Lessons Learned – or Not

On March 5, 1970, the United States became a party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which declared, in Article IV, that

On May 15, 1974, Iran entered into a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency – to remain in force as long as Iran remained a party to the NPT – wherein all Iranian "source or special fissionable materials" and activities involving them were to be made subject to IAEA Safeguards "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes."

The NPT explicitly states that

"The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities – including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes – in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty."

So, in 1976, pursuant to its NPT commitments, the Ford-Cheney Administration "endorsed" Iranian ambitious plans to develop a massive nuclear energy industry, all subject – of course – to IAEA Safeguards.

Then came the Islamic revolution of 1979, resulting in two decades of increasingly severe economic sanctions imposed by Congress on Iran and on American and foreign entities seeking to do business with Iran.

When the Shah was deposed, a German entity had almost finished building the nuclear power plant at Bushehr. A French entity had begun the construction of two nuclear power plants at Darkhovin.

Nothwithstanding their NPT and IAEA obligations, Germany and France, under intense U.S. pressure, cancelled those projects.

Iran’s billion-dollar investment in a large uranium-enrichment plant in France was also effectively confiscated.

When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Congress actually intensified sanctions on Iran!

In the early 1990s China contracted to build two nuclear power plants at Darkhovin and a turn-key uranium-conversion facility at Isfahan and the Russians agreed to provide Iran a turn-key gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plant.

As a result of intense U.S. pressure and the threat of sanctions against both China and Russia, all projects – except the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant – were cancelled.

At this point it is worth noting that the NPT does not prohibit Iran from producing – subject to IAEA Safeguards – weapons-grade uranium or plutonium.

Nor does the NPT prohibit Iran from producing or otherwise acquiring ballistic missiles capable of delivering small, sophisticated nuclear weapons to Israel.

Nevertheless, two years ago, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei publicly announced that – although he had found no indication that (a) there were any undeclared "source or special nuclear materials" in Iran nor that (b) "source or special nuclear materials" were being or had ever been "used in furtherance of a military purpose" – he still had "concerns" that Iran had been unwilling to address.

You see, "senior intelligence officials" had briefed ElBaradei and senior staff on some of the sensitive "intelligence" they had gleaned from what they claimed was a "stolen Iranian laptop computer."

On February 4, 2006, as a result of extreme pressure by the United States, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted an outrageous resolution – alluding to that laptop "intelligence" – in which it concluded that for "confidence" to be built "in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program" it was "deemed necessary" for Iran to, inter alia;

The principal objective of the IAEA is "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world."

In accomplishing its principal objective the IAEA "shall ensure, so far as it is able" that assistance "under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose."

That’s the limit of its authority.

The IAEA Board outrageously exceeds its authority when it "deems it necessary" for ElBaradei to satisfy himself of the exclusively peaceful nature of "certain military-owned workshops" and their activities not subject to IAEA Safeguards.

Nevertheless, as a result of extreme U.S. pressure, the UN Security Council subsequently implicitly agreed that until Iran has satisfied ElBaradei’s concerns, Iran somehow posed some threat to peace in the region. So, UNSCR-1696 "called" upon other states to apply sanctions on Iran until such time as ElBaradei so satisfies himself.

Last month ElBaradei came to an agreement with Iran that – if faithfully implemented – he expects will "clear up" suspicions about Iran’s uranium-enrichment program.

ElBaradei made it "clear" that if Iran is far beyond being in total compliance with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, then his job is done. The question of whether Iran is allowed to go on enriching uranium is none of his business.

What about those "smoking laptop" allegations?

Nevertheless, the new French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, apparently trying to curry favor with the Likudniks in France and elsewhere, still considers the U.S.-Iranian "stand-off" the world's "the greatest crisis," confronting the world with "a catastrophic alternative: an Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran."

To which Nobel Laureate ElBaradei responded "I would hope that everybody would have gotten the lesson after the Iraq situation, where 700,000 innocent civilians have lost their lives on the suspicion that a country has nuclear weapons."