Al-Sadr and the Sunnis

Moqtada Al-Sadr, no slouch at political maneuvering, appears to have preserved several options for his response to the looming elections. Anthony Shadid, in the Washington Post, on the Sadrists’ stance toward the Ayatollah Sistani:

Sadr’s men have stopped short of calling for a boycott but insist they are not supporting the election. In coded language, they have ridiculed Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the country’s most influential religious leader, whose perceived backing of the top Shiite coalition has made it the favorite in the vote. Loath to provoke the U.S. military, which killed hundreds of its followers in last year’s fighting, the Sadr movement has relegated its militia to a lower profile while keeping up its strident rhetoric.

According to Shadid, Sadr’s opposition to the occupation has not lessened. Often, al-Sadr is portrayed as a rival to Al Sistani for leadership of the Iraqi Shi`a, which is true, but is it possible that Moqtada al-Sadr is angling for the leadership of a coalition? Shadid quotes a statement by Sadr this month:

“I personally will stay away [from the elections] until the occupiers stay away from them, and until our beloved Sunnis participate in them,” the statement read. “Otherwise they will lack legitimacy and democracy.”

Hmmm. Lately, al-Hakim has been firming up his US-out-of-Iraq rhetoric, but it is widely understood that the United Iraqi Alliance (the party list al-Hakim heads) is less enthusiastic about the immediate departure of US troops than most Iraqis, correctly seeing the US as a necessary barrier to their immediate assassinations.

At this point, I think the pertinent question may be to ask what is the US response to be to an alliance of the Sadrists with the Sunni resistance when they respond to the newly elected regime’s failure to demand an immediate and complete withdrawal of US troops by overthrowing them?