The
election of Vojislav Kostunica as the new president of the Yugoslav
federation will undoubtedly present the citizens and political elites
of Yugoslavia with an opportunity to re-conceptualize and re-articulate
the political relations that define the current common state between
Serbia and Montenegro. Concurrently, the new president will be confronted
with many difficult obstacles in his quest to solidify democratic institutions
and the rule of law in the Yugoslav federation. However, let us presuppose
that the political differences between Serbia and Montenegro will be
reconciled and that the issue of Kosovo and Metohija will continue to
be unresolved with the international community attempting to establish
a dialogue between Serbian and Albanian political representatives. The
first question that the new president will need an answer to is; Does
the international community support substantial autonomy for Kosovo
within Serbia or does it support the American plan to take Kosovo out
of Serbia and make it a constituent republic in some new, possibly temporary,
Yugoslav arrangement? With Dr. Kostunica expected to arrive in Washington
in November, one may argue that the new president needs to come to Washington
with a plan not only to receive financial assistance, but with questions
regarding the American position on the security architecture that Washington
has facilitated and institutionalized in this part of Europe.
Since
the end of the Cold War, a new security architecture has emerged and
been institutionalized in the Balkan Peninsula. This has largely occurred
due to the emergence of new states and the influence of world powers
and regional powers in this part of Europe. The new security architecture
has also largely emerged with little or no media attention in Western
countries. Confronted with these new geopolitical realities, the emerging
states in the Balkans have signed over 60 military agreements on defense
cooperation with neighboring states and with state actors outside of
this geographic region in Europe. Thus, the Balkan region has become
the only region in the world where so many military agreements on defense
cooperation have been consummated in such a short time period.
The
relative paradox here is that these military agreements present serious
questions about whether or not the current security architecture in
the Balkans is intended and able to promote regional stability and peace
over the long term. What is striking about developments in the Balkans
is that little or no effort has been made to analyze the substantive
context of most of these military agreements. The only realistic attempt
at examining this issue in Serbia has been attempted by the Belgrade
based Independent Centre for Geopolitical Studies, 'JUGOISTOK.' While
there is a pressing need to assess the role of these military agreements,
one should rather briefly concentrate on illustrating and elucidating
how the United States has attempted to deal with developments in the
Balkan region.
At
the end of the Cold War, the United States was in an unprecedented position
to lead the international community and effectively influence the international
agenda. However, in order for effective and lasting peace to prevail,
there was a realization in Washington that, in order to be successful,
the United States was mandated to pursue a policy of multilateralism
with its allies. This included engaging states like Russia and the NATO
allies in order to build a transatlantic consensus on how to achieve
a lasting and just peace in areas of the world that were troubled by
political conflict. While a policy of engaged multilateralism was the
preferred method of exercising American leadership and influence, the
establishment in Washington was also well aware of the strategic imperative
that the United States continue to maintain a limited presence on the
European continent. In order to achieve this strategic goal, the United
States publicly adhered to the policy of multilateralism, while in reality,
the United States pursued its own foreign and security policy in the
Balkan region.
Harold
Mackinder pioneered the idea that the Central-East European heartland
is the vital springboard for the attainment of continental domination
in Eurasia. He popularized this concept in the following aphorism: "Who
rules Eastern Europe commands the heartland, who rules the heartland
commands the world island, who rules the world island commands the world."
With most of the world population situated on the Eurasian continent,
with its vast human and natural resources, the interests of the United
States in maintaining its hegemonic position in world affairs will depend
on its ability to decisively influence this strategic continent. This
is why the Bismarckian strategy advocated by many is the premise on
which American foreign and security policy rests today.
Therefore,
in order for the United States to maintain its engagement on the world
stage, it was vital to have a decisive presence on the Eurasian landscape.
This is why the American presence and influence in Europe is crucial
to American national interests. Without such a presence, the United
States would be excluded from this vast landscape and would cease to
be a major factor in the immediate affairs of Eurasia. The United States
has a direct interest in promoting the institutions of NATO because
it is the most significant transatlantic institution that binds the
United States to a military and political presence in Europe. Without
NATO and American leadership of this transatlantic organization, American
interests in Eurasia would be in question, but not necessarily compromised
since America has an abundance of military bases in Turkey. NATO and
American leadership in this organization are, however, vital if America
is to sustain its dominance in Eurasia and influence the process of
'democratic transitions' and 'consolidations' not only in Europe but
in the former Soviet bloc nations as well.
With
the reunification of Germany and its 'firm' commitment to Europe and
the integrative process of the European community, the necessary conditions
were created for the United States to maintain its hegemonic position
in Europe. However, a reunited Germany, with a population of roughly
80 million, along with a large industrial base, really presented the
United States with an opportunity to continue and enhance a strategic
partnership with Germany in Europe. There is an overwhelming consensus
in Washington today that Germany should become the leader or economic
engine of a united Europe. This preference for Germany by the foreign
policy establishment has enabled the United States to continue to use
Germany and Turkey as vital geopolitical pivots on the Eurasian continent.
