“An installation (at Dimona, Israel) for processing irradiated fuel was completed with French assistance in the mid-1960s. Between 15 and 40-60 kilograms of fissionable plutonium can be processed annually. This facility probably has the capacity to produce plutonium for five to ten nuclear warheads a year. ”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/dimona.htm

“The smallest possible bomb-like object would be a single critical mass of plutonium (or U-233) at maximum density under normal conditions. An unreflected spherical alpha-phase critical mass of Pu-239 weighs 10.5 kg and is 10.1 cm across … Since the critical mass for alpha-phase plutonium is 10.5 kg, and an additional 20-30% of mass is needed to make a significant explosion, this implies 13 kg or so. A thin beryllium reflector can reduce this by a couple of kilograms, but the necessary high explosive, packaging, triggering system, etc. will add mass, so the true absolute minimum probably lies in the range of 11-15 kg (and is probably closer to 15 than 11). This is probably a fair description of the W-54 Davy Crockett warhead. This warhead was the lightest ever deployed by the US, with a minimum mass of about 23 kg (it also came in heavier packages) and had yields ranging from 10 tons up to 1 Kt in various versions. The warhead was basically egg-shaped with the minor axis of 27.3 cm and a major axis of 40 cm. The test devices for this design fired in Hardtack Phase II (shots Hamilton and Humboldt on 15 October and 29 October 1958) weighed only 16 kg, impressively close to the minimum mass estimated above. These devices were 28 cm by 30 cm …
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/News/DoSuitcaseNukesExist.html

An extra danger is that with a missile shield on it’s border in countries like Poland, while Warszawa, much like Washington has no shortage of complete idiots and dangerous fools, the Russians could feel their warning time is considerably shortened, since they first are going to have to eliminate the ABM systems on their borders before launching retaliatory attacks.

In the short time that humanity has these nuclear weapons (just try to mark it on an evolutionary timescale, you’ll either won’t have the pencil sharp, or a road long enough to do it) we have had some serious incidents in the past that could easily have escalated into a “nuclear exchange” (which I have a hard time to imagine not escalate further.) This time any possible Stanislav Petrov simply may not have the luxury of time to save the world another time. If not this time then the next, there are no “ifs” in this game.

And “Dr. Gordon Strangelove?” Man, have you ever even read or heard mr Prather before?

If the Iranians got things really up and going with their nuclear energy program and they would enrich no further than about say 4-5% U235 or something like that. Would they not be able to use the U238 and make DU weapons and armour and perhaps sell it to parties that could conceivably make the costs in lives, but more important in money, to the Israeli to maintain their occupation and slow-motion ethnic cleansing or periodically invade certain countries rise even more steeper than already is the case?

Or is it that simply not possible, given quantities, regulations and inspections or other reasons?