Issue: 27 November
2004 |
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| The case for not attacking Iran
Do the last few days remind you of anything, by any chance?
Presidential heavy breathing about a ‘rogue’ Middle Eastern state; a
supporting chorus of exiles with dramatic new claims; and a senior
member of the US government bearing intelligence which turns out to
be more spin than spine-chilling. Less than a month after the
presidential election, the Bush White House has begun its campaign
against Iran. In the week that Americans break for Thanksgiving, it
might seem that, for Washington, the festival of the moment should
really be Groundhog Day.
Yet while the methods and timing are about as surprising as a
delay on the Tube, and while we may be tempted to say that all the
neocons have done is to change the ‘q’ to an ‘n’ in the name of the
target, there are excellent reasons not to dismiss the latest
American sabre-rattling.
This time there really can be very little doubt that Iran has
weapons of mass destruction, chemical and probably biological, and
that it wants to obtain something even more destructive, a nuclear
weapon, in fairly short order. In 2002, Tehran was forced to own up
to enriching uranium, an important prerequisite for the development
of a nuke, at a secret plant called Nantaz. Not incontrovertible
proof of anything: indeed, the Iranians said it was for civil use.
But Iran has the Middle East’s third largest oil and gas reserves,
and does not need nuclear electricity. Why, also, was Nantaz kept
secret, in defiance of Iran’s international treaty obligations, if
its purpose was entirely peaceful?
Since that dramatic discovery, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the UN nuclear inspectorate, has had several other
unpleasant surprises in the Islamic Republic. Inspectors have been
repeatedly misled, sometimes directly, sometimes by omission; other
secret facilities have not been declared; promises and undertakings
have been broken; and the history of the last two years has been of
constant Iranian brinksmanship, with agreements we thought we’d
signed having to be re-agreed later. Even this week, as the Iranians
agreed to suspend enrichment under the threat of referral to the UN
Security Council, they insisted that it would only be temporary.
An obscure substance, polonium 210, may become as familiar to us
in the next few months as were the now-forgotten Iraqi buzz words of
the Tuwaitha weapons plant, the al-Dawra vaccine factory and the
al-Hussein conventional missile. Polonium 210 is an unstable element
whose only real use is as an initiator for a nuclear weapon. The UN
has discovered that it has been produced in Iran. (Tehran says it is
for nuclear batteries to be used in the country’s space programme,
which is not yet operational.)
Buoyed by high oil revenues, Iran’s nuclear programme has seldom
been so flush. The Israelis say that Iran could have the bomb within
a year. It is unlikely to be that early, but most experts agree that
if the programme continues, the mullahs will be nuclear within five
years. The striking thing, really, is no longer the concealment; it
is Iran’s relative openness, even brazenness, about its atomic
ambitions. It knows exactly the calculations which we in the West
are making, and it wants us to carry on making them.
Politically, the picture is equally bleak. Iran is no
Saddam-style tyranny, but the reform movement which gave such hope
of a rapprochement with the West in the 1990s is at a desperately
low ebb. The moderniser, Mohammad Khatami, remains as Prime
Minister, but has effectively lost his struggle with the religious
conservatives. In this year’s parliamentary elections, they managed
to get a quarter of the candidates — and 87 of the sitting MPs —
disqualified for being too progressive. A mass reformist boycott, a
sullen electorate and a low turnout saw substantial conservative
gains. Iran’s hardline rulers have now embarked on what some call a
‘modified China model’. Petty social restrictions on things like
women’s dress have been eased, to reduce pressure for change — but
political repression remains as strong as ever.
Iran continues to sponsor terrorism, although not against the
West. It was an Iranian-made arsenal that was found on the Karine A,
the ship caught by Israel on a smuggling run, allegedly to the
Palestinian Authority, possibly to Hezbollah. The arms had been
loaded at an Iranian port. As far as the Israelis were concerned,
the Karine A wrote the death warrant for the Palestinian peace
process.
Yet should this mean that Iran is just Iraq with one of the
letters changed? Absolutely not. Except in the minds of the most
hysterical hawks, a capability does not constitute a threat. A
threat arises when there is capability plus intention. And there is
no evidence that Iran has the intention to attack us. Iran’s
relative flaunting of its nuclear ambitions may even, in one sense,
be reassuring: it suggests that the bomb is regarded as a deterrent,
or perhaps even a bargaining chip, rather than as an offensive
weapon.
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