The second chapter of the 9/11 report chronicles the growth of modern Islamic terrorism, specifically the history of al Qaeda.
Why Do They Hate “US”?
One of the biggest disagreements between pro-war and anti-war pundits concerns the basis of the terrorists’ hatred towards America. Were those nineteen terrorists screaming “Down with freedom, capitalism and Western values!” when they crashed those planes? Or rather, did they scream “Down with American foreign policy!”? Bin Ladin admits to hating Western values, willing to kill all people associated with America. Still, where does this hatred come from. If you ask pro-war pundit Bill Kristol, he believes that it has nothing to do with foreign policy. The 9/11 report begins to address this issue in Chapter 2:
- “Many Americans have wondered, ‘Why do ‘they’ hate us?’ Some also ask, ‘What can we do to stop these attacks?’ Bin Ladin and al Qaeda have given answers to both these questions.To the first, they say that America had attacked Islam; America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. Thus Americans are blamed when Israelis fight with Palestinians, when Russians fight with Chechens, when Indians fight with Kashmiri Muslims, and when the Philippine government fights ethnic Muslims in its southern islands. America is also held responsible for the governments of Muslim countries, derided by al Qaeda as ‘your agents'” (page 51)
- “Bin Ladin’s grievance with the United States may have started in reaction to specific U.S. policies but it quickly became far deeper.” (ibid.)
Saddam and Osama: A First Look
I found four instances of the supposed “Saddam/Osama” alliance in chapter two. Each indicates that there is little evidence for such a claim, and clearly no link between Saddam and 9/11. I quote each instance here:
- In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Bin Ladin, whose efforts in Afghanistan had earned him celebrity and respect, proposed to the Saudi monarchy that he summon mujahideen for a jihad to retake Kuwait. He was rebuffed, and the Saudis joined the U.S.-led coalition. [emphasis mine]
- Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda—save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against “Crusaders” during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army.
- “With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request.”
After moving his headquarters back to Afghanistan (from Sudan), Bin Laden is thought to have “sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation.” However, [n]one are reported to have received a significant response.” (page 66)
Now we get to the final discussion of this alliance:
- “In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative.” Later in 1999, “Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative.” (ibid)
Finally, the last quote comes with a caveat: the footnote. It reads:
- “We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 contacts. They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of his original information.” (page 470).
Would any reasonable, peace-minded conclude from the above discussion that the events of 9/11 demanded quick action against Iraq?
Onto chapter 3….