventionist approaches
might play in the administration. Indeed, those of us who were hoping, wishing,
and praying for the making of a new U.S. foreign policy paradigm one that
would disengage militarily from the Middle East, end the special relationship
with Israel, withdraw from NATO, terminate military pacts with Japan and South
Korea, and take a less belligerent approach toward Russia were bound to be
disappointed by many of Obama's selections for his foreign policy team.
But then Obama never stated that he would embrace the non-interventionist
agendas of Taft Republicans or McGovern Democrats. President Bush père
and President Clinton have been his role models when it comes to diplomacy
and national security. And these two were both committed to maintaining the
U.S.' dominant position in the post-Cold War era, including through the use
of military force. It is true that neither Bush père nor Clinton
embraced the more ambitious neoconservative policy proposals that called for
invading countries in the Middle East and establishing a permanent U.S. military
presence there. And while they and their aides occasionally employed Wilsonian
rhetoric, they never had any urge to "liberate" Iraq and implant
democracy in the Middle East. Theirs was a pragmatic or opportunistic foreign
policy that took advantage of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the
only potential challenger of U.S. hegemony, as well as America's economic might,
to establish a dominant U.S. position in the Middle East and East Asia, to
expand NATO to the borders of Russia, and to continue calling the shots at
the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. Under them, Washington
was able to maintain an American Empire whose military and economic costs were
largely acceptable to the U.S. public.
Obama, with the help of the Clintonites and the Scowcrofts, is hoping to recreate
that kind of cost-effective Pax Americana. Applying diplomatic means to reach
a "grand bargain" with Iran and to revive the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process could permit the United States to withdraw its troops from Iraq
and reassert its influence in the region. Creative statesmanship could also
help reduce tensions in South Asia and create the conditions for stability
in Afghanistan. Working more closely with the European Union (EU), the country
could bargain and make deals with the Russians. And then there is America's
"soft power," pumped-up by the sex appeal of Mr. Cosmopolitan Cool
himself, which might win the hearts and minds of Muslims everywhere.
Indeed, during his inaugural address, Obama seemed to reiterate the kind of
internationalist and realist principles embraced by Bush père
while avoiding any mention of an "axis of evil" or a "war on
terrorism." Instead, he projected a mix of tough pragmatism and soft idealism.
'"We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist,"
he said, sending a message to Iran, Syria, and other governments Bush II refused
to engage and sought to isolate. And he specifically addressed the Muslim world,
"To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest
and mutual respect."
Two days after entering office, Obama announced that former Sen. George Mitchell
would be his special envoy to the Middle East to help revive the Israeli-Palestinian
process, and that former Clinton aide Richard Holbrooke would serve as his
special envoy to South Asia. Obama's selection of the Lebanese-American Mitchell
and not of Dennis Ross, an American-Jewish diplomat perceived as being one-sidedly
sympathetic to Israel, was seen by some as an indication that Obama intends
to embrace a more evenhanded approach toward the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
Moreover, there is a rising expectation in Washington that Obama will use
his charismatic and cosmopolitan persona, including his quasi-Muslim roots,
to re-energize U.S. diplomatic influence and accentuate its commitment to be
an honest broker in the Middle East. Obama and his skilled foreign policy advisers
will demonstrate that Washington can now revive the dormant Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, overcome the many obstacles to a political settlement, and help
bring peace to the Holy Land.
At least that's the way many in Washington and the media seem to see things.
They insist that not before long, the Obama administration will bring stability
and peace to Middle East (and South Asia and the Caucus and
) where supposedly
everyone is waiting for the United States to exert its leadership role. If
Obama builds America's "standing" in the world, they the Israelis
and Palestinians (and Indians and Pakistanis) will come to the negotiation
table and make peace.
But once again, these high expectations may not be fulfilled. The problem
is that the United States of 2009 has clearly lost its position as the Global
Number One. It could find it very difficult to secure even the less ambitious
goal of being first among equals. The debacle in Iraq coupled with the horrific
costs of the financial crisis have eroded U.S. military and economic power,
and, by extension, diplomatic influence. This change in the balance of power
is driven to a large extent by growing public opposition to the Iraq War and
to new military interventionism.
The country's diminished leverage is also demonstrated in the failure to contain
Iran's rising power and growing influence through surrogates in Iraq, Lebanon,
and Palestine. Notwithstanding strong opposition from the Bush administration,
Israel decided to open negotiations with Syria while Lebanon invited Hezbollah
to join the government. Moreover, the Europeans and the Egyptians not the
Americans played the leading role in achieving a cease-fire during the recent
Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip.
If Washington could not get an Israeli-Palestinian peace process going at
the height of the 2000 "Unipolar Moment" when the Israelis and
the Palestinians were less radicalized and led by strong and moderate leaderships
there is little reason to expect President Obama will become an instant Holy
Land peacemaker. With a worn-out military and an economy in a downturn trajectory,
Obama and the rest of Washington will be forced to recognize this reality,
sooner or later. But the process of a great power adjusting to changes in the
balance of power tends to be long and painful.
Economists have drawn attention to the time lag between when an actual economic
shock (such as a sudden boom or bust) occurs and when it is recognized by economists,
central bankers, and the government. The existence of this time lag or, to
use the economic term, recognition lag explains why, for example, it has
taken economists so long to signal the current economic recession..
One can identify a similar lag between the time when an international crisis,
like a military conflict, takes placeand the time when officials, pundits,
and the public recognize its effect on the global balance of power. Hence,
in the immediate aftermath of World War II, which devastated the military and
economic power of the two leading empires, Great Britain and France, it was
still common for officials and journalists to refer to these declining nation-states
as Great Powers.
The same kind of lag can be observed in the way officials and pundits have
failed to recognize the combined impact of the Iraq War and the financial crisis
have had on America's long-term standing in the international system. There
is a tendency in Washington to attribute its declining influence to the Bush
administration's mismanagement of U.S. diplomacy and national security policy.
But even the most visionary and competent U.S. president will be constrained
in his ability to "do something" whenever an international crisis
takes place or to create incentives for global and regional players to work
Will Iran be interested in playing diplomatic ball with the U.S.? Will the
Europeans continue to follow U.S. leadership or will they try to make separate
deals with Russia? China and India are climbing up the economic and military
ladder just as America seems to be stepping down. Realpolitik in the
Obama Age could prove to be a painful cost-cutting exercise as Washington readjusts
to the realities of the post-neoconservative era. In that case, imperial retrenchment
could prove to be the default choice of the new president.
Reprinted courtesy of Right