MARKET
NATIONALISM TRIUMPHANT
The
case of Kostunica is the clearest, and one that I have
written about at length. The circumstances that led to
the Serbian revolution are well-known: a clique of national
socialists, led by Milosevic, seized power in Belgrade
after Titoist "multiculturalism" fell apart, but these
gangsters never had any real stature in the eyes of their
people. After their defeat in the Kosovo war, the Serbs'
national spirit collapsed along with the socialist economy.
The nation was faced with the dual crisis of national
identity and economic survival. Defeated by the overwhelming
force of US-NATO military might and the natural might
of the market, the response of the Serbian people was
to adapt to the latter and resist the former. Kostunica's
brand of classical "rule of law" liberalism, austere and
Hayekian in style and substance, was married to an equally
stern nationalism, one that opposed US hegemony in the
region and refused to countenance the myth of Serbian
war guilt. In this sense, then, Kostunica's victory represented
the triumph of a free-market nationalism over its socialist
rival.
SLOBO'S
END
Milosevic
represented the last degenerated remnants of the old left-nationalism
that forged the formerly Socialist republic of Yugoslavia,
one that prided itself on its independence from both superpowers
during the cold war. But Yugoslav left-nationalism could
not deliver in the realm of economics: it ended in a hierarchical
party-state as archaic, blinkered, and doomed as the old
Soviet Union. Milosevic had played the nationalist card
one too many times, and couldn't deliver in that
realm, either: having presided over a long series of defeats,
it was almost inevitable that he would finally be ousted
from power.
AMERICA'S
WAR ON KOSTUNICA
The
right-nationalism, or, more accurately, liberal
nationalism represented by Kostunica is embodied in a
single concept, that of sovereignty – the
sovereignty of the individual within the nation, and the
sovereignty of nations within the international community.
This brought Kostunica into conflict with Milosevic and
the US. Milosevic is no longer a problem: he effectively
disposed of himself by refusing to recognize the legal
victory of the Opposition. But now Kostunica is up against
a much more powerful, if no less vicious enemy, the US
government. The relentless US campaign to force Yugoslavia
to recognize the "legality" of Carla del Ponte's kangaroo
court – even at the cost of undercutting the US position
against submitting itself to the International Criminal
Court – is just the overt part of the American campaign
to make life difficult for Kostunica. Those Albanian "rebels"
who somehow get across the most heavily militarized border
in Europe and conduct raids and regular shelling in southern
Serbia were trained and directed by the US: are we to
believe that the US has absolutely no say in their
inner councils? The US is conducting a war on Kostunica's
Yugoslavia on two fronts: politically, by undercutting
his nationalist support on the "war crimes" issue, and
militarily, in southern Serbia.
IN
THE SHADOW OF DEFEAT
Half
a world away, the ascension of Junichero Koizumi to the
leadership of Japan occurred under broadly similar circumstances.
Here, too, is a defeated nation: US troops still occupy
Japanese soil, over fifty years after the end of World
War II. All this time they have lived in the shadow of
their defeat. The result: a postwar malaise far more severe
than that experienced by the Serbs. Here, too, an economic
crisis has recently gripped the nation, and this was really
the catalyst, the initial tremor that cracked the smooth
facade of the system. While there are many differences
between the Yugoslav and Japanese models of the party-state,
both systems relied on central planning and the political
dominance of a single party. Both of these parties –
in Japan, the Liberal Democrat party, and in Serbia, the
Serbian Socialist Party – traced their roots to the
immediate postwar period, and were products of the war.
In both cases, the stage was set for a liberal (in the
classical sense) reformer to challenge the party hierarchy
and open up the system. Both Kostunica and Koizumi are
seen by their supporters as modernizers, the enemies of
entrenched state-privileged interests, and a force for
cultural and spiritual renewal.
MISHIMA
WAS RIGHT
To
the superficial observer, this last may seem to be outside
the parameters of any foreign policy analyst. However,
when we take the continuing US military occupation of
Japan into account, the question of Japanese national
identity – and the vital importance of a rising Japanese
cultural nationalism – comes into play. For right
alongside Koizumi's plans to privatize the nation's postal
system – which is, in Japan, a central institution,
one that holds a great deal of the national wealth –
is his plan to amend the 'peace' constitution imposed
by the US. As it now stands, the Japanese constitution
clearly forbids the formation of a military force: as
Yukio
Mishima told the members of the Japanese Defense Force
as he exhorted them to rebel : "You are unconstitutional!"
