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America's
military and diplomatic relationship with Croatia in the 1990s evolved
with little or no public or media attention. This study will focus on
illustrating how this relationship developed and will demonstrate that
Washington's move to consolidate a new security architecture in the
Balkans was premised on furthering and strengthening America's strategic
presence in Eurasia. Through established predispositions regarding who
America viewed as an adversary in this part of Europe, the Clinton Administration
facilitated the emergence of a new security architecture by deliberately
choosing to view the Serbians as the primary obstacle to Washington's
strategic objectives in the Balkan region. At the end of the Cold War,
the establishment in Washington did not initiate a serious strategic
review in order to create new forms of cooperation and bilateral security
arrangements in this part of the world. Rather, with the end of the
Cold War, it looked to the Balkans as a means to consolidate its strategic
presence in Eurasia, to give NATO a renewed sense of political and military
purpose, and to further the drive towards a unipolar new world order.
The implications for European security, NATO, great power relations,
and regional stability are enormous, and as Robert Kaplan once argued
correctly, "the future of Europe will not be decided by what happened
in Maastricht, but rather, by what happens in Macedonia."
Constructing
the new security architecture in the Balkans did not happen over night
nor was it improvised along the way. In fact, it is the product of serious
long term planning by the establishment in Washington; planning which
actually predated the implementation that the Clinton Administration
undertook once it came into the Oval office. What is surprising, however,
is that the United States began its defense cooperation with a regime
in Croatia that was intrinsically committed to rehabilitating its fascist
past. The Clinton Administration was well aware of the ideological inclinations
of the Tudman government, yet this did not preclude it from looking
to Croatia as a strategic ally or proxy in this part of Europe. Simplified,
the goal of the establishment in Washington with regards to Croatia
had several lines of strategic reasoning and continuity. These goals
in order of strategic priority were as follows; consolidate America's
political and military presence in Europe, strengthen Croatia's military
while bolstering it's strategic position in the Balkan region, and lastly,
bind them into Washington's web of existing security arrangements.
Obstacles
to Defense Cooperation & The Role of Military Professional Resources
Incorporated (MPRI)
The
first American military attache was sent to Croatia soon after formal
diplomatic relations were established between the two states in August
of 1992. However, an impediment to evolving relations between Croatia
and Washington was the Tudman government's involvement in attempting
to carve out a Croatian statelet in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is not
to say that Washington was opposed to this eventuality down the road,
but for strategic purposes at the time, the immediate concern of the
Clinton Administration was to pacify this Croatian goal from becoming
a geopolitical reality. This impasse was overcome by Washington's ability
to convince Croatia into supporting the formation of a fragile federation
in Bosnia between the Moslems and Croats in March of 1994. Having achieved
this objective, one of the necessary conditions was in place for substantive
defense cooperation to begin between the United States and Croatia.
The Clinton Administration needed Croatian acquiescence on the Bosnian
federation in order to further Washington's strategic objectives and
long term interests in the Balkans. These immediate objectives were
focussed on safeguarding the survival and sustainability of an independent
and unitary Bosnian state. A terminally fragile Bosnian state was a
key strategic imperative for Washington because it would continue to
provide the raison d'être for America's and NATO's presence in
the region for generations to come.
Having
secured Croatian cooperation, the other immediate obstacle that was
overcome was getting Croatia to sign on to a defense cooperation agreement
with the newly formed federation between the Bosnian Moslems and Bosnian
Croats. This agreement mandated Croatia to support several top-secret
American airdrops of military supplies to the Bosnian Moslem Army in
order to assist it in combat operations against the Bosnian Serbs. As
well, Croatia also had to agree to the establishment of a CIA base on
the island of Krk in Croatia, which was used by the United States to
deploy the GNAT-750 and Predator unmanned aerial vehicles
for reconnaissance operations against the Serbs in Serbian Krajina and
Republika Srpska. Armed and readied with stealth technology, the Predator
possessed enough aerial capability to cover the entire geographical
territory of the former Yugoslavia. Specifically, it enabled the United
States to simultaneously utilize the territory of Croatia and Albania
in order to deploy these unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance
and intelligence purposes against the Serbians.
