The Washington, D.C., metro is following in the
footsteps of the New York subway and is now conducting random searches of passengers.
The justification given for further eroding the Fourth Amendment (which guarantees
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized") is, predictably, the same reason we've
heard time and time again for ignoring the Constitution: "the Security
Inspection Program aims to deter terrorist attacks."
But an effective deterrent must be just that – effective. Yet – just
like with the New York City
subway searches – a simple analysis demonstrates that the search program
can be easily circumvented. To begin, it's not possible to staff every metro
station (the D.C. system has 86 stations, many with multiple entrances) to
conduct round-the-clock searches (moreover, the searches are random, so not
everyone would be searched.) So a would-be terrorist just has to be willing
to find a station that isn't conducting searches. And unless there was some
compelling reason why a terrorist attack had to be conducted on a particular
day at a particular location, a terrorist could simply come back on another
day (or another time on the same day) when searches aren't being done. Or several
terrorists could try to gain access to the metro at multiple locations, relatively
confident that at least one of them would get in at a station without being
searched. Finally, a suicide terrorist could blow himself up while standing
in line to go through a turnstile or waiting to be searched. In other words,
the search program would only be effective if a terrorist allowed himself to
be searched (and the D.C. metro program shares a common feature with New York:
you can refuse to be searched and simply walk away).
Security expert Bruce Schneier described the D.C. metro search program
as "security
theater against a movie-plot threat." And it's worth noting that in
the aftermath of the July 2005 London tube and bus bombings, British authorities
decided against conducting searches of riders – rightly making the cost-benefit
calculation that the security benefits were minimal and not worth the cost.
Nonetheless, the general public seems more than willing to accept that the
D.C. metro searches are effective and necessary. This doesn't come as any great
surprise, given that the public has accepted having to nearly disrobe and trying
to fit as many 3-ounce containers into a quart-size bag to pass through airport
security (and I can't help thinking about George
Carlin's pre-9/11 piece about airport security). And this is the same public
that seems to believe that warrantless eavesdropping is OK too – all in the
name of protecting against terrorism.
What's fascinating is that many of the people who don't mind giving up
their Fourth Amendment rights by being searched without probable cause to ride
public transportation are the same people who would argue against any form
of gun control and believe that the Second Amendment right "to keep and
bear arms" must be defended at all costs. Seemingly lost on them is that
one of the reasons the Founding Fathers wrote the Second Amendment (however
cryptically worded) was for the people to have a way to protect against government
taking away all of their other rights. In other words, preserving the Second
Amendment doesn't amount to much if the rest of the Constitution isn't also
preserved.
Ultimately, the D.C. metro random search program reflects the post-9/11
preoccupation with trying to prevent the unpreventable. It's simply more security
that has little or nothing to do with making us more secure.