Mishima was right, back then, but no one listened. Now,
as the North Koreans shoot missiles over Japanese airspace,
the Japanese are listening. Koizumi is acting to
rearm Japan, doing what Mishima – before he
committed seppuku as a political protest –
had demanded in the 1960s, and amend the 'peace' constitution
to give Japan the right every other nation takes for granted.
RISING
SUN
Like
Kostunica, Koizumi is a liberal nationalist – and,
also like Kostunica, is unapologetic about this last.
His decision to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, where many
Japanese war dead are buried, has caused a storm of controversy
in Asia. The Chinese, Koreans, and others raise objections
because Japanese leaders convicted of war crimes are also
buried there. Yet Koizumi
refuses to back down in the passive "so sorry" manner
of a typical Japanese politician: "I will visit the shrine
as prime minister because I want to pay respects to those
who sacrificed themselves in war," he said. "I still don't
understand why I have to give up the visit (as prime minister)
only because others would complain about it." He refuses
to bow before the myth of Japanese war guilt, and this
is a rising trend in Japan. The
release of the new movie "Merdeka" [Independence]
is a bellwether of the Japanese mood: Merdeka tells
the story of 2,000 Japanese soldiers who chose to stay
behind and help the Indonesians defeat the Dutch (and
the British) after World War II. This movie, in tandem
with the release of Japanese history textbooks that tend
to show Japanese expansionism in the 1930s as a fight
against Western colonialism, is part of a growing nationalist
trend – one that can only culminate in the demand
for an end to the US occupation.
THE
BEST LAID PLANS
The
US response to the Koizumi-nationalist upsurge in Eastasia
is quite different from its reaction to the Serbian variant
of the same phenomenon in the Balkans. there have been
a slew of stories (here's
one) about how part of the Bush "plan" for an Asia-centered
foreign policy is a stronger military role for Japan.
But in remilitarizing Japan, the administration is overlooking
the political and cultural consequences. The US hopes
to use Japan as its regional gendarme, a virtual extension
of the US military, a kind of auxiliary policeman. But
the whole point of movies like Merdeka, textbook revisionism,
and the cultural transformation that will have to be a
part of Japanese rearmament, is that the trend is in the
other direction. This raises the question: who will police
the policeman? The significance and central theme of this
Nipponese nationalist resurgence is that Japan, not China,
is the champion of "Asian values" against Western (i.e.
US) hegemonism. How will the US keep a remilitarized and
newly confident Japan a vassal state? This question is
bound to vex US policymakers in the not so distant future.
BERLUSCONI,
THE REFORMER
Berlusconi
fits less obviously than into the liberal nationalist
mold: his liberalism is less pronounced than Kostunica's,
and his nationalism less apparent than Koizumi's. Yet
the pattern holds. Here is yet another reformer, albeit
one with a reputation smeared by phony charges of "corruption."
This is largely the result of a campaign conducted by
the "ex"-Communists and their allies on the Italian (and
European) left, but there is a grain of truth to it: in
Italy, any commercial success must first overcome the
tangle of legal restrictions, regulations, and myriad
taxes that make any kind of capitalist act between consenting
adults well nigh impossible, if done "legally." In Italy,
every real estate transaction carries two sets of books
– one, the official record, kept for tax purposes,
and the other, unofficial one, that reflects what actually
occurred. When the deal is sealed, the real records are
disposed of, and the transaction is complete. No one is
the wiser: otherwise, no transaction would ever take place.
Italian voters cast their ballots for Berlusconi's "Forza
Italia" ticket because they believe he will legalize what
they do already. Like Koizumi and Kostunica, Berlusconi
is up against a rigidified, reified state-centered economic
system that no longer works, and he is promising to fix
it by, largely, sweeping it away.