Although
the United States attempted to create the conditions for legally sanctioned
defense cooperation with Croatia, Security Council Resolution 713, better
know as the UN Arms Embargo, prevented wide ranging cooperation between
the two parties. The UN Arms Embargo on the former Yugoslavia theoretically
banned the United States and any other state from providing any military
assistance to any of the ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia. It
also applied to private entities, which meant that no organization outside
of government control could provide advice on military planning, intelligence
services, advice, strategy, or tactics to any entity in the former Yugoslavia,
including Croatia. However, these limitations did not stop Croatian
Defense Minister, Gojko Susak, from forwarding a request for military
assistance to the then Deputy Defense Secretary, John Deutch, who later
went on to become the Director of the CIA. When Susak finally visited
Washington seeking military assistance in March of 1994, the limitations
of the arms embargo forced Pentagon officials to refer the Croatian
Defense Minister to Military Professional Resources Incorporated.
MPRI
spokesman and former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Ed Soyster,
once referred to this organization as the "greatest corporate assemblage
of military expertise in the world." MPRI has a core full time
staff of 350 individuals and a database of approximately 2000 retired
generals, admirals, and other officers from which to draw potential
services. One could argue however, that MPRI is nothing more than an
extended arm of the Pentagon, conveniently formed to circumvent international
law when the American government is limited in seeking to achieve its
perceived strategic objectives in various parts of the world. Nevertheless,
before MPRI began working with the Croatian government, it first took
on a contract in 1994 code named the Drina River Mission to send
45 border monitors to Serbia in order to enforce the economic blockade
against the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs. MPRI's involvement in monitoring
Serbia's border in 1994 became critical to American strategic planning
in the Balkans because this organization enabled Washington to indirectly
introduce an American military presence into the region.
By
referring Defense Minister Susak to MPRI, the Clinton Administration,
through one degree of separation, enabled itself to theoretically stay
within the provisions of the UN Arms Embargo. Specifically, it enabled
the United States to deny that it was providing direct military assistance
to Croatia even though American intelligence officers were already directly
involved in the Balkan theatre of operations. MPRI's involvement with
Croatia officially started in September of 1994 when Croatian Defense
Minister Susak and retired General and Vice President of MPRI, Carl
Vuono, signed an agreement at the Croatian Embassy in Washington which
came to be known as the Democracy Transition Assistance Program.
MPRI personnel arrived in Croatia in November of 1994 and the first
Croatian officers to complete the DTAP training program graduated
in April of 1995. The success of this program set a precedent, which
eventually led to the expansion of MPRI's involvement into other regions
in the Balkans. However, before MPRI could begin working with the Croatian
government or any other ethnic group in the region, it was mandated
to seek authorization from the US State Department's Office of Defense
Trade Controls. Before this government agency could issue such a license
to MPRI, one of the provisions was that MPRI could only provide instruction
on leadership skills and on the role of a military in an emerging democracy.
Contrary
to the provisions of the licensing agreement, MPRI was instrumental
in violating the UN Arms Embargo by assisting Croatia in carrying out
Operation Storm in August of 1995. After the Vietnam War, the United
States was determined to review and revise the way it would conduct
combat operations in the future. Retired General and Vice President
of MPRI, Carl Vuono, participated in and commanded a special training
center that was responsible for devising a new American military doctrine
which came to be known as AirLand Battle 2000. This military doctrine,
which was first applied in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1990,
was also applied by the Croatian Army at the tactical level in Operation
Storm in 1995 against the Krajina Serbs. In fact, two weeks before the
Croatian attack, Vuono held top secret meetings on the island of Brioni
with Croatian General Varimar Cervenko, who was one of the architects
of the Croatian campaign against the Serbian Krajina. However, Cervenko's
plan was never actually realized because the Tudman government decided
on implementing General Ante Gotovina's military plans regarding the
Serbian Krajina. More importantly, however, five days before the actual
attack was undertaken by Croatia, Vuono held approximately ten meetings
with Croatian officers who were to be directly involved in the ethnic
cleansing of the Krajina region.
