An Alternative to Missile Defense
by Dietrich Fischer
June 19, 2001

During his trip to Europe, President Bush faced opposition to his planned missile shield from Russia’s President Putin and the leaders of France, Germany and the Netherlands, while some others, especially the heads of state of the newly admitted NATO members Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, who were eager to play the role of "good boys," voiced support. Bush is right on one point: what ultimately matters most is whether National Missile Defense (NMD) improves our security. He is wrong in believing it would.

One of the strongest arguments against NMD was made inadvertently by Reagan’s Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, when he tried to argue in favor of star wars, NMD’s predecessor. He said, "Imagine how dangerous it would be if the Soviet Union got such a system first. They could launch their missiles without fear of retaliation." The same, of course, is true in reverse.

It is doubtful that such a system would ever work reliably, but even if it did not work, a leader who falsely believed it would work could be tempted to strike first. Therefore Russia and China announced they would have no choice but to increase their nuclear arsenals to make clear to a potential opponent that they could penetrate any such system. Thus if the United States were to embark on a plan to build a national missile defense system, this would precipitate a new nuclear arms race.

NMD would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and could unravel the whole process of arms control. The main beneficiaries and supporters are US defense contractors, who hope to make an estimated $60-100 billion at taxpayers’ expense.

If the nuclear powers break their commitment under the ABM treaty gradually to eliminate all nuclear weapons, this double standard encourages others to acquire their own nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan justified their nuclear weapons programs by rejecting the monopoly of the established nuclear weapons powers.

If nuclear weapons proliferate, it is only a matter of time until "countries of concern" (formerly called rogue nations) and terrorist groups acquire some. NMD would offer no protection, even if it worked perfectly, because it cannot intercept bombs delivered in a suitcase, on a truck, or sailboat.

What we need instead is a more open world in which nuclear weapons can be effectively banned, as we have already concluded treaties banning biological and chemical weapons, with intrusive verification. The treaty with North Korea negotiated during the Clinton administration, which allows the United States to verify that North Korea has abandoned its programs to develop nuclear weapons and long range missiles in return for two nuclear power plants from the West which cannot generate nuclear weapons fuel, is a good example of what we need.

President Bush’s opposition to stringent verification provisions to enforce the biological weapons treaty is shortsighted. We need more thorough inspections, also to prevent nuclear proliferation, and if we wish to inspect other countries, we must be willing to open our country to such inspections as well.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can now inspect only sites that member countries voluntarily place under its supervision. If a suspected drug smuggler could tell a border guard, "You may check my trunk, but don’t open the glove compartment," such an "inspection" would be meaningless. The IAEA must have the power to inspect any suspected nuclear facilities, without advance warning, even in non-member countries, otherwise it is impossible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Many governments today object to such intrusive inspections as a "violation of their national sovereignty." But many airline passengers also protested first against having their luggage searched for guns or explosives, when that policy was introduced after a series of fatal hijackings. Many protested, "What’s in my bag is my private business" and "why do you suspect me as a terrorist?" But most have come to realize that such inspections protect their own security. Those who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear. Sooner or later, governments will reach the same conclusion. The question is only whether this will happen before or after the first terrorist nuclear bomb explodes.

"National sovereignty" is a false issue here, since no country today has sovereign control over the world’s nuclear arsenals. By giving the IAEA effective authority to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, we do not give up any control over our lives that we now possess, but gain added control that we could never achieve at the national level.

Ultimately, we must destroy all nuclear weapons. Some have argued that we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons and therefore will have to live with them as long as civilization exists. But nobody has disinvented cannibalism either, we simply abhor it. Can’t we learn to abhor equally the thought of incinerating entire cities with nuclear weapons?

Dietrich Fischer, a Professor at Pace University, New York, is Co-Director of TRANSCEND, a peace and development network.