On Monday July 28, the U.S. Department of Defense
that it had transferred three prisoners – a Qatari, an Afghan and a prisoner
from the United Arab Emirates – to their home countries from the prison at Guantánamo
Bay. Adding that they "were determined to be eligible for transfer following
a comprehensive series of review processes," the DoD also claimed that
the men's release from Guantánamo is "a demonstration of the United
States' desire not to hold detainees any longer than necessary," which
"underscores the processes put in place to assess each individual and make
a determination about their detention while hostilities are ongoing – an unprecedented
step in the history of warfare."
While critics might point out that holding prisoners without an effective screening
process, labeling them all as "enemy combatants," to be held without
charge or trial, transporting them halfway round the world to an illegal offshore
interrogation center, and depriving them of the protections of the Geneva Conventions
might also be regarded as "an unprecedented step in the history of warfare,"
what is distressing about this latest batch of releases (which brings the total
number of prisoners released to 506) is that two of the men – those from Afghanistan
and the UAE – have left Guantánamo as unknown as they arrived: ghost-like
and anonymous, and not even identified by the Internment Serial Numbers which
replaced their names for the last five or six years of their life.
As some sort of compensation, however, the third prisoner – Jarallah al-Marri,
Guantánamo's sole Qatari prisoner – has been identified, and his story
is fascinating for various reasons. Married with children, al-Marri was 28 years
old when he was seized by Pakistani forces crossing from Afghanistan to Pakistan
in December 2001 at a time when around a third of Guantánamo's total
population (at least 250 prisoners) were captured. As I explain in my book,
Guantánamo Files, many of these men were missionaries, humanitarian
aid workers, economic migrants or drifters enticed by rumors that the Taliban
were crafting a "pure Islamic state in Afghanistan." Others – al-Marri
included – had been encouraged to travel to Afghanistan "to participate
in the jihad," as described in al-Marri's tribunal at Guantánamo
in 2004 or 2005. However, not all of these men were aware of the reality of
the jihad, and al-Marri was one of many who stated that he had been tricked.
Arriving in Afghanistan just days before the 9/11 attacks, al-Marri admitted
that he had met people in Saudi Arabia who had arranged his trip to Afghanistan,
and also admitted attending the al-Farouq training camp (a camp for Arabs, established
by the Afghan warlord Abdul Rasul Sayyaf in the early 1990s, but associated
with Osama bin Laden in the years before 9/11). However, he only arrived at
the camp on September 10, and left the following day, without receiving any
training, when the camp was shut down. After hiding out at various locations
in Afghanistan – including a stint in the mountains near Kabul – he said that
"an individual in Afghanistan arranged for [him] to be smuggled across
the border into Pakistan," and that he "crossed the border on a motorcycle,
using a gate at which the smuggler seemed to know the guard." He was then
seized "while taking a bus from one town to another in Pakistan … after
a guard boarded the bus and questioned [him] on his nationality." At no
point was he accused of raising arms against U.S. forces, and in his tribunal,
at which he authorized his Personal Representative to speak on his behalf, after
requesting the services of a lawyer, he explained, "I never fought anyone.
I did not want to continue because it was wrong."
In statements made to interrogators, al-Marri elaborated on his misgivings
about the situation in Afghanistan. He said that he "was misled" about
the jihad and explained that he did not realize, until he was in Afghanistan,
that it "was a battle of Muslim against Muslim." He also stated that
he "learned after his arrival in Afghanistan that the Taliban were not
as good as he was told," and made a point of adding that "he had second
thoughts and wanted to return to Qatar after learning that the al-Farouq camp
was owned by Osama bin Laden." In addition, when questioned about al-Qaeda,
he made a point rarely mentioned by other prisoners: that he did not hear the
name "al-Qaeda" until after his capture, because "al-Qaeda, along
with all the fighters and trainees, were called Mujahideen."
Despite the fact that he did not undertake military training in Afghanistan,
and never raised arms against U.S. forces, al-Marri was treated abysmally in
Guantánamo. In 2005, his lawyer, Jonathan Hafetz, reported that "Mr.
al-Marri has been in solitary confinement for over 16 months and often goes
as long as 3 weeks without being allowed outside his cell for recreation. The
lights in Mr. al-Marri's cell remain on 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and he
has been denied adequate bedding and clothing. Mr. al-Marri is able to sleep
only 2 hours a night, and his physical and mental health have deteriorated significantly."
In summer 2005, he was one of at least 200 prisoners who undertook a mass hunger
strike to protest about their daily living conditions and the injustice of their
seemingly endless imprisonment without charge or trial. As a result, although
he only weighed 122 pounds (8 stone 10 pounds) on arrival at Guantánamo,
his weight dropped to 105 pounds (7 stone 7 pounds) and he was hospitalized
and placed on an IV, his situation complicated by a deteriorating heart condition.
He explained to Jonathan Hafetz that "the government had a nurse make sexual
advances towards him while he was lying in his hospital bed in a vain attempt
to convince him to give up his hunger strike."
What has not been made clear about Jarallah al-Marri's case is his relationship
with his brother Ali, a legal U.S. resident who was seized by the FBI in Peoria,
Illinois in December 2001 and has been held in complete isolation as an "enemy
combatant" on the US mainland since June 2003, without charge or trial.
Although the government alleges that Ali al-Marri was part of a U.S.-based al-Qaeda
sleeper cell, references to him are scant in the documentation relating to Jarallah,
and relate primarily to the grand jury indictment of May 2003, in which he was
accused of "making false statements to the FBI" in relation to the
9/11 attacks. What is curious is that Jarallah was released from Guantánamo
just two weeks after the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that, although Ali has some vague right to appeal his untested designation as
an "enemy combatant," the President's dictatorial powers, granted
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, remain intact, and he has the right to imprison
any American, either citizens or residents, and hold them forever without charge
or trial if he believes them to be "enemy combatants."
The timing of Jarallah's release may be coincidental, particularly as Jonathan
Hafetz explained to me that he was cleared for release after an administrative
review in April, and it may be that, in an attempt to reduce the population
of Guantánamo in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent ruling
that the prisoners have constitutional habeas corpus rights, his repatriation
– and those of his unknown fellow prisoners – was a straightforward process,
which enabled a quietly desperate administration to prevent a few more prisoners
the basis of their detention in the District Courts in the coming months.
Certainly, the case against him would, I am sure, appear dismally weak when
scrutinized by a proper court rather than the mockery of justice served up at
Guantánamo, where, as noted
by former insider Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham, the tribunal system was designed
merely to rubber-stamp the prisoners' designation as "enemy combatants,"
without any meaningful way for them to challenge the "evidence" against
them. Jonathan Hafetz also wondered if his release was timed to avoid a court
showdown over a motion regarding the destruction of evidence relating to Jarallah,
which, he stated, "was presumably about to go forward."
I can't help wondering, however, if Jarallah's release was not also timed to
remove a potential witness from his brother's case, one who might have exculpatory
evidence proving that Ali was a legitimate student in the United States, and
that the case against him, which is based solely on information provided by
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed during the first few months of his torture in secret
CIA custody in spring 2003, is nothing more than a web of lies spun by a prisoner
who, as torture victims do, told his captors whatever they wanted to hear to
get the torture to stop.