This
raises the sensitive issue of MPRIs and the Clinton Administration's
culpability in facilitating the war crimes that were committed by Croatian
forces against the civilian population of the Serbian Krajina in Operation
Storm. According to the former head of Croatian counterintelligence,
Markica Redic, "the Pentagon undertook complete supervision during
the Storm action." Moreover, Miro Tudman, son of the late Croatian
President and head of Croatia's equivalent of the CIA, has argued that
during Operation Storm "all our (electronic) intelligence in Croatia
went online in real time to the National Security Agency in Washington"
and "we had a de facto partnership." At the very least, American
involvement in Operation Storm raises the issue of war crime indictments
against members of MPRI, the Pentagon, CIA, and the NSA, who directly
assisted the Croatian attack in August of 1995, which expelled over
200,000 civilians and devastated over 13,000 homes and other structures
in the region. Nevertheless, Croatia's ability to occupy the Serbian
Krajina was due more to Belgrade's decision not to introduce the Yugoslav
Army into the conflict, than to Croatia's military prowess. In retrospect,
the fact that Croatia encountered stiff resistance in Petrova Gora from
the Krajina Serbs illustrates that if Belgrade had made the conscious
decision to defend the Serbian Krajina, the Croatian Army would have
been hard pressed to achieve the desired results it had sought in Operation
Storm.
Consequently,
since 1994, Croatia has continued to pursue an aggressive and unrelenting
intelligence operation dedicated towards infiltrating the highest levels
of the Yugoslav military and government. The intent of these operations
has been targeted at discerning the operational capabilities of the
Yugoslav Army and the intentions of the Yugoslav government. Specifically,
through intimidation, coercion, and blackmail, Croatia has sought to
influence Yugoslav officials by threatening reprisals against any relatives
some of them might have still living in Croatia. Croatian intelligence
activities against Yugoslavia have been based on the requirements of
both the Croatian government and of some western governments who have
requested that Croatia's foreign intelligence service fulfill some of
their unmet needs in Yugoslavia. It should be noted that the operational
capabilities of Croatia's intelligence services have been modeled after
Germany's BND intelligence service and that Germany has been instrumental
in assisting and guiding the formation of Croatia's intelligence services
both in Croatia and Germany.
Military
Professional Resources Incorporated & The Bosnian Connection
MPRI's
involvement with Croatia resulted in pressure from the leadership of
the Bosnian Moslems on Washington to initiate a reciprocal form of military
assistance to the Bosnian Moslem Army. With the approval of the Clinton
Administration and sanctioned by Congress, MPRI began training the Bosnian
Moslem Army after the Dayton Accords were established in October of
1995. The Pentagon spent $400,000 on a report in order to establish
what type of military aid the Bosnian Moslem Army required. This report
created the conditions for the United States to allocate and donate
$100 million dollars worth of military equipment to the Bosnian Moslems.
The American vessel known as the American Condor delivered the first
shipment of American military equipment to the Bosnian Moslems in November
of 1996. Specifically, between November 21st and 24th,
1996, the American ship delivered "46, 100 M16A1 assault rifles,
1000 M60 machine guns, 6592 pieces of communication equipment, 732 AN/PRC-126
handheld and 1600 AN/PRC-77 manpack radios, 45 M60A3 battle tanks, 80
M113 APCs, 840 AT-4 light anti-tank weapons and 15 UH-1H light utility
helicopters." The United States also financed the local production
of ammunition at the Igman factory in Konjic and the production of D-30J
howitzers at the Bratstvo factory in Novi Travnik.
In
addition to this, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Brunei and
the United Arab Emirates also donated $149 million dollars worth of
military equipment and financial assistance to the Bosnian Moslem Army.
