Kelley B. Vlahos


Featured columnist Kelley B. Vlahos discusses her coverage of the mainstream Democratic interventionist CNAS conference, the unprecedented politicization of military policy, public relations stunts disguised as war strategy initiatives and why think tanks that function only as echo chambers are not part of the reality-based community.

MP3 here. (18:45)

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, a Washington, D.C.-based freelance writer, is a longtime political reporter for, a contributing editor at The American Conservative magazine and featured columnist. She is also a Washington correspondent for Homeland Security Today magazine.

7 thoughts on “Kelley B. Vlahos”

  1. Hey Scott, do you perhaps have an interview with Scott Ritter planned in the near future? I haven't heard from him in a long time and would be pretty anxious to hear another hour long interview with him. He's definitely one of you best guests. You should invite him to talk about the Iran situation since it seems to be heating up and may just lead to a long war that could devastate America's economy.

  2. Well, all you need to do is look at Korea, Japan, Germany etc. etc. etc. How many legions have been stationed overseas since…. WHEN? So all this foot dragging about "finishing the job" or "have the stomach to…" Is only yet another paver on the road of empire.

  3. Scott, curious of your thought on this, in relation to your comment about Petraeus using COIN to basically buy time:

    A theory I've bounced around a couple of closed circles: You have a political time bomb in a war/occupation (Point A) and COIN isn't a beating into submission so much as building up an occupation of such a large force (Point B) that the political gains come from beginning to draw that force down (point C). But C is a larger force than A, and since B is so exponentially large that it makes people beg for anything but B; therefore, C becomes a godsend and populations organize, local security forces get more draconian to deter another B. The end result is more political capital at point C than point A and this is called success, no matter what the cost of B.

    Coincidentally though, B is so forceful that point C, simultaneously, is more in need of a prolonged occupation than A because of the havoc wreaked by B — the de facto garrison state. Point A can't be sustained, politically — this is Petraeus' dissertation and the common military narrative that Vietnam was lost on American streets, not the Asian jungles. But a large part of C is the constant reminder of what B was communicated as fighting and those boogeymen justify what A couldn't.

    I haven't written in depth about this because I'm still sifting through the CNAS boys' idealizing of B — mainly, Exum, the theorist, as opposed to Petraeus, the commander, and McChrystal, the executive — and want to collect more input, organize a better academic critique. If I'm unclear, I could make a visual. I've sketched a few and would like to digitize one anyway.

  4. It is very difficult to believe the Scott Ritter situation being fact. How could he think that he would not be watched closer than the average person. I could be wrong but I believe he could have been set up. I've also wondered when Scott Ritter would again be interviewed by Scott Horton.

    But then again he may have demons like everyone else and I've been withholding judgment b/c he has been a voice of reason for so long.

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