One
of the main contentions regarding Javier Solana Madariaga's past
is his presumed anti-NATO stance during the 1980s. Although this
volte-face from alleged peace activist to born-again militarist
has been debated many times before, I think it is necessary to
put it into historical context.
In
June 1980 U.S. President Jimmy Carter affirmed his administration's
conviction that Spanish membership in NATO would significantly
enhance the Organization's defensive capability. During the Cold
War, the importance of Spain for NATO was clear due to its great
geo-strategic importance, particularly its possession of the Canary
Islands in the Atlantic Ocean, of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan
coast, next to the straight of Gibraltar, and of the Balearic
Islands in the Mediterranean Sea. It meant that Spain controlled
a vital maritime route. Moreover, it had first-class facilities
for air-force operations, like Morón de la Frontera, an American
base in Andalusia that had been operative since 1953, following
an agreement between President Eisenhower and Generalísimo Franco.
However,
at that time the by then Spanish Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez,
was not being very "cooperative". Though coming from
a conservative party, the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD),
he was conducting himself as an individual too independent in
his views, making contacts with Castro, Qadhafi, Arafat and other
pariah leaders. Of course, something needed to be done: The Pentagon's
impatience with such disobedience soon resulted in its rattling
its sabers... In just two months, Suarez was the victim of a smear
campaign from inside his own party, leading him to resign shortly
thereafter. The objective of the White House was to integrate
Spain into its military engines, even at the cost of seriously
damaging (or even aborting) the constitutional process in the
course of performing this integration. In February 1981, an attempted
coup d'etat occurred: The US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig,
affirmed publicly that "it was an internal affair only of
concern to Spain," despite the publicly known active participation
of agents from the US Embassy in the preparations of the military
pronunciamiento.
Solana's
Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) had already shown itself as very
useful for the US Secretary of State's purposes, having promoted
a vote of no confidence in the parliament against PM Suárez. The
new UCD designated Prime Minister, the greatly unpopular Calvo
Sotelo, pushed the incorporation of Spain into the Atlantic Alliance
in the autumn of 1981. Of course, it was still not the ideal situation
for the Pentagon. Javier Solana, an old Fullbrighter, accused
of being a CIA man inside the PSOE structure (see the book. 'Soberanos
e Intervenidos, Estrategias globales, americanos y españoles,'
by Jaon Garces), was the person who made the official presentation
of Felipe González (PSOE's Secretary General) to the US Embassy
in Madrid.
Washington
was very much interested in controlling the Spanish political
scene, as it had done through the efforts of US Ambassador Frank
Carlucci shortly before in Portugal to "manage" the
revolution of 25 April there, isolating people like Saraiva de
Carvalho and, mainly, Vasco Goncalves, and offering in exchange
blind support for "moderate democrats" like Costa Gomes.
What
the Spanish Socialist Party received as payment was indirect financing
for the next round of general elections, via the omnipresent AFL-CIO
trade union federation, whose foreign activities peculiarly always
coincided with the State Department's and the CIA's interests.
Anyway,
if the Socialists wanted to win the elections they needed to play
the NATO card very wisely. Most of the Spanish people were fiercely
anti-NATO and any different position would alienate the leftist
voters. (The Communist Party, PCE, had been the only real political
underground opposition during Franco's dictatorship). The views
of the PSOE on that matter were always far from being clear. Even
their slogan for the 1982 campaign had a strange double meaning:
"OTAN, de entrada no" that could be understood as "NATO.
No incorporation" or "NATO, at first no; but later..."
The
Socialists also promised a referendum so that Spaniards could
decide whether they wanted their country to remain inside NATO
or not. After winning the elections in October 1982, the Socialists
changed their position and the new government of Felipe González
quickly adopted a pro-NATO stance. Three months later they signed
an agreement for the renewal of the US military bases in Spain.
With each succeeding day, they were making clear their NATOist
position: "The permanence in the alliance is a vital step towards
the consolidation of democracy"; "If Spain wishes to join the
EEC, then it has to be part of the defense system of the West";
"NATO membership, and joining the European Community, mean the
end of the traditional isolation of Spain."
The
country which Felipe González offered as an example of democracy
for Spain to emulate was...Turkey.
González
even threatened pensioners, telling them that an eventual exit
from the Alliance would mean "the end of the Welfare State." Anyway,
the Spanish people did not want to swallow that so easily. In
1986, two million Spaniards signed a petition for a referendum
on continued membership in the Alliance.
The
referendum was held in March of 1986: The Socialist government
campaigned in favor of NATO, the Communist Party and many other
groups on the left campaigned against it, and the Popular Party
(pro-NATO) adopted a contradictory position and asked its voters
to abstain. Of course Solana, González and their acolytes were
not going to give the electorate a simple choice to make. That
would be too easy and very dangerous if they happened to choose
"the wrong one." They rephrased the question to be asked in the
following way: Do you consider it advisable for Spain to remain
in the Atlantic Alliance, provided that:
1)
Spain will not be incorporated into NATO's integrated military
structure?
2)
Spain would be a nuclear-free country?
3)
American presence on Spanish territory would be considerably reduced?
Results: Yes: 52.5%; No: 39.8%; Abstention: 40% of the electorate.
Solana and Co. had found a way to divide the strong anti-NATO
feeling among the country's majority. Many people believed in
their words again when they promised that "Spain will never
join the Common Command," keeping outside the military structure;
they also believed that any status changes would require further
referenda before being approved. At the same time, the United
States looked aside while the Spanish Government profited from
a $280 million re-sale of American arms to Iran.
Spanish
duties inside NATO would be restricted to:
1.
Defense of the national territory.
2.
Naval and aerial operations in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean.
3.
Control over the Strait of Gibraltar and its access points.
4.
Naval and aerial operations in the Western Mediterranean Sea.
5.
Control and defense of the air space of Spain and adjacent areas.
6.
Use of the national territory as a retreat or multifunctional
platform (traffic, support and logistics).
According
to the above points, any Spanish collaboration in a future NATO
aggression against Yugoslavia would be illegal. However, on November
14, 1996, during the last Socialist term, one year after Solana became NATO Criminal-in-Chief
(sorry, I mean NATO Secretary General), they rushed a law
into the Parliament to "authorize the government to negotiate
the terms for the incorporation into the new NATO Joint Military
Command," clearly breaking the previous referendum's commitments.
Javier Solana welcomed this change with the words "It is
time for Spain to assume the role it should have inside the Alliance."
In regard to his old "anti-NATO" positions, he told
the Spanish language paper 'El Nuevo Herald' of Florida that,
"he the same as Clinton or even the CIA director, James
Woolsey, himself is a pacifist who knew how to evolve with the
new times," and (in another interview given to 'El País'
) that "he was proud to represent an Alliance dissociated
from its Cold War origins".
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