The military equipment shipped from these sponsoring states consisted
of "36 M56 105mm light howitzers, 51 Panhard Armored Personnel
Carriers, 40 AMX-30 Main Battle Tanks, 12 D-30 120mm howitzers, 12 130mm
howitzers, and 18 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannons." In July of 1996,
as part of an independent bilateral defense cooperation agreement with
Turkey, the Bosnian Moslems also received a shipment of 5.56mm small
arms ammunition and light anti-tank rockets from Turkey. The Turkish
government also delivered 659 tons of weaponry to the Bosnian Moslems
through the Croatian port of Ploce. This cargo of weaponry was delivered
to the Bosnian Moslems by the Turkish chartered Ukrainian ship, the
Valerian Zorin. Turkey has also participated in training Bosnian officers
in Turkey and, with the other sponsoring Islamic states, has also financed
MPRIs $140 million training role with the Bosnian Moslems.
MPRI
entered the Balkans before the United States military because under
international law, neither the American government nor military had
a legal mandate at the time to introduce an official American presence
into the Balkan theatre of operations. This is not say that the Clinton
Administration was not actively planning for such an introduction, because
in retrospect, the evidence and indictment is overwhelming in this regard.
Moreover, domestic constraints have always weighed heavily on Washington's
decisions to introduce American servicemen into a theatre of operations.
The introduction of American forces into a region is often untenable
due to the low threshold for casualties among the American people. The
domestic political landscape in the United States often dictates that
risking the lives of American servicemen is unacceptable even when key
strategic concerns are at issue. However, to augment this domestic political
constraint, throughout the Cold War, the United States relied heavily
on non-government proxies as a means to achieve strategic ends in various
parts of the world. Examples of such proxies would be the Mujahadeen
in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, and more recently, the extremist
ethnocentric drug running KLA in Kosovo and Macedonia.
Institutionalized
Defense Cooperation: America takes the Lead
On
November 29th, 1994, Croatia and the United States formally
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation, through
which a broad range of military cooperation agreements were outlined
as the cornerstone for future relations between the two countries. The
signing of the agreement was preceded by a visit to Croatia on November
10th, 1994, by then Deputy Secretary of Defense, Joseph Kruzel,
who traveled to Zagreb to iron out last minute details surrounding the
agreement. The United States facilitated the establishment of the International
Military Education and Training Program, the Joint Contact Team
Programs through the US European Command, and defense cooperation
agreements with Turkey and Israel. The US also turned a blind eye to
Iran's initiatives to ship armaments to the Bosnian Moslems long before
the US Senate passed the Dole-Lieberman Bill to lift the arms embargo
against Bosnia on July 6th, 1995. According to the deal,
Croatia as a point of transit for the arms shipments, received a percentage
of the arms deliveries from Iran. More importantly, however, the agreement
on defense cooperation would eventually result in frequent meetings
of military delegations at the highest coordinating levels between the
United States and Croatia.
This
level of bilateral engagement is illustrated by the fact that the late
Croatian Defense Minister, Gojko Susak, would meet with former Defense
Secretary, William Perry, four times in 1996. Moreover, when Gojko Susak
fell terminally ill, the US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, personally
sent his own plane to bring the Croatian Defense Minister to the United
States for medical treatment. At his funeral in Croatia at the Mirogoj
cemetery, former Defense Secretary, William Perry, declared that Gojko
Susak "was a visionary in military matters and his legacy will
be that one day the Croatian Armed Forces will be valued participants
in western security organizations." It is evident that Washington
placed a significant amount of emphasis on it's relationship with Croatia
because Croatian government officials like Susak had unlimited access
to America's national security apparatus and decision making circles
in Washington. Washington's investment in Croatia was not minimal and
institutionalized forms of defense cooperation have reaffirmed a growing
commitment and willingness on both sides to align their national interests
towards one another.
It
was only after Croatia ethnically cleansed the Serbs of Krajina with
the tacit approval of the Clinton Administration in August of 1995 that
the United States, as part of its defense cooperation agreement with
Croatia, became the first NATO country to formally organize military
cooperation programs for Croatia. The United States has not only organized
these programs but has led the way in financing Croatia's military in
what officials in Washington refer to as "engagement activities."
