Another new Wikileaks cable on Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki provides some insight into U.S. intentions in one of its newest client states. The diplomat writing the cables is Ryan Crocker, just recently appointed Ambassador to Afghanistan. He talks about Maliki’s turn towards authoritarianism and how his tactics and behavior have served to benefit U.S. interests there on the whole.
A key question posed by Maliki's evolving hold on levers of political and security power is whether the PM is becoming a non-democratic dictator bent on subordinating all authority to his hand or whether Maliki is attempting to rebalance political and security authority back to the center after five-plus years of intended and unintended dispersal to (and in some cases seizure by) actors and power structures outside Baghdad.[...] First seen as weak, ineffective, and ill-informed about the political and security structures put in place since Saddam's fall (Maliki was not a participant in the governing bodies set up during the CPA), Prime Minister Maliki was by the fall of 2008 being widely criticized - by leaders of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and other Sunni politicians, by the Kurdish political leadership, and by fellow Shi'a from outside Maliki's Da'wa Party -- as autocratic and excessively ambitious, with the long-term aim of becoming a new strong man dictator. The "political reform resolution," passed by parliament in conjunction with its approval of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement on November 27, 2008 (reftel), amounted to a manifesto of grievances against the Prime Minister that had been growing among his coalition partners, and the opposition, throughout the year. The document urged the Maliki Government to adhere to the Constitution, to commit to a democratic federal system, to share power with the legislature, to professionalize and depoliticize the security forces, to guarantee a free judiciary, disband "unconstitutional structures" within the government, and release prisoners eligible for amnesty or held without due process, among other demands.
Details are given about Maliki’s incessant corruption, nepotism, and over-reliance on security forces to get his way. And what does the U.S. think of this turn to centralized authority and strong-arm security tactics? It’s in the U.S. interest.
The critical progress on security and stability made over the past year, while underpinned by the U.S. military surge, owes much to Maliki's leadership and restoration of central government authority. It is in the interests of the U.S. to see that process of strengthened central authority continue...
There is a caveat thrown in there about doing this in a more “sustainable” way that reflects strong “institutions rather than personalities” and a “consensus national vision” among Iraq’s main groups. That is, so long as the main groups don’t interfere with our interests in Iraq. For example, to act as a check on Iran, to give primacy to American business, not interfering with U.S. military occupation and operations, and ignoring any part of Iraqi public opinion that contradicts U.S. imperial dictates.