January 7
[After we read reports of the U.S. using the U.N. to
spy on Iraq, we called Phyllis Bennis, an expert on U.S.- U.N. relations
to get her thoughts on just how bonedheaded the operation was. She
sent us this e-mail in response.]
The fact that U.S. officials may have used U.N. weapons inspectors
to spy for them isn't surprising. Whatever Iraqi secrets UNSCOM's
on-the-ground inspectors were able to provide to the U.S. were likely
matched by the wealth of NSA satellite surveillance that Washington
can gather at will.
The real issue is the willingness of the U.S., once again, to
treat the United Nations with the utter disdain of a feudal emperor
dissing his vassal king. Certainly that sort of treatment isn't
new. Washington's current $1.5 billion in overdue U.N. bills is
only slightly larger than usualthe U.S. stopped paying its
full bills a decade and a half ago, during the Reagan administration.
This is the part that matters most: UNSCOM was largely a creature
of the U.S. from its beginnings. It has always been viewed with
a jaundiced eye by observers critical of U.S. domination of the
U.N. And it has generally lived up to the most cynical expectations.
Although UNSCOM has ended up a disaster, it initially represented
a U.N. effort, however flawed, to craft an international enforcer
for disarmamentnot such a bad idea in these arms-bloated times,
especially in Iraq's arms-bloated neighborhood.
So what now? The U.S. cannot be allowed to claim the unilateral
right to determine Iraq policy on its own. Iraq policy must be returned
to the United Nations. Not the U.N. that was the victim of Desert
Storm's false consensus and of Desert Fox's indifferent violations,
but a new U.N., working to craft a new kind of multilateral diplomacy.
To begin that effort with policy towards Iraq, the following ideas
might be considered:
Phyllis Bennis is a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies.
Her books include Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates
Today's U.N. and Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader.
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