One of these programs is the congressionally authorized International
Military Education and Training Program. In 1996 alone, Croatia
received $200,000 in congressionally authorized funds to help further
the military education and training of it's armed forces. Direct American
military training assistance to Croatia grew from $65,000 in 1995 to
$500,000 in 2000, adding up to about $2 million in this five year period.
During this period, the United States has trained over 200 Croatian
military and civilian personnel in the United States and several hundred
more at scheduled seminars held in Croatia. Funds from this program
have also helped facilitate the creation of three English language speaking
schools, which has allowed the Croatian Military School of Foreign Languages
to produce 150 fluent English speaking individuals annually.
In
addition to this, in 1996, the United States European Command opened
a liaison office at the Croatian Ministry of Defense. This office was
given the responsibility of coordinating the Joint Contact Team Program,
which is focussed on furthering bilateral relations between the United
States and Croatia. The Joint Contact Team Program differs from
the IMET Program because personnel from the US European Command are
prohibited from conducting training and must restrict their activities
to familiarization and orientation type activities in Croatia. Since
1997, the US European Command has funded two full time personnel to
assist the Croatian military with scheduling and executing the congressionally
authorized International Military Education and Training Program.
To date, the US European Command has conducted over 300 events in Croatia
aimed at presenting the US Armed Forces as a 'role model' for Croatian
military officials.
The
Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany has also been an institution frequented
by Croatian military officials due to the support of the United States
and Germany. This center is designed to support higher security and
defense learning for foreign and security policy officials. Croatia
has sent more than 40 members of it's defense ministry and general staff
to the Marshall Center for training since 1995. This training endeavor
has cost the United States $350,000 in 1999 and 2000 alone. As well,
German support to Croatia in this regard has been significant since
it began offering Croatian officers training in its military schools
in 1999. To date, 23 Croatian officers have been educated in German
Military Schools and 30 more have completed familiarization and orientation
activities at these schools. The focus of their studies at German Military
Schools has been primarily on professional military education, specifically,
battalion and company level courses, as well as time spent in the German
Command and General Staff College. Staff talks between German and Croatian
officers have occurred annually at all levels and Germany has conducted
exercises with Croatia in the field of arms control in line with the
Dayton Military Annexes. The total amount of aid allocated to Croatia
out of the German defense budget to date has been approximately $2 million.
In
an attempt not to be left out, France has also provided significant
military training to Croatia's armed forces. In 1998, after an agreement
on bilateral defense cooperation was consummated between France and
Croatia, the French established various military programs to assist
the Croatian Military. Croatia has seen 31 of it's officers graduate
from schools such as the French War School, with 14 graduating in 1998
and another 17 in 1999. The French have also assisted in providing language
training to Croat officers as part of their defense cooperation agreement
with Croatia. It should be noted that Croatia has also received assistance
from Great Britain in the areas of English language instruction and
on arms control in line with the Dayton Military Annexes. However, French
and British military cooperation with Croatia is largely symbolic because
they are not perceived as active players in the Balkans who can influence
policy decisions in Washington or Brussels where the Balkans are concerned.
By
the end of 1999, every major command of the Croatian Armed Forces, every
sector of the general staff, and every directorate in the defense ministry
had someone who had attended military training programs abroad. The
move to rapidly accelerate Croatia's military readiness is linked to
Washington's desire to integrate Croatia into western security institutions
and at the same time improve the operational capabilities of the Croatian
Army at the tactical and command level. The need to accelerate Croatia's
military readiness has also been complemented by the need to assist
Croatia's ability to upgrade and modernize its existing military hardware.
Much of that hardware was acquired from the Germans, consisting mostly
of Soviet era East German military equipment. It should be noted that
Croatia's procurement of military hardware was also assisted by Ernst
Werner Glatt, who was once the CIA's point man for military shipments
to the Contras in Nicaragua and the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan. However,
rather than having Washington supply these upgrades and modernization,
the Clinton Administration initially relied on integrating Croatia into
it's existing web of security arrangements.
