Author: Mike Ewens

This chapter covers the various actors in al-Qaeda before 9/11. Much of the information, the report warns, comes from interrogations of captured terrorists. (page 146)

First, the report covers Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the “mastermind” behind the attacks on 9/11. Rather than hating America because it is capitalist democracy, KSM’s

“…animus toward the United States stemmed not from his experiences there as a student, but rather from his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.” (page 147)

This theme repeatedly pops up throughout the report. KSM intended to use terrorism to influence American foreign policy by “targeting the country’s economy.” (page 153).

Named the “planes operation,” the 9/11 plot took years of planning and training. One of the first plans, later rejected, involved the hijacking of ten planes:

KSM himself was to land the tenth plane at a U.S. airport and, after killing all adult male passengers on board and alerting the media, deliver a speech excoriating U.S. support for Israel, the Phillippines, and repressive governments of the Arab world. (page 154)

The chapter continues to detail the growth of the group of 19 hijackers. Here we are introduced to the infamous “20th hijacker”, Mohammed Atta. He ends up a part of the “Hamburg contingent,” the core of the 19 hijackers.

Financing

The esimated cost of the 9/11 attacks range from $400,000 to $500,000. This money did not come from bin Ladin’s riches:

Instead, al Qaeda reled primarily on a fund-raising network developed over time. The CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations. (page 169)

Also, state sponsors were lacking:

It does not appear that any government other than the Taliban financially supported al Qaeda before 9/11, although some governments may have contained al Qaeda sympathizers who turned a blind eye to al Qaeda’s fundraising activities. Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization.(page 171)

Finally, despite the federal government’s insistence, the drug trade does not support al Qaeda:

While the drug trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for al Qaeda, and there is no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in or made his money through drug trafficking. (page 171)

Titled "Responses to Al Qaeda’s Initial Assaults," the fourth chapter of the 9/11 report follows the government’s slow appreciation of Osama bin Ladin’s threat to America. Overall, the chapter demonstrates the internal conflicts within various government agencies on how to respond to the growing threat of terrorism. 1996 saw the first concerted effort to focus on Bin Ladin with the formation of the CIA’s "Bin Ladin Unit." It was set up "to analyze intelligence on and plan operations against Bin Ladin." (page 109). Once Bin Ladin moved back to Afghanistan the Bin Ladin unit was able to use CIA contacts [tribals] in the regions to get fairly reliable information on his location. However, action could not follow until the US charged him with a crime:

"The eventual charge, conspiring to attack U.S. defense installations, was finally issued from the grand jury in June 1998—as a sealed indictment.The indictment was publicly disclosed in November of that year." (page 110)

The first plan to capture or kill Bin Ladin was ready by early 1998:

"Tenet apparently walked National Security Advisor Sandy Berger through the basic plan on February 13. One group of tribals would subdue the guards, enter Tarnak Farms [a Bin ladin hideout] stealthily, grab Bin Ladin, take him to a desert site outside Kandahar, and turn him over to a second group.This second group of tribals would take him to a desert landing zone already tested in the 1997 Kansi capture. From there, a CIA plane would take him to New York, an Arab capital, or wherever he was to be arraigned." (page 112)

Due to a concern for civilian casualties and a belief that the capture plan was too flawed, the CIA did not go ahead with the operation. This plan was the last before the embassy bombings of 1998. In response, President Clinton ordered a Tomahawk missile strike on a suspected Bin Ladin camp. Although the missiles hit their targets, Bin Ladin escaped the attack reportedly because he was tipped off by Pakistani military intelligence. As readers may recall, these attacks occurred during the Monica Lewinsky scandal, leading some pundits to claim that the action was meant to distract the American public. The commission claims that such sentiments affected the way America approached Bin Ladin in the following years:

"The failure of the strikes, the ‘wag the dog’ slur, the intense partisanship of the period, and the nature of the al Shifa [supposed chemical plant in Sudan] evidence likely had a cumulative effect on future decisions about the use of force against Bin Ladin. Berger told us that he did not feel any sense of constraint." (page 118).

Continue reading “Notes on Chapter 4 of the 9/11 Report”

. . . are now available.

"Counterterrorism Evolves" highlights the many faults with the US law enforcement and intelligence gathering agencies prior to 9/11. One includes the structure of institutions such as the FBI:

"[P]erformance in the Bureau was generally measured against statistics such as numbers of arrests, indictments, prosecutions, and convictions. Counterterrorism and counterintelligence work, often involving lengthy intelligence investigations that might never have positive or quantifiable results, was not career-enhancing." (page 74)

Still, the FBI had plenty of power to thwart foreign terrorists:

"In 1986, Congress authorized the FBI to investigate terrorist attacks against Americans that occur outside the United States. Three years later, it added authority for the FBI to make arrests abroad without consent from the host country." (page 75)

Unfortunately, there was a definite lack of focus only a year before 9/11:

"Although the FBI’s counterterrorism budget tripled during the mid-1990s, FBI counterterrorism spending remained fairly constant between fiscal years 1998 and 2001. In 2000, there were still twice as many agents devoted to drug enforcement as to counterterrorism." (page 77)

Overall, one gets a sense that the commission still believed that the FBI and others still didn’t have enough power. Continue reading “Notes on Chapter 3 of the 9/11 Report”

The second chapter of the 9/11 report chronicles the growth of modern Islamic terrorism, specifically the history of al Qaeda.

Why Do They Hate “US”?

One of the biggest disagreements between pro-war and anti-war pundits concerns the basis of the terrorists’ hatred towards America. Were those nineteen terrorists screaming “Down with freedom, capitalism and Western values!” when they crashed those planes? Or rather, did they scream “Down with American foreign policy!”? Bin Ladin admits to hating Western values, willing to kill all people associated with America. Still, where does this hatred come from. If you ask pro-war pundit Bill Kristol, he believes that it has nothing to do with foreign policy. The 9/11 report begins to address this issue in Chapter 2:

“Many Americans have wondered, ‘Why do ‘they’ hate us?’ Some also ask, ‘What can we do to stop these attacks?’ Bin Ladin and al Qaeda have given answers to both these questions.To the first, they say that America had attacked Islam; America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. Thus Americans are blamed when Israelis fight with Palestinians, when Russians fight with Chechens, when Indians fight with Kashmiri Muslims, and when the Philippine government fights ethnic Muslims in its southern islands. America is also held responsible for the governments of Muslim countries, derided by al Qaeda as ‘your agents'” (page 51)

But here is the kicker:

“Bin Ladin’s grievance with the United States may have started in reaction to specific U.S. policies but it quickly became far deeper.” (ibid.)

Saddam and Osama: A First Look

I found four instances of the supposed “Saddam/Osama” alliance in chapter two. Each indicates that there is little evidence for such a claim, and clearly no link between Saddam and 9/11. I quote each instance here: Continue reading “Notes on Chapter 2 of the 9/11 Report”

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