The members of the 9/11 commission claim that their report attempts "to provide the most complete account . . . of the events of September 11, what happened and why." (xvii) I decided to buy a copy and see for myself how well they perform. Chapter One sets out to detail the events of 9/11 and the government’s reaction to it. Given that many already know most of the details of that day, I will merely highlight some of the interesting points and themes that emerge from the chapter.
Government Responsibility
It was refreshing to see government criticize itself. First on the FAA’s failure to communicate the existence of multiple hijackings:
"Several FAA air traffic control officials told us it was the air carriers’ responsibility to notify their planes of security problems. One senior FAA air traffic control manager said that it was simply not the FAA’s place to order the airlines what to tell their pilots. We believe such statements do not reflect an adequate appreciation of the FAA’s responsibility for the safety and security of civil aviation. " (page 11)
and
"Most federal agencies learned about the crash in New York from CNN." (page 35)
Symbols?
In describing Flight 93, which crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, the commission believes that the main motivation of Jarrah – the lead hijacker and pilot – "was to crash into symbols of the American Republic, the Capitol or the White House." (pg 14) Since when were those two building symbols of the American Republic? Perhaps instead, Jarrah wanted to hit at the central node of federal power. One suspects that this type of emotion saturated rhetoric will be found throughout the book.
Protect the State First, Citizens…Next
The report details the administration’s response after the attacks began:
"At 9:59, an Air Force lieutenant colonel working in the White House Military Office joined the conference and stated that he has just talked top Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. The White House requested (1) the implementation of continuity of government measures, (2) fighter escorts for Air Force One and (3) a fighter combat patrol over Washington D.C." (page 38)
Before this conference, there was a White House teleconference:
"The first topic addressed in the White House video teleconference — at about 9:40—was the physical security of the President, the White House, and federal agencies. " (page 36)
Cheney in Command?
In the section "United 93 and the Shoot down Order," the 9/11 report implicitly suggests that Vice President Cheney over-stepped his bounds, giving orders without the consent of the President. The incident revolves around a certain phone call that only some recall taking place right before the President boarded Air Force One. The president and VP contend that they spoke about further hijackings, leading to the VP requesting and receiving clearance to order fighters to shoot down planes. The commission reports that:
"Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President’s chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs.Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room." (page 41)
Perhaps without realizing it, the commission again suggested that the chain of command was disturbed on 9/11:
"In most cases, the chain of command authorizing the use of force runs from the president to the secretary of defense and from the secretary to the combatant commander." (page 43)
Maybe it was just the unbelievable stress of the day . . . or perhaps Vice President Cheney was really in command.
That Was Close
Upon completing the chapter, one gets an eerie sense that America was lucky on 9/11. Repeated instances of government incompetence coupled with the disorganization of its bureaucracy demonstrated that little could have stopped further attacks that morning. The 9/11 commission agrees:
"NORAD officials have maintained consistently that had the passengers not caused United 93 to crash, the military would have prevented it from reaching Washington D.C. That conclusion is based on a version of events that we [the commission] now know is incorrect." (page 44)
Onto chapter 2….