The
Role of Turkey & Israel
On
the insistence of the Clinton Administration, Croatia was mandated to
undertake a defense cooperation agreement with Turkey. On June 19th,
1996, Franjo Tudman, along with his defense minister Gojko Susak and
his foreign Minister Mate Granic, visited Ankara, Turkey, at the invitation
of Turkish President Suleyman Demirel. The two states agreed in principle
on a broad framework for a defense cooperation agreement, which enabled
the Turkish International Cooperation Agency to immediately open a bureau
in Croatia's capital of Zagreb. On August 22nd , 1996, the
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Cevik Bir,
formally signed the agreement with Croatia on military training exercises.
This agreement focussed on an exchange of staffs between the two states
and on the training of officers at Turkish and Croatian military institutions.
Since 1999, Croatia has seen 12 of it's officers attend Turkish military
training schools. This training has involved a one year Turkish language
regimentation for Croatian officers before formal professional military
education training, such as the armed forces military academy and courses
focussed on commanding companies and battalions could begin.
General
Bir's visit to Croatia to sign the agreement on military training was
followed by a visit to Ankara on December 3rd, 1996, by the
Croatian Air Force commander Major General Josip Vuletic. The Major
General had meetings with the Turkish Defense Minister, Turhan Tayan,
with the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Ismail Hakki Karadayi,
and with the commander of the Turkish Air Force, General Ahmet Corekci.
Upon receiving the Croatian Air Force commander, General Corekci commented
on the Croat commander's visit to Turkey by stating that "both
countries efforts continued to play a key role for peace and stability
in the Balkans." In fact, there is an element of truth to this
statement because Washington has positioned both of these states to
play an important role in the new security architecture as geopolitical
pivots in the region. However, Washington has looked to Ankara and Zagreb
as important allies in maintaining and consolidating America's Cold
War victory based on the old bipolar security architecture that used
to be in place in this part of the world. Consequently, this outlook
has impeded Washington's ability to create a new security regime in
this part of the world and it has reinforced the belief that the Serbians
are the main obstacle to America's strategic objectives in the region.
While
the agreement with Turkey on defense cooperation focussed on military
exchanges and training, it also paved the way for other agreements in
the defense industry field. According to Turkey's defense cooperation
agreement with Israel that was established in 1995, Israel is mandated
by the agreement to upgrade and standardize any technical requirements
that a state such as Croatia would require in the defense industry field.
Therefore, through a binding defense cooperation agreement with Turkey,
Israel was required to undertake a defense cooperation agreement with
Croatia. The scope of this agreement has covered areas such as upgrading
and modernizing Croatia's MIG 21s, T55 tanks, and the joint production
of the 'Tabor' assault rifle. The MIGs were intended to be refitted
in Israel and later modernized at the Aircraft Technology Department
in Velika Gorica, Croatia, where Croatian technicians would be trained
by their Israeli counterparts. These upgrades typically include multirole
air to air and air to ground radios, radars, passive and electronic
warfare suites, new head up and head down displays, helmet sights, and
the integration of western weaponry. As part of the upgrade program,
the Israeli Aerospace Company, Elbit, located in Haifa, Israel, was
specifically offering the El/M/2032 lookdown/shootdown pulse doppler
radar, manufactured by Israeli Aircraft Industries.
When
Croatian Defense Minister, Pavao Miljavac, was asked by an Israeli reporter
to comment on the statement of an Israeli opposition deputy in the Knesset
that a military agreement with Croatia was "like selling our souls
for a hundred million dollars," the defense minister replied that
"Israel is a country in which everyone has the right to say what
they think, but that for Croatia it is important what the decisionmakers
and those who guide policy think." With Israel receiving billions
of dollars of aid on a yearly basis from Washington, it is only natural
that the Jewish State would be obligated under existing defense cooperation
agreements to closely align itself under the American security umbrella.
