Iran claims that it can produce enough weapons-grade uranium for
a nuclear weapon within a year. According to Undersecretary of State
John Bolton, "We cannot let Iran, a leading sponsor of terrorism,
acquire nuclear weapons." Bolton claims that the "regime has to
be isolated in its bad behavior" (although if North Korea is any
example, such action will simply accelerate Iran's quest for nuclear
weapons). Bolton also wants "concerted, immediate intervention by
the international community."
But since so many of the assumptions about the threat posed by
Iraq have been so wrong, the United States needs to avoid the same
mistake of rushing to judgment about Iran.
It's easy to paint a picture of Iran as a threat to America. After
all, it's a country ruled by Islamic fundamentalist clerics who
are hostile to the United States. And because al-Qaida's radical
Islamist ideology is also fundamentalist, many people don't see
any difference between the two. Finally, most Americans haven't
forgotten the 52 Americans taken hostage after the U.S. Embassy
in Tehran was seized in November 1979. So Iran is considered a long-standing
nemesis. That doesn't automatically make it a grave threat.
Iran claims its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. The
United States assumes otherwise based on the discovery in December
2002 of two secret nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities at Natanz and Arak.
Previously, Iran's nuclear program was thought to be confined to
the light-water reactor facility in Bushehr.
Subsequently, the International Atomic Energy Agency found traces
of highly enriched uranium, deemed questionable for non-military
purposes, and blueprints and parts for P2 centrifuges suitable for
producing weapons-grade plutonium. Iran has since announced that
it was going to resume centrifuge activities, which are allowed
for peaceful nuclear energy but not for making weapons.
Although Iran's claims about being able to build a nuclear weapon
within a year could be boasting, it's clear that Iran's nuclear
program is more advanced than Iraq's was. But even if Iran is able
to build a few weapons in the near future, the mullahs in Tehran
can no more ignore the reality of deterrence and the vast U.S. strategic
nuclear arsenal than could the Soviet Union before or North Korea
now.
To be sure, a nuclear-armed Iran would not be a welcome situation.
But it may well be a situation that the United States must find
a way to live with or else face the prospect of war. Indeed, if
one accepts the logic of pre-emptive action, the United States would
have to wage war against the 12 nations with nuclear weapons programs
that the Pentagon says are extant and emerging threats.
A legitimate concern about Iran's nuclear aspirations is that
country's ties to terrorism because, by definition, terrorists are
not deterrable. According to the State Department, "Iran remained
the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003." It's no secret
that Iran provides funding, safe haven, training and weapons to
anti-Israeli groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. But, like Iraq,
Iran has not supplied terrorist groups with chemical or biological
weapons to use against Israel. So it's not clear what incentive
Iran would have to give nuclear weapons to terrorists. Indeed, Israel's
nuclear arsenal (believed to be as many as 200 warheads) serves
as a powerful deterrent against Iran taking such action.
Iran's terrorist ties were also cited by the 9/11 Commission,
which implicated Iran in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing and cited
"strong evidence" that Iran facilitated the transit of several al-Qaida
members before 9/11 (including perhaps eight or more of the hijackers).
The commission did not say, however, that Iran was involved with
the attacks. President Bush responded to the possibility of an Iran-al-Qaida
connection with rhetoric that sounded like an instant replay of
accusations made against Iraq in the run-up to that war - claiming
Iran was harboring al-Qaida leadership, had a nuclear weapons program
that must be dismantled and needed to stop supporting terrorist
groups.
The potential Iran-al-Qaida connection is a serious issue that
deserves further investigation. But without clear evidence that
the regime in Tehran was involved in 9/11 or is otherwise supporting
or harboring al-Qaida, the United States cannot afford to wage another
unnecessary war as it did against Iraq.
Even if the idea of a war against Iran seems unlikely or absurd
(especially with 140,000 U.S. troops tied down in Iraq), some hawks
advocate the so-called Osirak option (referring to Israel's pre-emptive
strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981) against Iran. (Indeed,
it's entirely possible that the Israelis might choose to do the
same thing again.)
But whether it's a U.S. or Israeli operation, the risk is how good
the intelligence is on the location of Iran's nuclear facilities.
After all, the United States was surprised to discover that Iran's
nuclear activities were not limited to Bushehr, so are there other
unknown sites? Even a limited strike with precision weapons against
Iran could be a dangerous roll of the dice.
Ultimately, the United States is left with having to choose from
a menu of less than savory options in response to Iran's nuclear
weapons program.
Efforts to convince the Iranians to give up their quest for nuclear
weapons should not be abandoned, but success in that long-shot strategy
cannot be the only acceptable outcome.
Other options must be explored, such as how to limit the size and
scope of Iran's nuclear weapons program and arsenal so that it is
not a direct threat to the United States, and ensuring that weapons,
materials and technology are not transferred to terrorists.
But that's not likely to happen if the U.S. policy towards Iran
is to isolate it. For now, that leaves engagement as the most prudent
course of action that could yield a productive outcome.