Despite a reduction in violence over the past
15 months, "the U.S. risks getting bogged down in Iraq for a long time
to come, with serious consequences for its interests in other parts of the
world," according to a new assessment by the same group of experts
who advised the bipartisan blue-ribbon Iraq Study Group (ISG) in 2006.
The assessment, which was released on the eve of critical congressional testimony
this week by Washington's ambassador and chief military officer in Iraq, concludes
that the decline in violence has resulted in very little progress toward achieving
national reconciliation and that gains in security remain "fragile and
dependent on the presence of U.S. forces."
"Political progress is so slow, halting, and superficial, and social
and political fragmentation so pronounced, that the U.S. is no closer to being
able to leave Iraq than it was a year ago," according to the report released
by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and entitled "Iraq
After the Surge: Options and Questions."
"Lasting political development could take five to 10 years of full, unconditional
U.S. commitment to Iraq," it concluded, noting that such a commitment
already "carries a massive cost, both human and financial, in addition
to the global interests the U.S. is sacrificing to its commitment in Iraq.
Even if progress in Iraq continues, the results may not be worth the cost,"
it warned.
The report, which lays out three possible options for U.S. policy in Iraq
over the next year or so, comes just two days before Ambassador Ryan Crocker
and Gen. David Petraeus are to ask that Washington suspend its current drawdown
of U.S. "surge" forces in Iraq at the anticipated 140,000-troop level
by the end of July to ensure that security gains achieved over the past year
can be sustained. At the height of the surge several months ago, Washington
had about 170,000 troops in Iraq.
That recommendation, which appears to enjoy the backing of U.S. President
George W. Bush, is likely to be hotly disputed by Democrats in Congress who
favor continuing to withdraw combat troops at the rate of about 5,000 a month
through the end of the year – a position privately shared by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who have fretted publicly that maintaining high levels of
deployment in Iraq is taking an unsustainable toll on both the morale of U.S.
ground forces and their readiness to deal with other potential military crises.
The new USIP report, which represents the views of scores of military and
regional experts who advised the bipartisan, congressionally appointed Iraq
Study Group (ISG) two years ago, will almost certainly give the dissenters
ammunition in their questioning of Crocker and Petraeus.
The ISG, which was co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and
former Democratic Rep. Lee Hamilton, had called in December 2006 for withdrawing
all U.S. combat troops by April 2008, leaving the remaining troops – around
80,000 – to focus on training and equipping Iraqi security forces, conducting
operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq, and protecting U.S. civilian personnel.
Bush, however, rejected that recommendation and opted instead for a surge
strategy that increased U.S. troop strength by about 30,000 in hopes that the
additional forces would substantially reduce sectarian violence in and around
Baghdad and encourage Iraq's warring political and religious factions to make
the compromises necessary for national reconciliation.
While the strategy has made major advances on the
security front, progress toward reconciliation has
been largely consisted of "tactical horse-trading"
designed above all to satisfy minimum U.S. "benchmarks"
– such as revenue sharing and a reform of the de-Ba'athification
laws – to ensure Washington's continued support,
according to the report.
"[T]hough positive as far as it goes, [it] has not alleviated the underlying
causes of political instability in Iraq or facilitated the emergence of a truly
national polity," the report concluded, noting as well that "much
of [the] success [of the current strategy] is due to factors that are outside
U.S. control and therefore subject to change."
Among those factors are a cease-fire by the Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and
the willingness of former Sunni insurgents "stridently opposed to the
[Shia-led] Iraqi government" to cooperate with U.S. forces against al-Qaeda
in Iraq.
The report suggests two possible alternatives to
the current policy of an "unconditional"
U.S. commitment to Iraq.
The first, an echo of the 2006 ISG report, calls for a "reduced, conditional
commitment" that would tie future U.S. support for the government in Baghdad
to a few minimal goals – creating a mechanism for oil-revenue sharing,
holding provincial elections to formalize a decentralized power structure,
and professionalizing a nonsectarian army to "guard the state and police
factional violence."
If Baghdad failed to make meaningful progress toward
these goals by the end of this year, then the U.S.
would withdraw its forces according to its own timetable.
If it did make such progress, Washington would still
reduce its forces and focus on training and equipping
the Iraqi army and helping it prevent factional violence.
A second option would be an "unconditional, near-total reduction of the
U.S. military commitment" coupled with "an enhanced security presence
in the region, an invigorated diplomatic effort [directed primarily at Iran
and Saudi Arabia], and continuing political support for the Iraqi government."
Each of these options, including the current strategy of unconditional commitment,
carries different risks and possible benefits for U.S. interests in Iraq, the
region, and beyond, according to the report, which identifies five "paramount
interests" affected by U.S. policy in Iraq.
They include preventing Iraq from becoming a haven or platform for international
terrorists; restoring U.S. credibility, prestige, and capacity to act worldwide;
improving regional stability; limiting and redirecting Iranian influence; and
maintaining an independent Iraq as a single state.
The report addresses the possible impact of each of the three scenarios on
the five interests. Maintaining the current strategy, it concludes would have
a "major negative impact" on Washington's capacity to act worldwide;
a reduced, conditional commitment would, on the other hand, have a "positive"
impact on that capacity, while an unconditional, near-total reduction of commitment
would have a mixed impact by, on the one hand freeing up U.S. military capacity,
while, on the other, risking the "perception of U.S. defeat."
(Inter Press Service)