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March
8, 2001
The
Fourth Balkan War
On
Tuesday night it seemed as if the Albanian militants who invaded
the Macedonian border village of Tanusevci [Tanushevtsy] were
retreating, unhindered,
into Kosovo after Monday’s pitched battle with Macedonian
forces. Despite the fierce fighting, government forces did
not manage to dislodge the militants, who were well-armed,
even better positioned, and protected by minefields. Three
Macedonian soldiers were killed
during the operation – two hit
landmines and bled to death, as Albanians shot
at KFOR helicopters that tried to evacuate them, while
one was killed by sniper fire. Parallel to NATO’s statements
that the militants were supposedly retreating, the government
in Skopje said the insurgency was far from over. The army
detected traces of militants that suggested other villages
in the area might have been affected. Prior experience indicates
that this is not the last Macedonians have seen of the "National
Liberation Army," or the last attempt of militant Albanians
to carve out their desired Balkan empire.
ONE,
TWO, THREE
Early
in the 20th century, the continued Ottoman occupation
of Balkan lands was of great concern to those nations that
spent the prior century struggling for their freedom. In 1912,
they formed a coalition and attacked the Turks in what became
known as the First
Balkan War, driving them almost all the way back to the
Bosporus before Austria-Hungary intervened to stop the Turkish
defeat. The great powers then dictated the terms of peace,
creating Albania as a state and limiting the territorial gains
of Serbia and Greece. Bulgaria, unhappy with its share of
the spoils, attacked Serbia in 1913. Other allies joined Serbia
and defeated Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War, which gave
the Turks a chance to recapture some territory and cut Bulgaria
off from the Aegean. Events of the 1990s could justifiably
be called the Third Balkan War – as events from 1991 to 1995
represented a continuum that ended with the Dayton
Agreement, once again a solution forced upon the combatants
by the world powers. Given that the fighting in Kosovo, which
started in 1998, stopped only under a temporary armistice
between NATO and Yugoslavia in June 1999, we might as well
face the stark reality that we are in the middle of the Fourth
Balkan War. The stakes are as high this time as they were
ninety years ago, or ten years ago, and the bloodletting may
have just begun.
CAUSES
OF WAR
At
the heart of this Fourth War is the Albanian drive for separation,
not only from Serbia but from Macedonia, Greece and even Montenegro.
Whether this separation serves the purpose of a "Greater
Albania," or a "Greater
Kosovo" seems immaterial. The program of Greater
Albania is, after all, advocated by Kosovo Albanians more
than any others, and the future capital of this "country"
is supposed to be in Pristina, not Tirana. Albania proper
may be on the periphery of events right now, and could even
express public
criticism in order to deflect bad press, but there is
little doubt it would join a Greater Kosovo if that monstrous
creation ever came into being.
PATTERNS
OF BEHAVIOR
From
what little is known of them, it seems the Albanian militants
in Macedonia have the same modus operandi as those
in southern Serbia, even the KLA in Kosovo. It seizes and
holds a village or multiple villages, provoking an armed response.
At the same time, it rants and raves to the international
press about the horrible "repression"
Albanians are subjected to. Once attacked by government forces,
the insurgents fight hard, then withdraw, taking or ordering
many civilians along. These "refugees" are then
used to bolster the militants’ claim of "genocide"
now pursued by the government that have until then merely
"repressed" them. Of course, the militants declare
their absolute commitment to a peaceful solution, which invariably
entails the de facto separation
of the territories they claim, and its placement under
international protectorate or armed occupation. This "peace
process" should be "mediated" by an external
broker, preferably NATO or the US. This was the case at Rambouillet
in early 1999, and the Albanians claiming Presevo valley in
southern Serbia are demanding
it be the case again. If the pattern holds, Albanians from
Macedonia are likely to make a similar demand in a month or
so. All along, however, these militants will refuse to disarm,
retreat or disband, claiming their existence is necessary
to "protect and defend" their people. They are,
of course, open to the possibility of "demilitarization"
by submitting to NATO command and getting on the payroll,
as the "reformed" KLA did by transforming into the
KPC.
EASY
PICKINGS
Another
mark of Albanian militants is that their attacks usually follow
the path of least resistance. If fought decisively they will
retreat and regroup, but never quit. At this point, Macedonia
and Yugoslavia are both theoretically strong enough to deal
with the militants. However, they are hobbled by NATO’s insistence
on restraint and, in come cases, indirect
support for the militants. In Yugoslavia’s case, the lingering
effect of the conflict with Kosovo militants has left a bad
taste in Belgrade’s mouth – not to mention depleted uranium
marks – and seriously undermined
the new government’s will to fight. Barred from resolving
the issue themselves, they demand of NATO to intervene
on their behalf. The logic of this is most peculiar, especially
in the case of Yugoslavia, officially still the enemy of NATO
in Kosovo. For if Yugoslavia were not
considered an enemy, there would be no need for KFOR’s
continued occupation.
Both
Macedonia and Yugoslavia have other problems, which further
weakens their capability for self-defense. Macedonia has to
find a way to act without alienating a large Albanian population,
whose representatives are part of the ruling coalition government.
The issue of its official name and southern border, which
was about to be resolved with Greece, was postponed due to
the Albanian attack, and represents a permanent strategic
liability.
Yugoslavia
also has to deal with a potentially fatal issue of Montenegrin
secessionism, running more rampant as the country weakens.
The cobbled-together government of Serbia is very politically
unstable and often contradicting itself. As if that weren't
enough, the US-funded War Crimes Tribunal continues to blackmail
and pressure
Belgrade on the issue of its former leaders, indicted for
alleged (and yet unproven) war crimes as a boost to NATO’s
position during the 1999 war. This relentless pressure also
magnifies the scope of new Albanian claims of "repression
and genocide," propaganda which defies countermeasures
in a US/NATO-dominated media world. Even Macedonia has to
be sensitive to these accusations, because Balkans mud does
not come off easily.
LOCAL
INTEREST
The
surrounding countries are also interested in the progress
and outcome of the conflict. In the west, Croatia hopes the
region would calm down but also secretly hopes Serbia would
be further weakened and eliminated as a rival. Croat and Muslim
ethnic interests in Bosnia are also watching, hoping that
Serbia’s defeat could open the possibility of "revising"
the Dayton treaty by taking
out the Serbs within Bosnia’s boundaries. In the most
moderate scenario, the Serbs would be assimilated into a unitary
state. In some less amicable plans, they would meet the fate
of Croatian Serbs at the end of the Third War.
In
the north, there is a growing possibility that Serbia’s province
of Vojvodina
might split off if Albanians have their way. A sizable Hungarian
population there could likely advocate annexation
by Hungary. Bulgaria could also hope to increase its territory,
by marching into what’s left of Macedonia after the Albanians
are done. Some fear that Bulgaria’s offer to
send troops to help fight the Albanians might be the first
act of just such a move. Moreover, a week ago Bulgaria’s president
signed a treaty with NATO giving its troops free
access to all of Bulgaria.
Greece
has plenty of reasons to worry, as Albanian aspirations include
some of its territory as well. If Albanians are allowed to
expand and grow stronger, it may be just a matter of time
before Greece is "asked" by its NATO allies to relinquish
the so-called "Chameria"
region, "in the interest of regional stability,"
of course.
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