Through its special relationship with Washington and its defense cooperation
agreement with Turkey, Israel has been an active participant in assisting
Washington to consolidate a new security architecture in the Balkans.
Israel's defense cooperation with Croatia is one of the many obligations
that the Jewish State has had to undertake as part of it's special relationship
with Washington. In this regard, Washington has had the unnerving support
of Jewish political action committees in Washington and American Jewry
in general, as it has tried to construct a new security architecture
in the Balkans.
After
the fall of the Tudman government in Croatia, the deal to upgrade 20
Croatian MIGs in Israel at $30 million was put on hold because Lockheed
Martin, with the permission of the Clinton Administration, offered Croatia
American F16 fighter aircraft. The American F16s in question are older
versions of the plane that require modernization, but according to the
offer, the job of upgrading the aircraft would be done by Lockheed Martin
and paid for by the Croatian government. The upgrade of F16 aircraft
and the offer to receive them as a form of military assistance from
the United States was an ultimatum that Croatia had to accept if it
wanted to be admitted into the Partnership for Peace Program. Since
paying for the upgrade of the aircraft is a fiscal liability for the
current government in Croatia, the United States has responded by allowing
payment for the aircraft to be settled through long term defense cooperation.
As part of the payment process however, Croatia has had to allow the
United States military to use existing airfields in Croatia. This development
has essentially reaffirmed America's firm intention to maintain a long
term presence in Croatia, the Balkans, and in Europe, long after the
last American military presence is scaled back or pulled out altogether
from the European Union and specifically, Germany.
To
this end, the United States and Croatia conducted their first joint
military exercises on September 25th, 2000, near the Croatian
port city of Split and on some islands off the coast of the country.
The four day exercise referred to as operation 'Croatian Phiblex', consisted
of 400 sailors and 200 Marines from the US 6th Fleet, USS
Austin and elements of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit.
This unit was the first American peacekeeping force to move into Serbia's
province of Kosovo after the war with Serbia and Montenegro in 1999.
It also became the first American military unit to complete the first
ever American and Croatian bilateral amphibious landing exercise on
September 29th, 2000. The Chief for the Office of Defense
Cooperation for the American Embassy in Croatia, Army Major Richard
Liebl, stressed the importance of this exercise by stating that "the
only way to be effective in the future of warfare is to build that bilateral
exchange among willing nations" because "knowing your allies
enhances any country's ability to operate." Major Kenneth Lassure,
a participant in the exercises, qualified the importance of the maneuvers
by claiming that "the Marines and sailors of the 26th
Marine Expeditionary Unit and USS Austin have been a part of history
here. It excites me. It gets my juices going to know that we are helping
a country move in a democratic direction."
In
addition to this exercise, Croatia also hosted two more training exercises
with the United States in late 2000 and early 2001. These exercises
were referred to as Slunj 2000 and Slunj 2001 and it was only by chance
that these exercises were held in Croatia. These military exercises
were initially scheduled to take place in Israel, but because of the
current unrest in the region and for ecological reasons associated with
the nature of the live fire exercises, the United States moved the exercise
to Croatia at the last moment. The US Sixth fleet and approximately
1500 soldiers from the 26th Marine Expedition Unit participated
in the Slunj 2000 exercises. For this particular exercise, the Americans
also used the airfield at Udbina in Serbian Krajina, and according to
Croatian General Josip Culetic, the Americans raised the issue of stationing
a military base in this ethnically cleansed Serbian city. The actual
exercises entailed the live firing of heavy ordinance by American forces,
which caused outrage among Croatia's environmental activists. While
the exercises were not received favorably by various segments of the
Croatian public, the Croatian government and military used these exercises
to begin selling the prospect and benefit of permanent American bases
in Croatia to the Croatian public.
Bringing
It All Together: Strategic Continuity
Limited
by the UN Arms embargo, the United States circumvented this obstacle
by turning to MPRI in order to lay the groundwork for long term military
cooperation with Croatia and eventually with other proxies in the region.