THE
SOVIET UNION OF THE WEST
In
the foreign policy realm, Berlusconi is pledged to a united
Europe, and has so far voiced no dissent from the pro-NATO,
pro-US stance of his predecessors, whether Christian Democrats
or socialists of one variety or another. But his coalition
partners – the post-fascist Allianza Nationale,
and the separatist Northern League – are belligerent
critics of the pan-European "vision" emanating from Brussels,
and are not likely to stand idly by while Italy surrenders
its sovereignty to a socialist super-state. Insofar as
the US stands behind the European project, and opposes
not only all nationalist resistance but also all regionalist
and separatist movements, it is bound to come in conflict
with the forces unleashed by Berlusconi's victory. Sections
of the Italian right are viscerally hostile to the US
and NATO, and bitterly opposed the Kosovo war: wouldn't
it be fun if, say, one of Umberto Bossi's boys (perhaps
Bossi himself) was appointed to the foreign ministry?
That would show those arrogant Belgians who's boss
south of the Alps! After all, it was Bossi who said of
the EU that it is "the Soviet Union of the West": a clearer
and more trenchant description of the EU's political orientation
would be hard to imagine.
THE
DEVIL IN BERLUSCONI
The
"House of Freedom" built by the man they call "Il Cavaliere"
(the Knight) has many subdivisions, some of which have
already caused consternation among Europe's socialist
elite. But what has really caused dismay on the left has
been the victory of a man they tried to demonize –
and who won, not in spite of his devilish characteristics
but precisely because of them. The great irony
of the Italian election was that here was all of Europe,
with its state-owned media, television, radio, newspapers,
all blaring away about how the media tycoon Berlusconi
will create a state where dissent is impossible. His media
empire, you see, is private: he built it himself, and
not at the expense of the taxpayers: and this is precisely
what they resent – that even before taking office
he had the kind of power, usually reserved for governments,
to unleash a wave of propaganda. Even now they are complaining
that he must separate his own private interests from his
position as head of the Italian state. But why should
the Knight disarm himself? Will the socialists of Europe
divest themselves of their state-subsidized perks and
privileges, and surrender control of their state-owned-and-managed
media? Don't hold your breath. . . .
ANCHORING
THE SHIP OF STATE
Here
is a man who made billions: who built one of the biggest
media empires in the world, and one of the largest fortunes
in Europe: an upstart, a rebel, "Il Cavliere" – Italy's
Knight. In his persona, the sheer size of his ego, his
very public and outgoing personality, he embodies the
very opposite of the gray bureaucrat, the cold fish without
personal distinction of any kind. They sneer that he named
his party – "Forza Italia!" ("Go Italy!") –
after a soccer team. The people, on the other hand, love
it. If any one man in Italy can keep a government together
by the sheer force of his personality, and popularity,
it is Berlusconi: he is a giant beset by pygmies. He is
a leader, perhaps the stabilizing larger-than-life leader
Italy has been waiting for, who will anchor the nation
with the sheer weight of his persona.
OUT
WITH THE OLD . . .
The
old nationalism, a nationalism of blood and soil, of protectionism
and state-controlled industries, of perpetual war and
one-party rule, is finished. It was finished in 1945,
at least in the developed world. The new nationalism that
is cropping up in diverse locales, from Eastasia to southern
Europe, is based not on resentment – although there
is some of that – but on a sense of renewal. It is
not the blind worship of tradition, but the rediscovery
of a lost legacy, dusted off and brought up to date. It
is, in short, a liberal nationalism, informed by a knowledge
of market economics and imbued with a sense of liberation
– the feeling that a large weight is being lifted
off the backs of the people. Serbia, Japan, and Italy
– the inhabitants of these countries are prisoners
of history, held hostage by their defeats. These three
mavericks of liberal nationalism – Kostunica, Koizumi,
and Berlusconi – are all faced with different variations
on the same task: to somehow reverse the verdict of history
and redeem the nation. To roll back the disability of
military defeat and economic crisis, and reassert their
sovereign and separate national identities.
.
. . IN WITH THE NEW
This
is the overarching theme of the new liberal nationalism,
when its national peculiarities are sifted out: whether
in Serbia, Japan, in Italy, or elsewhere, the rebels against
the new world order are nationalists whose devotion to
liberty is congruent with their fight for national independence.
