Ray appeared on Tommy’s Podcast (Thomas Harrington) January 14, 2023 on Rumble.
I don’t think President Putin wants to occupy all, or even most, of Ukraine. That would be the kind of really stooooooped thing Cheney/Bush/Rumsfeld would try to do.
But, if the U.S. really wants to avoid war with Russia, it must realize that, barring the use of nuclear weapons, Russia is not only determined to prevail but has the means to prevail. What has gone on in Ukraine over the last nine years poses an existential threat to Russia. It will not tolerate an existential threat.
Similarly, the Defense Intelligence Agency should have been included, particularly since it has considerable expertise on the G.R.U., the Russian military intelligence agency, which has been blamed for Russian hacking of the DNC emails.
But DIA, too, has an independent streak and, in fact, is capable of reaching judgments Clapper would reject as anathema. Just one year before Clapper decided to do the rump “Intelligence Community Assessment,” DIA had formally blessed the following heterodox idea in its “December 2015 National Security Strategy”:
“The Kremlin is convinced the United States is laying the groundwork for regime change in Russia, a conviction further reinforced by the events in Ukraine. Moscow views the United States as the critical driver behind the crisis in Ukraine and believes that the overthrow of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych is the latest move in a long-established pattern of U.S.-orchestrated regime change efforts.”
Any further questions as to why the Defense Intelligence Agency was kept away from the ICA drafting table?
As some will remember, I have been calling attention repeatedly to Biden’s assurance to Putin one year ago today, that “Washington had no intention of deploying offensive strike weapons in Ukraine.”
What did it mean when just 13 days later – following a Biden-Putin conversation on Feb. 12, 2022 – the Kremlin (Ushakov) lamented “we have received no meaningful response on non-deployment of strike weapons systems on Ukrainian territory.” In my view, Putin saw this as further proof that Biden is not his own man, that someone had changed Biden’s mind; in other words, that Biden himself is недоговороспособный (not able, not capable of making a deal).
And so, after securing a nihil obstat from Xi Jinping, Russia invaded Ukraine 12 days after Ushakov’s lament.
Media analysis, a highly useful tool in the hands of experienced analysts (Kremlinologists and Sinologists, in particular) has fallen into disuse. One major exception is Alexander Mercouris. So, before submitting my draft to antiwar.com yesterday, I asked Alexander if he saw things the way I saw them on this important question. I had to go ahead and file my story before he could respond. I was happy to receive these comments from him this morning. I share them with his permission.
Following is text of Dec. 30 email from Alexander Mercouris:
I don’t think you are making too much of this.
I was following the news very closely at the time of this call [the Putin-Biden call of Dec. 30] and I remember that the Russians came away from it guardedly but decidedly more optimistic than when they went in. They definitely came out of it believing that progress was being made.
Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, a publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the Saviour in inner-city Washington. His 27-year career as a CIA analyst includes serving as Chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch and preparer/briefer of the President’s Daily Brief. He is co-founder of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).
One has to put some context around the appearance of Saint Volodymyr Zelensky Wednesday evening before the U.S. Congress. Those with a modicum of accurate background information could smell a rat behind all the hugs, kisses, and stormy applause. The real record renders the smell a stench. Alas, neither the accurate record nor the stench can find its way into the corporate media.
Here’s the thing – in the words of humorist Will Rogers: “The problem ain’t what people know. It’s what people know that ain’t so; that’s the problem.”
A Help Desk
One can expect serious writers like Joe Lauria of Consortium News to post some thoughts apres-St. Zelensky-tour-de-force, in due course. But everyone is entitled to some time off for Christmas and something needs to be said – like now.
Happily, much has already been written and spoken that exposes the dominant (propaganda) narrative for what it is – drivel. For example, readers can find much helpful sustenance in an extremely detailed piece Lauria wrote on July 2, 2022 about what actually happened in Ukraine over the past several years.
Joe’s piece came in response to spurious charges by a Orwellian ‘rating’ group, led by the usual suspects, called “NewsGuard”. Consider Lauria’s piece required reading; you may find it on the final exam.
For those who prefer video, I gave a kind of kind of tutorial on July 7, 2022, with emphasis on how Russia views the stakes in Ukraine: “Ukraine: A Taste of The Truth”.
I have also done several other videos on the general subject. (See: YouTube or raymcgovern.com.)
Not-So-Much Journalists
Reading the two articles below confirms the truth of Will Rogers’s adage – in present circumstances a dangerous one – that THE problem is “what people know that ain’t so”. You may wish to tell your friends to read/watch Lauria and me (above), as a sort of inoculation against the rubbish below:
Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, a publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the Saviour in inner-city Washington. His 27-year career as a CIA analyst includes serving as Chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch and preparer/briefer of the President’s Daily Brief. He is co-founder of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).
What follows is from Dutch investigative journalist Eric van de Beek, who has covered Dutch involvement in the MH17 coverup like a junkyard dog – in the tradition of the late Robert Parry. Bob also wrote extensively about the MH17 charade on Consortium News, the website he founded. Here are van de Beek’s remarks; they are well worth adding to the information he provided yesterday:
Most Dutch people have been led to believe that the original U.S satellite imagery had been available to the prosecutor and court before last week’s court proceeding that ended up imposing life sentences (in absentia) on two Russians and one pro-Russian Ukrainian. In reality, the satellite imagery had not been made available, as anyone who listened carefully to what was said in court should have known.
The lawyers for Pulatov (who was not convicted) talked about the imagery in extenso on June 22, 2020. The true story about the satellite imagery is that someone from the Dutch Military Intelligence Service (MIVD) received a classified report from the DNI (U.S. Director of National Intelligence) about what the satellite imagery showed, not the imagery itself. This was reported to the Prosecution Service and was included in the case file. In sum, neither the Prosecution nor the court received the actual satellite imagery from the U.S.
It gets worse. The intercepts from Ukrainian intelligence weren’t “meticulously vetted and assessed untampered with” as claimed. Just the opposite.
The Prosecution refused to answer the question of Pulatov’s lawyers regarding whether the audio files were authentic. On November 1, 2021 the court made known that the Prosecution had never ordered any technical research on the files. I was flabbergasted when I heard this, but the Dutch media kept silent.
The reason given was that the Dutch Nation Forensic Institute was not able to perform this kind of technical research. They claimed they had no certified specialist in the house! Also on November 1, 2021, the court made known that they had asked the National Forensic Institute of Lithuania to assess 14 Pulatov intercepts. That Institute found these were not the original audio files! Moreover, no one checked on voice cloning; lack of the tools to do so was the explanation given.
The Prosecution presented three photographs and six videos of a Buk Telar, which is a transporter-erector-launcher-and-radar for the Buk missile.) It claimed that all imagery was taken in rebel-held territory on 17 July. The Telar was identified by a Dutch police officer as a Russian Telar.
There are many issues with these photos and videos. (It is not without reason that I dedicated a full chapter to this in my book.) None of this imagery was published before the shoot-down, and in almost all cases the photographers are unknown. The Joint Investigation Team seems to have received only two files physically, on two Secure Digital cards. The others were downloads from social media or file transfer services.
Even the files on the SD cards, which include a dashcam video, have serious issues. For example, the dashcam video contains a 2012 timestamp. According to the person who filmed from his car this was due to a malfunctioning battery. Police officers of the JIT then asked him if he remembered when he shot the video. He said this must have been somewhere in July, a few days before he heard about the crash. Despite that testimony, the Prosecution claimed the video was shot on 17 July 2014, the day of the shoot-down.
