The Cheney Cabal media sycophants at the New
York Times and elsewhere are indignantly reporting that Iran continues to
ignore certain sections of resolutions passed by Board of Directors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, requiring actions deemed "necessary" to satisfy
their "concerns" about Iranís nuclear programs Ė concerns subsequently
"reaffirmed" by the UN Security Council, ever "mindful of its
primary responsibility" under the UN Charter "for the maintenance
of international peace and security."
But the reality is the IAEA has once again verified to all IAEA members and
NPT-signatories "the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials"
by Iran. Furthermore, Iran and the IAEA Secretariat have just announced an important
agreed "time table" for "resolution" by yearís end of "all
outstanding questions" relevant to the implementation of Iranís Safeguards
Agreement. And even some "questions" that arenít relevant.
On May 15, 1974, Iran entered into an agreement
with the IAEA Ė to remain in force as long as Iran remained a party to the Treaty
on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Ė wherein all Iranian "source or
special fissionable materials" and activities involving them were to be
made subject to IAEA Safeguards "with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful purposes."
Now, it is true that Iran voluntarily suspended certain activities in
2003 when it signed an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, and
offered to begin complying with the Additional Protocol, immediately, in advance
of its formal ratification. And, in 2005, offered to permanently suspend
certain other activities, in return for certain security guarantees by the European
But that offer to the EU was never even acknowledged, no NPT-illegal sanctions on Iran were ever lifted, and no security guarantees were ever provided to Iran.
So, Iran resumed some of the activities it had voluntarily suspended. Furthermore,
Iranís Parliament decided not to ratify the Additional Protocol and ordered
the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency to cease complying with it.
Since then, the official mission and role of the IAEA in Iran is once again totally proscribed by the original Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangements.
Nevertheless, on February 4, 2006, under extreme pressure by the United States,
the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution
in which it concluded that for "confidence" to be built "in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iranís nuclear program" it was "deemed
necessary" for Iran to :
- re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
- reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
- ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
- pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
- implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations.
Now, it is certainly within the Boardís purview to ask Iran to resolve those
legitimate "outstanding questions" concerning Iranís implementation
of its Safeguards agreement, chronicled in the Director-Generalís report of
September 2, 2005.
But nowhere does the UN Charter, the IAEA Statute or the NPT, itself, even
suggest that the Board needs to satisfy itself that any countryís nuclear program
is exclusively peaceful.
For the Board to "deem it necessary" for a sovereign state to promptly
ratify the Additional Protocol to its existing Safeguards Agreement Ė a treaty
Ė is an egregious violation of the IAEA UN-proscribed charter.
And for the Board to "report"
Iran to the Security Council as a "threat to the peace" for Iranís
failure to comply with the Boardís illegal and outrageous demands is beyond
The primary mission of the IAEA is to "encourage and assist research on
Ė and development and practical application of Ė atomic energy for peaceful
purposes, throughout the world."
The IAEA Board should have censured President Clinton for his successful attempts in 1995 to prevent Russia from supplying Iran a turn-key gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plant and China from supplying Iran a turn-key uranium-conversion plant. Or his unsuccessful attempts to prevent Russia from completing the nuclear power plant at Bushehr.
Today, the IAEA Board should be doing all it can to facilitate the coming on-line of Bushehr and completion of the uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz.
And, every nation-state throughout the world knows that.
Way down on its list of missions, the IAEA is "to establish and administer
safeguards" designed to ensure special fissionable materials and activities
involving them subject to IAEA safeguards are not used to "further any
So, back to the "timetable"
for "resolution" by yearís end of "all outstanding questions"
relevant to the implementation of Iranís Safeguards Agreement.
As to "outstanding" issues that are relevant to Iranís Safeguards
agreement, they agreed to try to resolve questions concerning (a) the lab experiments
involving the production of minute quantities of Plutonium and Polonium-210
and (b) the source of the enriched-uranium micro-contamination found at "a
technical University in Tehran."
The Iranians agreed to try to document all attempts to procure, manufacture
and operate so-called P2 (second generation) gas centrifuges.
Also, even though Iranís Safeguards Agreement doesnít require it, Iran also
agreed to try to resolve apparent inconsistencies relating to a brochure, apparently
supplied by Pakistanis, gratis, found in Iranís files and subsequently
placed under seal by the IAEA, which included instructions Ė which the Iranians
claim they never used Ė on how to cast hemispherical shells of uranium.
Finally, the IAEA agreed to provide Iran with access to the "documentation"
it has in its possession Ė apparently obtained in 2004 by the CIA from the "smoking
laptop" and "leaked" to the IAEA in 2005 Ė regarding (a)
the Green Salt Project (b) high explosive testing and (c) missile re-entry vehicle
studies, all alleged programs which the Cheney Cabal alleges are related to
Iranís nuclear programs.
So, if by year-end the IAEA Secretariat is satisfied that Iran is in complete compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and so reports to the IAEA Board, then how can the Cheney Cabal possibly "justify" an attack on Iranís Safeguarded nuclear facilities?
Oh, well, theyíll think of something.