They are, in a sense, libertarian nationalists, a seeming
paradox if not a contradiction – just like our own
founding fathers, whose devotion to liberty did not prevent
them from founding a state, writing a Constitution, and
defending their revolution. But if these emerging liberal
nationalists are like the early American revolutionaries,
then what role does the United States play? You guessed
it: let Bush II be George III, and imagine our American
"peacekeepers" are very much like British redcoats –
you know, like in The Patriot. But this
is not a movie: it is a reality all three of our mavericks
have to deal with – US troops on or uncomfortably
near their territory.
THE
IRON LAW OF IMPERIAL DECLINE
We
keep hearing about how America's strategic vision must
be either "Asia-centered" or "Euro-centric," based on
"civilizational" versus "ideological" premises: but never
do we hear about a foreign policy based on what we know,
that is, a policy based on the clear lessons of history.
And the first topic in this syllabus is the iron law of
imperial decline: empires rise, and then they go downhill,
and that is the natural order of things. As with schoolyard
bullies, so with empires: the bigger they are, the harder
they fall. There is no American "strategic vision," no
array of weaponry, that can stand against the aspirations
and interests of the rest of the world. What is heartening
about the rise of a specifically liberal nationalism
is that it may not come to that.
THE
GOOD NEWS
Unlike
left-nationalist and authoritarian figures like Milosevic,
Saddam Hussein and the dynastic dictator of North Korea,
liberal nationalists can oppose Western hegemonism in
the name of the Western tradition and thus engage the
American (and pan-European) policy of global interventionism
politically – before they have to do so militarily.
This makes it difficult for the War Party. After all,
it was easy convincing the Americans and the Europeans
that a two-bit crook like Milosevic was a genocidal monster
on a Hitlerian scale, but selling the image of Kostunica
as a human monster isn't going to be so easy. How are
they ever going to stick Berlusconi with the label "IL
Duce II" if he comes across like an Italian version of
Ronald Reagan with a dash of Howard Hughes? And Koizumi
– the bold, tousle-haired, outspoken free market
reformer could hardly be caricatured as some kind of Japanese
warlord. When the inevitable clash with America's imperial
pretensions comes, it will be a lot harder to demonize
these relatively sympathetic figures, and, for American
anti-interventionists, that is good news indeed.
AN
EASIER JOB OF IT
During
the cold war and through much of the post-cold war period,
opponents of American globalism have defended the national
sovereignty of countries ruled by some pretty nasty regimes.
The Communists were not the good guys, and, even though
they were doomed from the start, they made a lot
of trouble on the way down. Things have been no easier
in the post-cold war era. Saddam Hussein, it must be said,
is no Thomas Jefferson, and Milosevic was no angel either.
Manuel Noriega was not at all a sympathetic character,
and the various and sundry other recipients of US bombs
and military action (Afghanis, Somalis, Sudanese, Osama
bin Laden) are not exactly candidates for sainthood. With
the rise of liberal nationalists as the emerging opponents
of American hegemony, we have a much more sympathetic
cast of characters and our job, as non-interventionists,
here at Antiwar.com, is a lot easier – and that is
welcome news indeed.
MY
ENTHUSIASMS
I
sometimes get letters from readers who puzzle over my
enthusiasms. Why "hail" Koizumi? Why declare "Viva Berlusconi"?
Wasn't I going outside the narrow confines of my job as
the defender of the non-interventionist position in taking
up Kostunica's cause so fervently and constantly? Well,
now you know the reasoning behind my enthusiasms –
or, at least, some of them. These three mavericks of liberal
nationalism represent more than just themselves: they
embody an idea, a trend that is apparent in the nations
over which the American Empire presides, one that could,
in the end, prove its undoing. It is not enough to simply
report US interventions abroad, and then simply say: "We
should stay out." For in that case the reporting of facts
is irrelevant and unnecessary: why not just jump to the
proper conclusion, and keep reiterating "we should stay
out"? The idea is to identify and encourage sources of
opposition to US intervention: paraphrasing Marx, it is
the impulse to not only understand history but to change
it.
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