For the Bush administration, the approaching U.S. showdown with Iraq is merely a preliminary step in a much more ambitious, indeed monumental, undertaking. That undertaking aims at nothing less than remaking the entire Middle East. Understanding why U. S. officials have concluded that such a project is not only plausible but even imperative requires an appreciation of the deep-seated convictions informing present-day American grand strategy.

That strategy rests on four distinct but related propositions.

First, the imperative of America's mission as vanguard of history.

On this point, despite his long since forgotten promises of humility, George W. Bush is adamant: The United States, alone among all the world's nations, has discerned and manifests history's purpose. The end toward which history tends is self-evident. It is freedom, embodied by the American Way of Life. Among other things, freedom requires the universal embrace of democratic capitalism, according to President Bush, the "single sustainable model for national success."

Second, the imperative of international openness and integration.

The creation of an international order open to free enterprise has long been a central objective of American statecraft. Since the 1990s, globalization has endowed global openness with a sense of inevitability.

Sweeping aside barriers that impede the movement of goods, capital, ideas and culture, globalization promises boundless new opportunities for the creation of wealth. But it does much more: globalization imprints onto its beneficiaries the sensibilities of the project's chief sponsor. A world opened up by the forces of globalization will not only be more affluent; it will also be freer, as Americans define freedom. It will be more democratic, as Americans understand democracy.

But globalization is not to be confused with social work. An open global order in which American enterprise enjoys free rein and in which American values, tastes and lifestyle enjoy pride of place is a world that benefits the United States most of all. As Raymond Aron observed over a quarter century ago, "A world without frontiers is a situation in which the strongest capitalism prevails."

Third, the imperative of American "global leadership."

Only the most devout disciple of Adam Smith counts on the market's "invisible hand" to keep order in a globalized world. Someone has to be in charge. If there is one point on which the entire American foreign policy establishment agrees, it is that only the United States - "the indispensable nation" - can play this role.

In one sense, leadership means lighting the way, with America, the first "universal nation," serving as a model for others. But modeling alone will not suffice. In the final analysis, according to President Bush, "the advance of freedom depends on American strength."

In other words, leadership requires assertiveness. Today's Pax Americana rests on one large, indisputable fact: The United States enjoys unquestioned primacy in the Western Hemisphere, Europe and East Asia. The coming war with Iraq will cement U.S. hegemony in a fourth region, the Persian Gulf.

Finally, the imperative of military supremacy, maintained in perpetuity.

Sept. 11 showed how precarious the utopia promised by a globalized world is likely to be. Protecting Americans from terrorists and rogue nations requires the ability to crack heads. Like Hollywood's worldwide domination of the motion picture industry or the globe-straddling omnipresence of American fast-food franchises, U.S. military supremacy is something that most Americans now view as part of the natural order.

Furthermore, the American inclination is to take the fight to the adversary, wherever that adversary may be. When President Bush declares that "the best defense is a good offense," he affirms a cardinal principle of the American military tradition.

Thus does the Pentagon configure U.S. forces less "to provide for the common defense" than to project power globally, eliminating threats to the open order and to American dominion even before they develop. Hence, the logic and the appeal of preemption.

The strategy derived from these principles is an imperial one, a fact recognized in most of the world's capitals, denied only in Washington - denied, that is, not only by those in power but also by those in opposition. And there lies the rub: As long as we persist in our collective refusal to acknowledge that we are engaged in the management of global empire, what passes for foreign policy "debate" will amount to little more than quibbling over tactics. Critics of the Bush administration will wring their hands, but will offer no clear-cut and practical alternative.

Meanwhile, the United States will find itself shouldering an ever-expanding array of commitments and responsibilities and the inexorable militarization of American policy will continue.