However, it should be noted that European integration does not solely
depend on Germany alone. It also depends on the ability of France and
Germany to reconcile their differences and on their ability to harness
a co-operative relationship. European integration without France or
Germany, along with the importance of NATO, will be in doubt unless
the United States takes the interests of both of these countries into
consideration.
In
fact, the French who see themselves as a natural leader of Europe dating
back to Napoleonic days, have at times been at odds with the United
States over common security and foreign policy issues. When the Cold
War ended, Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer, stated that
"the unipolar moment" meant that with the close of the century's three
great wars [World War I, World War II and the Cold War], an ideologically
pacified North "sought security and order by aligning its foreign policy
behind that of the United States." As the United States seeks to promote
and enhance the German position in Europe, the French and the British
to a lesser degree have begun to pursue foreign policy objectives outside
the realm of the Atlantic Alliance and sometimes in direct conflict
with the United States. For example, the French have sought to gain
contracts in Iran for the establishment of an oil pipeline and have
been active in trying to get the sanctions regime on Iraq lifted.
However,
where the interests of the alliance have really come into question is
over the situation in the former Yugoslavia. In the wars of the former
Yugoslavia, Germany has largely supported its former World War II proxies
the Croatians, Bosnian Moslems, and the ethnic Albanians in Serbia
at the expense of the Serbs, who historically opposed German
expansionism in the two world wars of the last century. The French,
the British, and the Russians have at times openly voiced their opposition
against such a policy while the United States has, to a large degree,
fallen in line with the historic German and Turkish positions on developments
in the south of Europe. Whether or not this is a concession to Germany
and Turkey is not the question, but any solution in the former Yugoslavia
will have to take into consideration not only the interests of Germany
and Turkey, but also those countries of Europe that used to be closest
to the United States, Britain and France.
The
complexity of this argument is convincing if we use the Dayton Accord
for Bosnia as a paradigm in which to see great power relations at play.
The achievement of Dayton was that it became a compromise whereby the
maximalist aims of the three warring factions were not realized in the
final peace agreement. It also required a consensus on the part of the
Contact Group before negotiations could begin in Dayton, Ohio. One might
hypothesize that the two questions the Europeans are asking nowadays
is: Does the rearmament of the Bosnian Moslem side by the United States,
through the 'Arm and Equip program', imply a commitment by the US to
the division of Bosnia accepted in Dayton or does it imply something
else? And does the failure of international forces in Serbia to completely
demilitarize the KLA imply a commitment by the United States to the
peace agreement established to end the war or does it imply something
else as well? What one may believe is that the final decision has not
been taken, and that is a possibility that cannot be ignored. Moreover,
the various ethnic groups in this part of the world can attribute the
ambiguity that has arisen from this American policy to the lack of cooperation
and implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and of the peace
agreement with Serbia.
On
the other hand, the pressures on Washington to honor the compromise
of Dayton and the peace concluded at the end of the Kosovo war with
Serbia are still quite considerable. However, if the United States was
to manufacture a round two in which the Moslems beat the Serbs and Croats
in Bosnia and if Kosovo was to be de jure and de facto detached
from Serbia, there would undoubtedly be a price to pay in the relationship
with Britain, France and Russia. Now maybe it's a price that Washington
will be prepared to pay these days: maybe Washington believes that the
Germans and the Moslem world are much more important then the old allies,
the Western European fringe that used to be closest to the United States.
If this scenario were to unfold, then the conflict in Bosnia and the
conflict in Kosovo will have proven something not about the Balkans,
but rather, it will have proven something about the major players in
Europe and their relationship to Washington.
It
is obvious that Dr. Kostunica's immediate concerns are focused on dealing
with and solidifying the economic and political transition that is taking
place in Yugoslavia. The European Union has led the way in helping Yugoslavia
come out of international isolation in order to begin the process of
reintegration into Europe and the world community at large. However,
before Serbia and Montenegro can truly contribute to Balkan peace and
stability, Dr. Kostunica will eventually need to have answers from Washington
about the role of Serbia and Montenegro in the increasingly American-dominated
security architecture in the Balkans. Unfortunately, where the Balkans
are concerned to date, the United States has until now pursued a policy
of punishing, demonizing and disenfranchising the Serbian people by
refusing to recognize their basic human rights and right to self determination,
something which they readily afforded to the other ethnic communities
in the former Yugoslavia. Dr. Kostunica has recently raised the issue
of cooperation or resistance to the international community: Serbia
could take either of these two roads. But one may believe that the answer
for Serbia and Montenegro does not lie in these two highly ambiguous
terms. The answer lies in Dr. Kostunica's ability to ascertain from
Washington realistic answers to the questions posed above.
Mirko
Dakovic is a Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Independent
Center for Geopolitical Studies 'Jugoistok' in Belgrade, Serbia.
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