I would not bet against an American invasion of Iraq
in the near future. The Bush administration has invested
too much political capital in building the case against
Saddam Hussein.
Even so, I refuse to give up hope that a shift in
public opinion could, if not stave off war, then at
least mitigate some of the more ambitious plans of
conquest and reshaping the entire Middle East that
drives many of the hawks who seem to have the upper hand
in the administration.
Many Americans seem quite comfortable with the notion
that the Sole Superpower has the uncontested right to
wage a preventive war - not a pre-emptive war, for the
threat is potential and speculative rather than anything
resembling imminent - whenever it decides to do so.
That this would make the United States the aggressor
instead of the defender of sovereignty against an
aggressor (as was at least arguably the case with the
1991 gulf war) seems to bother many Americans not at
all.
But you might think some would pause to consider the
likelihood that waging a war would make many of the
problems and uncertainties that have been used to
justify an aggressive posture against Saddam Hussein
worse rather than better.
THE THREAT OF INCREASED TERRORISM
We were plunged into the awareness that there is an
irregular and aggressive campaign against the West and
much of what it used to stand for with the terrorist
attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. We are rightly concerned that
more terrorist attacks may be in the offing.
But waging war against Iraq - even assuming it can be
accomplished as quickly and as easily as the more
optimistic hawks believe - is more likely to increase
the threat of terrorist attacks than to diminish it.
We saw Osama bin Laden resurface last week, urging
faithful Muslims (by his delusive definition) to
redouble terrorist and suicide attacks when a war
against Iraq begins. Despite administration efforts to
spin it that way, bin Laden's diatribe did not
demonstrate an alliance between Iraq and al-Qaida;
indeed, bin Laden went out of his way to denounce
Saddam's regime and declare that it will have to go come
the fundamentalist apocalypse.
Instead, it showed that bin Laden is opportunistic,
using the likely invasion to recruit followers.
Bellicose American statements and a long campaign to
develop a believable rationale for the war many American
policymakers have wanted since Sept. 12 - and long
before that in some cases - gave bin Laden this
opportunity. Following through will enhance that
opportunity.
Surely most decent Muslims reject bin Laden's
extremism, but who doubts that among 1.2 billion Muslims
worldwide at least some will be impelled by an American
invasion to heed the siren call and take up box cutters
or other weapons?
Ahmed Yassin, the Hamas leader in Gaza City, has also
called on Muslims to attack U.S. nationals and "threaten
Western interests and strike them everywhere" the moment
the war begins. CIA Director George Tenet and other
government figures have acknowledged that starting a war
against Iraq will increase the threat of terrorist
attacks.
Although the government has been typically cagey, it
is more than possible that the current Orange threat
level that has led to a run on duct tape is related to
the imminence of war in Iraq among other factors.
So waging war in Iraq, in my view and in the view of
many, will increase the threat of terrorism. We will be
less safe rather than more safe.
THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Administration spokespeople have expressed great
concern over the likelihood that Saddam Hussein has
biological and chemical weapons.
So what would make it more likely that Saddam would
actually use such weapons? Again, CIA Director George
Tenet in testimony last September confirmed what is
commonsensical to anybody who gives it a moment's
thought: Saddam would be more likely to use them in the
event of war.
Saddam didn't use them in the 1991 gulf war, perhaps
in part because he was somewhat deterred by open hints
that we would nuke him if he did. But this time we are
after "regime change." If he is a goner anyway, what
incentive does he have not to take lots of infidels down
with him? Given his twisted mentality, might he see it
as a glorious way to go down?
So waging war almost certainly would make it more
likely chemical and biological weapons would be used
against Americans.
THE TRANSFER OF WEAPONS TO TERRORISTS
We are afraid that Saddam, rather than using nasty
weapons himself, would transfer them to terrorist
groups. He hasn't done this so far, and the evidence is
that there is little love lost between him and the
Islamic fundamentalists who are the most conspicuous
current terrorists.
But it is at least possible that he might do so in
the spirit of a temporary alliance of convenience, even
though he knows he would be the first suspect should a
chemical or biological weapon be used in a terrorist
attack.
How much more likely would he or some of his
underlings be to transfer weapons to terrorists if the
war were going badly and they knew they were about to
lose or die?
Or how much more likely would it be, in the chaos of
war, especially war in which the Iraqis are in the midst
of being routed, that terrorists or terrorist
sympathizers could gain access to chemical or biological
weapons that are normally fairly well guarded?
Or how possible might it be that some Iraqi officers,
seeing that the war is going badly, would snatch some
nasty weapons and head for the remoter parts of the
desert either planning to organize guerrilla resistance
against U.S. occupation or to hook up later with some
terrorist groups and exact revenge?
The assumption behind all these scenarios is that
from a strictly military standpoint the war goes rather
well for the United States and we gain a relatively
swift and decisive military victory.
Yet a strong case can be made that in terms of the
kinds of things some Americans seek to fix through war -
terrorist attacks, use of nasty weapons, proliferation
of such weapons to terrorist groups - the world would be
a more dangerous place for America and its interests
(however defined) because of the war.
STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
There's also the question of stability in the Middle
East, a notably volatile part of the world.
The grand dream of many pundits - see Michael Ledeen,
Paul Wolfowitz, Bill Kristol, Fred Barnes, the Weekly
Standard magazine, the Wall Street Journal editorial
page - is that the United States wins the war with Iraq
and imposes or facilitates a relatively democratic and
decent regime, paying for it all with future oil
revenues.
The best-case scenario is that other countries,
inspired by the success of the Iraqi model, follow it
through peaceful means and establish benign democracies
and a peaceful and prosperous Middle East.
The somewhat less-best-case would be to take Iraq and
then look for the next target of opportunity, whether
Iran, Syria or Saudi Arabia, that could be pushed toward
democracy with only a little military impetus from the
Sole Superpower.
Either of these scenarios strikes me as implausible.
More plausible would be increased fundamentalist
activity in certain regimes and a long period of bloody
conflict that might well threaten Israel in ways the
current Intifada could never do. And there's the pesky
question of whether democracy would yield stable,
peaceful pro-Western states or fundamentalist regimes.
A fundamentalist party (though fairly moderate and
benign just now) won the recent elections in Turkey.
Fundamentalists won in Algeria (leading to invalidating
the election) through democratic means a few years ago.
It seems at least as possible that genuine democracy
(however unlikely) throughout the Middle East would lead
to more fundamentalist regimes than to regimes friendly
to the United States and eager to live in peace with
Israel.
Would a war make everything worse? Perhaps not. But a
strong case can be made that it would make almost all
the current and potential problems that now serve as
psychological and emotional justification for war worse
- and by a lot rather than a
little.