MPRI has been invaluable as a mechanism to further strategic priorities
for Washington in the Balkans. Specifically, it has enabled the United
States to utilize a private organization such as MPRI to further American
security policy, while at the same time, limiting the chances for casualties
among American military personnel stationed in the region. In addition
to this, it has also enabled Washington to utilize MPRI in a cost-effective
way to reduce costs associated with training foreign military personnel
in the region. In fact, it was Croatia that financed it's relationship
with MPRI, with Washington taking over the majority of fiscal responsibilities
once institutionalized forms of defense cooperation took over in late
1995 and early 1996. Thus, outsourcing war became the modus operandi
for Washington in the Balkans in the 1990s. In fact, at a closed Defense
Intelligence Agency symposium held on June 24th, 1997, on
the 'Privatization of National Security Functions,' the overwhelming
consensus of the participants was that this form of military engagement
would only increase in the years to come.
The strategic posture of America and the Clinton Administration towards
Croatia has been premised on consolidating America's political and military
presence in Europe, strengthening Croatia's military, and bolstering
its strategic position in the Balkan region. By organizing substantial
training and education for Croatia's armed forces, Washington made the
conscious decision to look to Croatia as a pivotal military ally in
the western Balkans. Hence, Washington's moves to hastily integrate
Croatia into it's web of security arrangements with states such as Turkey
and Israel and it's simultaneous moves to accelerate Croatia's military
readiness by offering F16 fighter aircraft as a gift. However, this
relationship for Croatia comes at a price, a price where the concept
of limited sovereignty will continue to define Croatia's relationship
with America for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the national
security apparatus in Croatia believes that this is an arrangement that
is in the country's long term interests, because in the event of another
Balkan conflict, Croatia believes that the full weight of American diplomatic
support will be forthcoming in any eventual renewal of hostilities with
Serbia.
There
is no reason to believe that in the event of another Balkan conflict
Croatia would not enjoy this support. As ambassador Richard Gelbard
told a Croatian American delegation visiting Capital Hill in March of
1999, "the US needs a pillar of stability in the region and we
look to Croatia as that pillar." Ambassador Gelbard also indicated
at the time that the Clinton Administration was fully supportive of
Croatia's rights to the Prevlaka region, and he termed it a security
issue for the administration and not a territorial one. Ironically,
while the Clinton Administration was reassuring one of its new clients
in the Balkans, the Croats, at the same time it was preparing for a
brutal war of aggression against Serbia in Kosovo. As one analyst has
outlined, however, the new security architecture in the Balkans is based
on convictions held in Washington that "it looks to Tirana as the
capital of the Pentagon in the Balkans and towards Croatia as a bulwark
of military strength against Serbia in the north."
The
strategic implications of America's approach to the Balkans in the last
decade will continue to raise questions about whether or not the new
security architecture in the Balkans can promote long term regional
security, stability, and sustainability in this part of Europe. However,
the new security architecture is not based on promoting sustainable
regional security or on developing a regional consensus among the Balkan
states. Rather, it is focussed on consolidating America's permanent
presence in the region whose primary goal is to make the United States
the sole arbiter of intrastate relations in this part of Europe at the
beginning of the 21st century. America is not lacking compliant
states in this part of Europe in its pursuit of this end game in the
Balkans. In fact, on more than one occasion, the Clinton administration
pursued the law of power as opposed to the power of the law to redraw
the political, military, and territorial geography of this part of Europe.
It remains to be seen whether the Bush administration will provide strategic
continuity in this part of Europe or if it's policies will differ appreciably
from those of their predecessors in the Clinton administration. However,
in light of recent developments in Macedonia, one should not be hopeful
that the policies of the Bush Administration will deviate substantially
from those of their predecessors in the Clinton Administration.
Mirko
Dakovic and Boro Miseljic are Senior Fellows for National Security Studies
at the Independent Center for Geopolitical Studies JUGOISTOK in Belgrade,
Serbia. This article is an excerpt from their forthcoming book The
New Security Architecture in the Balkans to be published by the end
of this year.
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